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I.—THE DOCTRINE OF SCRIPTURE AS TO THE RELATION OF  
BAPTISM AND THE REMISSION OF SINS.

THAT Christian baptism stands in some relation to the remission of sins is undisputed. To deny this were to deny the express declarations of Holy Writ. So long as it is said, "John came preaching the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins," (Mark i, 4;) "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved," (Mark xvi, 16;) "Repent and be baptized every one of you for the remission of sins," (Acts ii, 38,) etc., no one can deny that, whatever particular theologies may teach, the Scriptures do undeniably declare that some relation has been divinely established between baptism and the remission of sins. We shall, in this article, take this as conceded.

Again, we shall assume that Christian baptism is a positive institution, deriving its authority solely from the command of Christ, and that the remission of sins is a free and sovereign act of divine grace, bestowed according to God's own good pleasure, and, of course, through channels and upon conditions of his own choice and prescription. If baptism is to be respected at all, it is simply and only because the Savior has ordained it; and if remission of sins is to be received at all, it is simply and only because it pleaseth the Father to grant it; and if there be any definite and determinate way in which it is granted, or formal conditions preliminary to conferring it, it is simply and solely because the Great Head of the Church has so prescribed and established. The reason for selecting and ordaining

baptism is *God's* reason, not *man's*; and the connection between it and the remission of sins is of *His* appointment, not *man's*. We, therefore, can not change or modify the one or the other. We are not at liberty to search out *fanciful* reasons for baptism, and make these the basis of our treatment of this positive institution of the Christian economy; neither can we philosophize about the connection between baptism and the remission of sins so as to make void the plain and explicit declarations of the Word of God about it.

The relation between the two being conceded, and the obligation to accept this relation, as it is stated in the declarations of the Inspired Word about it, being also granted, we are left to the simple inquiry, What is the relation which the Savior has established between baptism and the remission of sins as declared by his own Word?

This question can be rightly answered only by determining accurately the meaning of those passages of Scripture in which this relation is affirmed to exist. The meaning of these passages must be ascertained before we can understand the doctrine of Scripture on this subject. Happily they are few, and the importance of the subject will justify us in a careful examination of them all. And since the question is one of *relation*, and this is expressed by a *preposition*, our inquiry will be still further narrowed in its scope: it will be confined primarily to the determination of the meaning of a *preposition*, the little Greek word *eis*. That the question in its most elementary form is only this, will be evident on the simple inspection of the passages to be examined: "The baptism of repentance *unto* (eis) the remission of sins." "Repent and be baptized . . . *for* (eis) the remission of sins." In both these passages the relation between baptism and the remission of sins is expressed in the Greek by the same preposition, (*eis*), and when we have determined what this little word means, we have determined what this relation is. Let this, then, be our first inquiry.

Our best Greek critics say that "the proper meaning of *eis* (*eis*) is 'within,' 'in,' with the idea of the being within a space having boundaries. It is opposed to *ek*, (*ēx*), *ex*, (*ēx*), 'out,' 'without.'" This is its *proper* meaning, but when it is used with its case, (the accusative,) or to qualify verbs of action, this meaning is variously modified, so that other seemingly derivative meanings are properly assigned to it. We find these various meanings of *eis* nowhere more fully

and accurately given than in the following table from the thorough and exhaustive work of Dr. Harrison on "Greek Prepositions and Cases of Nouns," p. 226:

Signification of <i>eis</i> .	Accusat. a. "Up to," "As far as."	b. "As to," "as regards."
"In," "within."	a. "Up to," "as far as." b. "Until," "against," (of time, etc.) c. "By—," (distribution.)	a. "Into," "to," (within.) b. "To," (pregnant construction.) c. "Among." d. "Against," (hostility.) e. "As regards," "in the case of," "touching," "on." f. "For," (object, purpose.) g. "To," "so as to," (result.)

This table is exhaustive. We presume no scholar will deny this. It is strictly *critical*, and free from the vagueness often introduced into popular lexicons. It shows that the *proper* meaning of *eis* is "in," "within." That the *accusative case*, with which alone it is used, primarily marks the object reached by an action or motion, answering to the English phrases "up to," "as far as," and that, secondarily, it (the accusative) denotes (a) the measure and extent of an action or motion, and (b) the limits within which any expression is to be understood as confined, answering to the English phrases "as to," "as regards," (*Har.*, p. 140,) and that the two, (the proposition *eis* and the *accusative case*), in connection, give the seemingly derivative meanings of "for," "against," "until," "up to," "as regards," etc., as detailed in the subordinate divisions of the table.

Now, with these simple and undeniable principles of criticism any man of common sense, even though he know nothing about Greek, can easily determine for himself what must be the sense of *eis*, as used in the passages before us, to express the relation between *baptism* and the *remission of sins*. Let us take the first clause of Peter's response to the inquiring Pentecostians, "Repent and be baptized," and apply to it these several meanings of *eis*, and see which alone will give any intelligible sense to the command: *Repent and be baptized* "up to," "as far as" *the remission of sins*: *Repent and be baptized* "until," "against," (of time, etc.), *the remission of sins*: *Repent and be baptized* "by—" (distribution\*) *the remission of sins*:

\* Equivalent to the English expression "by files," "by fifties," and such like.

*Repent and be baptized "into," "to," (within,) the remission of sins: Repent and be baptized "to" (pregnant construction\*) the remission of sins: Repent and be baptized "among" the remission of sins: Repent and be baptized "against" (hostility) the remission of sins: Repent and be baptized "as regards," "in the case of," "touching," "on," † the remission of sins: Repent and be baptized "for" (object or purpose) the remission of sins: Repent and be baptized "to," "so as to" (result) the remission of sins.* These are all the possible meanings of Peter's command, so far as the relation between baptism and the remission of sins is concerned, and what can any man make of it but that the *terminus ad quem*, the end of the baptism, the object in view, the purpose for which it was received, the thing with regard to which it was required, was the remission of sins?

While *eis* may be translated by so many different words and phrases, it never loses its proper meaning of "in," "within." This is its force every-where, namely: *that the subject (that is, the true logical subject) between which and something else this preposition is used to express a relation comes or is brought to be "in," "within," that something else.* Dr. Harrison says: "When *eis* is added to the action or motion of the verb, or to any substantive idea that may imply these, and regard is had to the accusative case following, there arises from the conjunction of the preposition, with its sense of 'in,' 'within,' of the action or motion of the verb with its now defined direction, and of the accusative case, with its power of marking the limits within which the action or motion is confined the sense of 'into,' and the effect is to represent the subject of the action or motion as brought within the *circumscribed space, class, or category, state, or circumstances named by the noun in the accusative*"—(p. 221). This statement describes precisely the circumstances which are found in the passages which we have under discussion. Let us

\*By this is meant cases in which the verb of action, used with *eis*, besides its proper meaning, involves also another consequent action; as, for example, when Xenophon says, "This city the inhabitants abandoned into a strong fortress upon the mountains," the word *abandoned* has a pregnant sense, involving, besides the idea of "forsaking" the town, that also of "fleeing" to the mountains, so that it is equivalent to saying, "This city the inhabitants abandoned [and fled] into the mountains." (See Har., p. 211.)

†The cases in which *eis* means *or* are such as, "Who is going to expend his own substance 'on' you," etc., equal to "with regard to you" as the object of the spending, so that if we adopt this meaning in our passage, it will mean, "Repent and be baptized with regard to the remission of sins," having that in view as the object of baptism.



apply it to them. We begin with Mark's statement about John, that "he came preaching the baptism of repentance *eis* the remission of sins." Here the phrase, "baptism of repentance," is described by *eis* as having a relative direction of "in," "within," a *terminus ad quem*; the accusative case—"remission of sins"—denotes the object with regard to which it has this relative direction, and the effect is to represent the person who is the subject of the baptism as brought "into," or within the state or circumstances described by "remission of sins."

The passage in Acts ii, 38, requires the same explanation. The command of Peter, "Repent and be baptized," is made by *eis* to point in a *certain direction*; not "around," "above," or "beneath," but "in," "within;" and the circumscribed limits of this direction are defined by the accusative to be *the remission of sins*. The baptism looks to this, and nothing else, and the effect is to represent the subject of baptism as brought into or within the condition described by the logical *accusative*—"the remission of sins."

It is not necessary to say that the preposition *eis* properly, and of itself, expresses *purpose* or *design*; it is not, in fact, strictly true to say so; but where the action is that of a rational agent, or is the command of an intelligent authority, purpose or design is implied in this, and then the preposition expresses the direction of the purpose or design, the end to which the rational action looks, and this end is definitely determined and limited by the following accusative. Nothing in language can be more perspicuous and sharply defined than the relation expressed by *eis* with its *case*, yet it is often perverted into strange uses, and treated as if it could express relations the most opposite conceivable.

To avoid this obvious force of the preposition *eis*, and to sustain a theory which would make baptism not an antecedent, but a consequent of the remission of sins, other passages of Scripture have been appealed to in order to show that it must, at least, in them, mean something quite different. It is necessary, therefore, in order to defend our criticism against superficial objection, to notice some of the strongest cases that have been, or that can be, appealed to. It is said in Matt. iii, 11, "I indeed baptize you with water *unto* (eis) repentance." Here it is claimed that *eis* can not point to purpose or design, for John did not baptize to make penitents, but

baptized such as were penitents. But this reverses the first canon of interpretation, and instead of ascertaining the meaning of the *passage* by the *words*, interprets the words by an assumed meaning put upon the *passage*. It says the passage means *so* and *so*, and then forces the preposition *eis* out of its plain and uniformly-established meaning, to make it agree with a pre-established interpretation of the passage. But what is the true analysis of this Scripture? Is it not this? Baptize is a verb of action. It is followed by the preposition *eis*, with the accusative case. The established *proper* meaning of this preposition in such a connection is to indicate the *terminus ad quem*, that with a "view to which" the thing is done or commanded. This is, in such a case, its plain and acknowledged signification by the consent of all lexicographers and grammarians whose authority is worth quoting. It has been established by an exhaustive induction, and there can be found no respectable dissent. What, then, is the special *terminus ad quem*, or *end*, to which baptism here looks? Evidently "repentance" (*μετάνοιαν*). The conclusion is inevitable. The passage means, "I indeed baptize you *unto*," or, "with a view" to repentance; that is, the persons baptized are brought into a state engaging to a life of repentance. To say that John baptized those who came to him *because* they had repented, is to confound the preposition *eis* with *dia*. If the Evangelist had wished to say that their repentance was the "ground," or "reason," of his baptizing them, he would have used *dia metanoian* (*δια μετάνοιαν*), on account of repentance, and not, as he does, *eis metanoian* (*εις μετάνοιαν*), *with a view to repentance*. He could have said *dia*, to mark the "ground" or "reason" of his action, as easily as he did say *eis*, to mark the "end" or "object" of his action.

It may be true, and from the manner in which he reproved the Pharisees and Sadducees, who came to his baptism, it is probable that John did, in some suspicious cases, require some *evidence* of penitence previous to baptism; but, as a general rule, he could have known nothing more than that the parties were willing to be baptized as a solemn engagement to a life of penitence in preparation for the kingdom which he taught them was at hand. The great multitudes whom he immersed made it impossible for him to require any special *proofs* of sincere repentance in every case. If his baptism had been (*dia*) because of repentance already experienced, then he should have

required a special experience in every case before baptizing any one. On the contrary, when all Jerusalem and Judea went out to his baptism, he required only a confession of their sins, and this, most likely, only implicitly, or as it was involved in their demand for baptism.

But of all this, the passage before us affirms nothing. It tells us that John baptized them *eis* "with a view to" repentance—and this is intelligible. It is the correct rendering of the words, and there is an evident meaning in them which is consistent also with the general scope and significance of other Scriptures, especially with the varied form of expression which is found in Mark i, 4, Luke iii, 3, and Acts xix, 4. Mark, Luke, and Paul all use this expression, "Baptism of repentance," in the same sense. Perhaps we can not better express the final conclusion of the highest criticism on these passages than by quoting the precise and accurate words of Dr. W. Lindsay Alexander, Professor of Theology to the Congregational Churches of Scotland, and Examiner in Philosophy to the University of St. Andrews; also editor of the last edition of Kitto's "Cyclopedia of Religious Literature." He says: "Instead of a preposition the genitive of object is sometimes used, as 'the baptism of repentance' (*Βαπτισμα μετανοίας*), (Luke iii, 3, *et al.*), as equal to baptism *into* or *for* repentance; that is, the baptism which has repentance (*μετανοία*) as its end and purpose." (*Kitto, Art. Baptism.*)

Another passage of Scripture appealed to in proof that *eis* is sometimes used to express "the ground," "reason," or occasion of an action is Matt. xii, 41, where Jesus says of the Ninevites that "they repented at (*eis*) the preaching of Jonah." Here it is argued the meaning is that their repenting is—as it were—put within the limits of the preaching of Jonah, especially referring to that, in the more precise sense that they repented with reference to his preaching as the occasion, very well expressed in English by "at," that it is almost impossible to suppose that some persons repented in order that another man might preach. This sense of *eis*, it is claimed, is *absolutely necessary*. But here again we have an assumed *necessity* pleaded as a justification of a meaning of *eis*, which, we contend, confounds it with *dia*, and which, according to highest authority, it never has. It requires us to understand that *the preaching of Jonah was the "ground," or "occasion," of the repentance of the Ninevites*, or, more properly, that through which as a "means," agency, or sec-

ondary cause, they were induced to repent, not, indeed, because *eis* properly means "ground of," or "occasion," still less "by means of," by the "agency of," in the sense of intermediate cause, but "because of the necessity of the case." But if it can be shown that there is no such *necessity*, but that the passage gives good sense when *eis* is made to retain its proper signification, then the reasoning fails, and the rendering should be abandoned. Let us take the passage, term by term, and apply to it the acknowledged grammatical principle under which it comes. In the sentence—"they repented"—the repenting is described by *eis* as having a relative position, or direction; or, let us say, as it is a mental act, *tendency* of "in," "within" the accusative case, expressed by the phrase "the preaching of Jonah." The "preaching of Jonah" denotes the object "with regard" to which it has this relative tendency, and the effect is to represent the Ninevites, who are the subject of the repentings, as brought "into," or "within" the conditions or circumstances required or described in the preaching of Jonah. Thus by a strict application of a plain principle of grammar, we reach this interpretation of this passage, namely: That the Ninevites, through their repentance, were brought within the conditions or requirements of Jonah's preaching. Jonah's preaching required certain things, and, with a view to these, they repented. This interpretation not only gives good sense, but it preserves the universal sense of *eis*, and makes the preaching of Jonah the *terminus ad quem*, with a view to which the Ninevites repented. They did not, it is true, do the ridiculous thing of repenting in order that Jonah might preach, but they did repent, not that their *repentance* might be brought "within" the preaching, but that *they themselves* might be brought within its terms and conditions, and thus escape the wrath which he denounced against them.

Taking, as we do, the broad negative position that "*eis*" is *never used to express the antecedent ground, or occasion*, either as "the reason of," or "the means of" an action, it is proper to explain that there are some examples, both in the Scriptures and in the classics, which are apparent exceptions, not because of any grammatical law, but from the peculiar nature of the example. The peculiarity consists in this: The preaching—as in the case we have just considered—may be contemplated in two aspects. *First*, as furnishing the "ground," "reason," or "occasion" of the repenting, or, that by

"means of," or by "the agency of" which it is induced; and, *second*, as presenting the circumstances or conditions to which the repentance looks or tends, and into which it brings the penitent. Now, when the example presents this peculiarity, how does the critical translator determine in which of these two senses the preaching is contemplated? Clearly, only by *the preposition and case which are used*. If *dia*, with the *genitive*, is used, then the meaning is that the Ninevites were induced to repent by the preaching of Jonah, specifically by means of it, as the "occasion," or secondary cause. If *dia*, with the accusative, is used, then the meaning is "materially the same, only it is reached in a different way." (*Har.*, p. 208.) But if *eis*, with its case, is used, then the meaning is that already stated as contemplated in the *second* aspect of the case.

That *dia*, and not *eis*, would have been used in connection with "the preaching of Jonah," if it had been the intention of the Savior to convey the idea that the preaching was the antecedent "ground" of the repenting, or the means by which it was induced, is plainly shown by several parallel examples which we take from the Scriptures. In 2 Corinthians viii, 8, it is said, "I speak not by commandment, but *by occasion (dia)* of the forwardness of others." Again, 1 Corinthians i, 21, "It pleased God *by (dia)* the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe." Here the foolishness of preaching is the *secondary cause*, or *occasion*, and in both of these examples *dia*, with the genitive, is used. Had our Savior intended to say that the preaching of Jonah was the "occasion" of the Ninevites' repenting, would he not have used "*dia* the preaching" in the genitive? But Romans iii, 25, furnishes us with a still clearer illustration of the difference between *dia* and *eis*: "Whom God set forth as a propitiation *through (dia)*, with the genitive) faith in his blood, for (*eis*) the exhibition of his righteousness, because of (*dia*, with the accusative) remission of sins before committed," etc. Here we have both prepositions in the same verse, the one (*dia*) to express the relation of "intermediate cause," or "the reason," the other (*eis*) "with a view to," or the *terminus ad quem*. Can criticism demand or affirm any thing clearer or more conclusive than this? When the *end in view*, the *terminus ad quem*, which is the exhibition of his righteousness, is intended, it is introduced by *eis*; but when it is intended to state the "ground" or "reason" of this, which is "the remission of sins before com-

mitted," then *dia*, with the accusative, is used. Paul means to say that the fact that God had remitted sins before the sacrifice of Christ was made was a cause or reason for his setting him forth as a propitiation to *the end*, or with the view (*eis*) that his righteousness might be made manifest. Because (*dia*) God had remitted sins before the sacrifice of Christ was made, therefore, *with a view to* (*eis*) the manifestation of his righteousness, he set forth Christ as a propitiation, etc.

Another passage in which it is thought *eis* is used to express the occasion, ground, or reason of the action in the verb with which it is connected is found in Acts xxv, 20, where it is said, "And I, Festus, being perplexed *in regard to* (*eis*) the dispute about those things," etc. But there is no "necessity" for forcing *eis* to mean "ground" or "reason" in this case. It is true, Festus might have said he was perplexed or troubled because the dispute or discussion had occurred, but in this case he could have used *dia*, and the declaration would have been creditable to him; but he did not say this, nor can we suppose he felt it. The thing that troubled him was the fact that he had to investigate it; it was something that lay before him in the future that troubled him. It is a common style of speaking for a judge, when he has a difficult case to decide, to say he is perplexed, not because the case has arisen, but with a view to the duty and responsibility laid upon him to decide it. Relieve him of this future difficulty and responsibility, and his perplexity is at once ended. A man is often perplexed to-day in anticipation of the duties and obligations of to-morrow. Those duties have had a cause in the past, true; but it is not that to which the perplexity looks; its *terminus ad quem* is the obligation, the difficulty and harassing duty of the future. It was because this was the trouble with Festus that he was anxious to have Paul "go up to Jerusalem, and there be judged of these matters." He cared nothing about the matter, save as he was perplexingly brought into it by his duty as a judge, and because he wished to say this definitely he used *eis*. Dr. Lechler (in Lange's great work) translates this passage, "But as I was at a loss as to this investigation," thus giving to *eis* its precise force, and showing that Festus was troubled *with a view to* the difficult question which lay before him for decision.

Several examples have been culled from the fields of classic



Greek, but they are all easily dealt with by the principles of criticism which we have applied to the examples cited from the Scriptures. We need not weary the reader with repeated analyses where the principle is so easy of application, but before we proceed to another line of argument let us recall what has already been done.

We have given a full tabular view of all the meanings of *eis*, but it has not been our purpose to give illustrative examples of each. We have been particularly concerned, *first*, to ascertain its meaning in those passages in which it is used in the Scriptures to express the relation between baptism and the remission of sins. In discussing these we laid down this affirmative proposition in the identical words of Dr. Harrison:\* "When *eis* is added to the action or motion of the verb, or to any substantive idea that may imply these, and regard is had to the accusative case following, there arises from the conjunction of the preposition with its sense of 'in' or 'within,' of the action or motion of the verb with its now defined direction, and of the accusative case, with its power of marking the limits within which the action or motion is confined, the sense of 'into,' and the effect is to represent the subject of the action or motion as brought within the circumscribed space, class or category, state or circumstances named by the noun in the accusative." This we adopt as the *regulative principle* for interpreting all cases that come under its description, and claim that the passages in the Scriptures in which *eis* is used to express the relation between baptism and the remission of sins *are all precisely such cases*. This position, we believe, can not be fairly and successfully assailed.

In the *second* place we advanced the negative position, which we now explicitly state thus: "*Eis* never looks backward to point out the 'ground,' 'reason,' or 'antecedent motive' of the action expressed by the verb in connection with it, but always forward." The special intention of this negative position is to meet the erroneous interpretation of the phrase "baptism for the remission of sins," by which it is made to mean "baptism *because* sins have been remitted;" that is to say, that the force of *eis* is to indicate that the ground or antecedent motive of the action is the fact that sins had been

\* We quote Dr. H. because we regard his work on Greek prepositions as, beyond all comparison, the fullest and most exhaustive discussion of these important little words ever given to the English reader.



remitted. We believe that no exception to this universal negative can be found, and have shown, in those which have been adduced, that the interpretation put upon them is erroneous, and confounds *eis* with *dia* in a way utterly unwarranted by accurate criticism. But let it be distinctly observed that, even could an example be found contradictory of this universal negative, it would not invalidate our universal affirmative unless it could be shown that it is also a direct contradictory to it.

We think it evident that the attempt to give to *eis*, in this connection, a meaning which does not legitimately belong to it, is the result of *opinion* rather than of sound *criticism*. A theological notion is substituted for the plain language of Scripture, and the passage is made to yield a meaning in harmony with the former instead of with the critical interpretation of the latter. The method is false, and the conclusion reached is, in some instances, absurd. For example, when it is said, "John came preaching the baptism of repentance for (*eis*) the remission of sins," if we make *eis* mean "the ground" or "reason," then the interpretation must be that John preached the baptism of repentance because sins had been forgiven! And again, when it is said, "Repent and be baptized every one of you for (*eis*) the remission of sins," the meaning must be that they were to repent because their sins had been forgiven! But this is absurd, and an absurdity logically drawn from given premises is a demonstration that at least one of the premises is false.

This method of making our views of the general teaching of the Bible a criterion for determining the meaning of Greek words, makes an open door for the wildest license in interpreting the Word of God. It is an inflexible canon of interpretation, that admits of no exceptions, that "*nothing shall be elicited from the text but what is yielded by the fair grammatical explanation of the language.*" "We must not," says Luther, "make God's Word what we wish; we must not bend *it*, but allow it to bend us, and give it the honor of being better than we could make it; so that we must let it stand." Ernesti says: "The system of deducing the sense of words from the matter is altogether fallacious; matter ought rather to be deduced from the words, and from their sense rightfully investigated." Melancthon says: "Scripture can not be understood theologically unless it be understood, first, grammatically." Again Luther says: "The

knowledge of the sense can be derived from nothing but the knowledge of the words."

"Opinion, or the analogy of the doctrine, as it is called," says Ernesti, "can be applied to interpretation only thus far, that in words which are ambiguous, either from the variety of significations, or from the structure, or from some other cause, it may lead us to the choice of a signification. But even then we must be careful that the opinions which we use for determining the sense be drawn from plain, perspicuous, and well-known words in other passages, and that they do not oppose the words whose sense we are investigating. Where this caution is not used, and where opinion and analogy are alone used, without any attention to grammatical principles, nothing more is effected than that a sense is determined which, though it may not be absurd in itself, does not exist in the words, and was not in the mind of the author." Bretschneider lays down these principles: "1. That neither Theology nor Philosophy ought to exercise any influence on an interpreter. 2. That an interpreter is not to consider the logical propriety of the sense, as discovered by the historico-dogmatic process, but must leave all such considerations for the dogmatic theologian. 3. That he is not to shrink from apparent inconsequence, or inconsistency, in the sense which he has satisfactory hermeneutical reasons for giving to the text." Who can deny that these canons are necessary, unless we are to make *opinion* the basis and test of revelation, instead of the *Word*, as spoken by the inspiration of the Spirit?

Having examined thus the passages which explicitly affirm relation between baptism and the remission of sins, and ascertained what they teach, and only can teach, by a *critical* examination of the meaning of the words in which they are expressed, we proceed next to consider other passages, in which this relation is also taught, but through different forms of expression. We may divide these, for convenience of discussion, into *two* classes. *First*, passages which affirm this relation directly by *parallel* terms or phrases; and, *second*, passages which teach it by *clear implication*.

Of the *first* kind are such as: 1. "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." (Mark xvi, 16.) 2. "The Lord added to the Church daily the saved." (Acts ii, 47.) 3. "Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins." (Acts xxii, 16.) 4. "And such were some

of you; but ye were washed, but ye were sanctified, but ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God." (1 Cor. vi, 11.) 5. "That He might sanctify and cleanse *it* (the Church) with the washing of water by the Word." (Eph. v, 26.) 6. "The like figure whereunto, even baptism, doth also now save us (not the putting away the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God), by (*dia*) the resurrection of Jesus Christ." (1 Peter iii, 21.)

In these passages the phrase, "the remission of sins," is *paralleled* by the phrases "be saved," "wash away thy sins," "were washed," "cleanse with the washing of water," and "baptism doth now save us," and they as clearly assert the relation between baptism and the remission of sins as do those passages upon which we have already commented. This, we think, can not be denied unless it be assumed, first, that "save" and "cleanse" are not equivalent to "the remission of sins;" or, *second*, that the "washing" referred to does not express the effect of baptism. Neither of these positions can be successfully maintained.

The word "save" (σώζω), or "salvation" (σωτηρία), when used with reference to man's moral or spiritual standing before God, always, in the Scriptures, means deliverance from the criminal and condemning consequences of sin. "He shall be called Jesus, because he shall save his people from their sins;" "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners;" "For the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which is lost;" "The Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth;" these, and similar declarations, show that "the remission of sins," and "salvation," are but two expressions for the same thought. To remit one's sins is to take away, judicially, the ground of condemnation; remove the cause of his ruin. To save one, is to deliver him from the consequences of sin; rescue him from ruin. The first expression looks to the cause; the second, to the effect. Both, as acts of divine mercy, result in pardon and restoration to favor. Pardon one's sins and you save him, for his sins alone destroy him; save a man and you pardon his sins, for salvation, in the divine economy, is only reached by the removal of one's sins. Hence it is said of John the Baptist: "Thou shalt go before the face of the Lord to prepare his ways; to give knowledge of salvation unto his people 'in' (ἐν) the remission

of their sins," (Luke i, 77;) and again, of the Savior: "In whom we have redemption through his blood; the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of his grace," etc. (Eph. i, 7; Col. i, 14.)

In the first of these passages a part of the force is lost in the translation of the common version. The comma after "people" should be omitted, and the preposition ἐν should be translated by "in," its proper meaning, so as to show that not "salvation" simply, but the *knowledge* of salvation (γινῶσιν σωτηρίας) is given *in* "the remission of sins." In the second quotation, the phrase "forgiveness or remission (ἄφεσιν) of sins," is introduced as explanatory of the word "redemption" (ἀπολύτρωσιν); but redemption, considered as an effect of the ransom paid for sin, is no less than "salvation," both depending alike upon the sacrifice of Christ, so that "forgiveness of sins" and "salvation" are, in the language of Scripture, equivalent ideas; and this is so, whether the "forgiveness" be considered in its *negative* or *positive* aspect, since "salvation" also may be equally considered in both ways. If, through the merits of Christ, *negatively*, men's trespasses are not imputed unto them, but they are persuaded, through a ministry of reconciliation *positively*, to appropriate the promise of the remission of sins, so it is equally true that *negatively* "God our Savior will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all." So is He, *negatively*, "the Savior of all men," but *positively*, only of *such as believe*, as by faith and obedience lay hold of the promise.

Having shown thus the parallelism of the expressions "the remission of sins," and "saved," or "salvation," we are warranted in concluding that whatever relation these passages affirm to exist between baptism and "salvation" exists also between baptism and "the remission of sins." This we assume to be logically indisputable.

In reference to the word "cleansing," we need say but little. It occurs only once in the passages I have quoted, and there the reference is so plainly to "the remission of sins," that we presume it will be questioned by no one. "Cleansing," under the new dispensation, can have reference to nothing but sins. It is said, "Christ, by his blood, purges the conscience from dead works." "The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin." "If we confess our sins, He is

faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." *The Father cleanses us of sins by forgiving them.*

We said, *first*, that the words "save" and "cleanse," in the several passages referred to in this part of our argument, are equivalent to the phrase "the remission of sins." This we have made good. We said, *second*, that the "washing" referred to in these passages expresses the effect of "baptism." We proceed to establish this. The exhortation of Ananias to Paul, "Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins," (Acts xxii, 16,) admits of no ambiguity. It has successfully resisted the ingenuity of theological critics, whose systems of doctrine did not harmonize with its plain teachings. When Olshausen, with a nobility of scholarship which lifted him above petty efforts to strain the Scriptures to make them suit imaginary systems, declares that this passage "plainly represents baptism as an act of cleansing from sin," (the ἀφεσις τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν—the remission of sins,) his learned translator, Dr. Kendrick, adds, in a precautionary note, "the expression, however, is not to be *literally* interpreted. 'Wash away thy sins' in baptism is an elliptical and forcible expression, equivalent to 'submit to that baptism which attends upon and indicates the remission of sin.' Baptism without faith could certainly not bring salvation, and faith under circumstances where baptism is impossible, will be accepted of God." This is, indeed, a singular caveat. Who, in the present day, asserts any connection between baptism without faith, and salvation? Why deny it? Or, who dogmatizes against the acceptableness of faith, where baptism is impossible? Why affirm it? The true question is as to the relation between a baptism *with* faith, and the remission of sins. Dr. Kendrick admits, as he must, that the passage means, *wash away thy sins in baptism*, but says it is equivalent to "submit yourself to that baptism which attends upon and indicates the remission of sin." And what baptism is this? He says: "The rite of baptism follows upon and symbolizes the forgiveness of sins." This is it then; but there is no such baptism spoken of in the New Testament. If Paul's baptism followed upon and symbolized the forgiveness of sins, how could Ananias, in the strong imperative of the middle voice, command him to "have himself baptized and cleansed of his sins"? Paul surely did not regard his sins as consciously *forgiven* before his baptism. On the contrary, he was in deep distress, and "did neither

eat nor drink." True, "the expression is not to be *literally* interpreted," that is to say, Paul's sins were not *material* pollution, clinging to the surface of his body, to be washed away by the solvent property of water; and this is all that should be meant by saying "the expression is not to be *literally* interpreted." The only figure in the case is in considering sins under the analogy of material pollution. The use of water in baptism is *literal*; the *consequent* of baptism, which is the remission of sins, is *literal*; the conception of this consequent under the relation which washing bears to material cleansing, this only is *figurative*, and the meaning is, that as in nature washing is the means of cleansing from material pollution, so by Divine appointment baptism is the means of cleansing from spiritual pollution. When, however, we speak of means in connection with spiritual effects, we must not confound the relation of the two in any literal sense with that which exists between physical means and physical effects.

The passage, "And such were some of you; but ye were washed," etc., (1 Cor. vi, 11,) is a clear allusion to baptism. The "such" refers to the sins mentioned in the 9th and 10th verses, and the middle voice of the verb *apelousasthe* (*ἀπελούσασθε*) is a declaration that they had *washed themselves clean as to them*. But the only way of being washed clean of sins, recognized in the Scriptures, is by baptism.\* So in the next passage quoted: "That he might sanctify and cleanse *it* (the Church) with the washing of water by the Word." (Eph. v, 26.) What can the washing of water be but baptism? and what is the *cleansing* effected by it but the washing away of sins? which, as we have seen, is the act of God forgiving sins in baptism. "In the word," (*ἐν ῥήματι*) shows that the cleansing efficacy of baptism is in the power of the word. "If the power of the word be not felt in the heart, in true repentance and faith, the baptism is worthless—with this accompanying condition, it is a bath of cleansing whereby the *bride* is *purified* and made presentable to the bridegroom," "a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing."

The passage from 1 Peter iii, 21, is particularly instructive. When it is said, "The like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now

\* The passage in Rev. i, 5, does indeed represent Christ as having "washed us from our sins in his own blood," but the washing here is not *literal*, as in the passages under consideration, and the explanation is, of course, different.



save us—not the putting away the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God—by (*θεα*) the resurrection of Jesus Christ,” there is a clear recognition of baptism, as a cleansing ordinance. “Not the putting away of the filth of the flesh” is an explanation that the effect of this baptism is not to be understood as removing material or outward pollution, as in the Jewish lustrations, and which is the ordinary material effect of washing the body, still, that it is nevertheless a cleansing, but of the inner man, the conscience. “The filth of the flesh” (*ρόπου σαρκός*) is put in antithesis to “a good conscience” (*ἀγαθῆς συνειδήσεως*); the former *is not*, the latter *is*, the end of baptism. But in what sense can “baptism” be called “the answer of a good conscience”? We think there can be no critical doubt that “answer” is not the translation of the Greek word *eperotema* (*ἐπερωτημα*), which is used here. This word occurs nowhere else in the New Testament, but the verb *eperotao* (*ἐπερωτάω*), from which it is formed, occurs frequently, and it never means to “answer,” but always “to ask.” This, too, is the only classical meaning of both forms—of the verb and the verbal. Evidently the translators have taken an unwarranted license here, based upon some *imagined* allusion in the expression to the asking and answering of questions at the time of baptism. But these catechetical experiences were of a later date. This is fatal to the fancy, but even if it were not, we have no right to attach a totally new meaning to a word when its legitimate signification makes good sense, and, in fact, better sense than the one which is forced into service. Unquestionably we ought to read “asking,” not “answer.”

In what sense, then, can baptism be called “the asking of a good conscience toward (*εἰς*) God”? “Good conscience” is in the genitive, and this case expresses that with respect to which “the asking” must be understood, but whether in the “subjective” or “objective” sense must be determined by the connection. “The asking of a good conscience” may mean either an “asking” proceeding from “a good conscience” as the *subject*, or an “asking” having respect to “a good conscience” as its *object*, expressed by “for”; as when we say, “The love of God,” we may mean either the love which God feels as the *subject*, or the love which is directed to God as the *object*, equal to “love *for* God.” Grammatically, “a good conscience” in our passage may be either a *subjective* or an *objective* genitive; the



connection must determine. If we say it is "a subjective genitive," then we make the "asking" proceed from a good conscience previously existing; it is a good conscience when it "asks." But "the asking" is the parallel of "baptism," and if the former proceed from a good conscience, so must the latter. But it is said, in the first member of the sentence, "Baptism doth now save us," and if "a good conscience" precedes baptism, so must it also precede that which is the effect of baptism; that is, we must have a good conscience before we are saved. This is absurd, and therefore we must reject the hypothesis that the adjunct "a good conscience" is a *subjective* genitive.

Not only does the harmony of the sense require us to do this, but the grammatical relation which the expressions "the filth of the flesh" and "a good conscience" bear to each other leads us to the same conclusion. The two expressions are both in the genitive case, and grammatically correspond to one another. But the former is clearly an *objective* genitive. The "putting away" is not an action proceeding from "the filth of the flesh" as the *subject*, but is an action done with respect to "the filth of the flesh" as its *object*. As this is an *objective* genitive, so, grammatically, must we understand its antithesis to be. What sense will this give to the expression, "The asking of a good conscience toward God"? Clearly this: that the "baptism which doth now save us is not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the asking or seeking *for* a good conscience toward (ἐν) or 'as regards' God." Thus the object of baptism is to be saved, and the object of its parallel, "the asking," is to procure a good conscience toward God, and both salvation and "a good conscience toward God" flow from "the remission of sins." The sense of all these Scriptures is one. The phrase "through the resurrection of Jesus Christ," with which the Apostle closes this verse, is to be construed with "save us," and it shows that in the symbolic relation of baptism to the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ it is made the means of "bringing us to God." (v, 18.) Having sufficiently considered the *first* class of passages, or those which directly affirm a relation between baptism and "the remission of sins," but by parallel terms or phrases, we will proceed, as briefly as practicable, to examine the *second* class, or those which teach this relation by *clear implication*. We adduce as such the following: 1. "Unless

a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he can not enter into the kingdom of God." (John iii, 5.) 2. "Know ye not that so many of you as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by (*διὰ*) baptism into death, that like as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life." (Romans vi, 3, 4.) 3. "Baptizing them into (*εἰς*) the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." (Matthew xxviii, 19.) 4. "For by (*ἐν*) one spirit are we all baptized into one body." (1 Corinthians xii, 13.) 5. "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy saved he us by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit." (Titus iii, 5, 6.)

In the *first* of these passages we take "born of water" as equivalent to baptism. There is some difference of opinion as to this interpretation, but the general agreement is on its side. It is, therefore, equivalent to saying, "Except a man be baptized, he can not enter the kingdom of God," and as sin is the only bar to our entrance into the kingdom, there is but little difference in meaning between "entering into or seeing the kingdom of God" and receiving the pardon of our sins. Baptism admits to the kingdom through the remission of sins.

The *second* of the passages quoted under this class presents baptism in relation to the most vital causes of our redemption. It represents Christians as "baptized into Jesus Christ," "into his death." Baptism thus brings us into relation with the sacrificial death of Christ, into fellowship with the atonement for sins, into participation with the last victorious struggle of the Great Deliverer, suffering unto death for us. By the death of repentance we go to the burial of baptism. Where sin laid the Savior, there we lay our sins, the "old man" crucified, with "the Lamb of God, slain from the foundation of the world." And thus, participating in the sin-pardoning merits of the atonement, like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, so also we rise new creatures to walk a new life. Sin is put out of the way in the burial of baptism—"remitted," "pardoned," "washed away."

The *third* passage represents baptism as making us formally partakers of the divine nature in all its triune fullness. To be brought "into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy

Spirit," this is to be a new creature, a child of God, an heir of eternal life. Does it not involve the remission of sins?

So with the *fourth* passage, "Baptized into one body." There is one faith, one baptism, and one body, and one formal condition of admission into that body, even baptism. But we are *really* made members of the body of Christ only through the remission of our sins, and because this is received in baptism, therefore can it be said that "we are baptized into one body."

We shall close this detailed examination of Scriptures on this subject by a few remarks on Titus iii, 5, 6, where it is said, "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy saved he us by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit." It is important to notice that this passage expressly denies the position often carelessly assumed with respect to baptism as a work of righteousness. Baptism, or the "washing of regeneration," is put into pointed antithesis to "works of righteousness." The latter can not save us; the former, according to God's gracious appointment, does. Not, indeed, alone, but by the accompanying operation of the Spirit through the Word; nor yet as "a work of righteousness," having any efficacy or worth in itself, but as a gracious *sacrament* of Divine appointment, vouchsafed as the means of conferring and signifying pardon. Those who hastily conclude that the doctrine of baptism for the remission of sins is subversive of the Pauline doctrine of *justification by faith without works* would do well to consider that here it is expressly denied that the "bath of regeneration" is a work of righteousness at all. So far as the heart of man is concerned, faith is the *subjective* condition of his justification, but it is in no way inconsistent with this that the Author of our salvation should appoint a time and place, a form, in short, a *sacrament* in which he will recognize and formally accept the faithful heart, and confer upon it the blessing of pardon. "Regeneration," in the sense of the Scriptures, is not a sudden and sensible operation of the Holy Spirit, killing, as by a flash of lightning, the "old man," and springing into vigorous and conscious life the "new man." It is a process. Faith, repentance, and baptism are its stages of development, the Spirit and the Word the quickening, nourishing, and consummating agent in all. The chrysalis has life, but it is not until it has passed through silent and mysterious changes of death that it

bursts forth the glorious butterfly, joyful in its regeneration, and free as the air in which it flies.

The studious reader—and we can scarcely expect that any other will be likely to go through this article—but the studious and discriminating reader will have observed that we have been governed by no theory of regeneration in our investigations, but that we have taken every passage of Scripture at its fair grammatical value as language, and accepted its lesson just as it is given by the words. This is the *method* of the inquiry, that we have not rested the conclusion which we reached upon a *single* passage of Scripture, nor upon the meaning and force of a *single* preposition, as is often superficially charged, but that we have established it upon the proper interpretation of many passages, each and every one of which we have shown, either directly or by *clear implication*, teaches the same great law of pardon; furthermore, that this doctrine is not only forced upon us by the letter of many Scriptures, but that it is in perfect harmony with the general doctrine of inspiration on the whole subject to which it relates.

Should any one conclude that this doctrine, which makes baptism a formal condition of pardon, places a limitation upon the free grace of God, and ask what right has man to do this, we might retort the question, and ask, Does not the making of faith an instrumental condition of justification equally place a limit upon the free grace of God? Or, again, What right has man to say that God shall not limit himself, if he chooses so to do? "Who art thou, O man, that answerest against God?" But the question is a sophism. We are not bound to say, nor do we say, God forbid that we should say that none but the baptized will ever be saved. Infants die without faith, and vast continents of human beings have never heard the Gospel; and what shall become of all these, and some even in Christian lands almost as destitute of privileges and light as they, I thank God is a question not for me to decide. It would appall me to think that baptism stood between them and the free grace of God. My duty is to preach the Gospel as its Author has delivered it to me, and leave the rest to him; he will do all things right. But the true question is this, not do we limit the free grace of God, nor yet has God limited himself, but *has he limited us?* We say, *Yes*, he has—in kindness and mercy has he done so. He has not left us to say,

lo here, and lo there, to seek for salvation in visions, and dreams, and fanatical fancies of inward operations delusively interpreted as the sensible work of the Spirit in our regeneration; but he has entered into formal covenant with us, given us a definite symbol and seal of pardon, a sacrament of grace in which he will meet us, and give us assurance of the remission of sins, and bestow upon us as our advocate and comforter, the Holy Spirit, to abide with us forever; so that, "not by any works of righteousness which we do, but according to his mercy doth he save us by means of (*δια*) the bath of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit." To his name be the praise forever!

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## II.—DEVELOPMENT.

"NEITHER pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word, that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that Thou hast sent me." So prayed the Savior with the most ignominious death within sight. Of all the subjects that engaged in that solemn hour his attention, and which he laid, as our faithful High-Priest, before his Heavenly Father, one of the most prominent was the unity of believers—the oneness of His Church. Some time before he had said, while penetrating with his never-erring vision through the veil that separates the future from the present, "And other sheep I have which are not of this fold; them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice; and there shall be one fold and one shepherd." There shall be one fold; not an inclosure for, but one flock of sheep (*ποιμνη*); and how can this be otherwise from the nature of the case? There is one God for all; there is one Savior; there is one Holy Spirit; there is one principle of the new life; there is one doctrine; one source of information; one baptism, by which believers are ushered into this fold; one faith; one common object to be realized by all—supreme love to God, and to love our neighbor as we love ourselves; and

finally, one heaven, a participation of all in the same endless bliss and glory which God in his infinite love has prepared for his faithful children.

That this grand object, which lies so near the sympathetic heart of the Savior, has not yet been realized, after eighteen centuries, is too painfully manifest to require any proof; it is patent to all. Not only is the Christian Church divided into three great divisions, that anathematize each other—the Roman Catholic, the Greek Catholic, and the Protestant Church, (there are also many sects in Asia that have maintained a separate existence from the Greek Church, as Armenians, Nestorians, Copts, etc.)—but the Protestants are split into an almost countless number of sects, which but lately have commenced to show a spirit of forbearance and regard for each other. Of the evils, the necessary evils resulting from this state of things, as the fostering of a spirit of selfishness, uncharitableness, vanity, self-glorification, frittering away the influence and power of the Church of Jesus Christ, etc., it is not our object to speak in these lines. But a few decades ago this divided state was gravely represented by Christian men as the normal state, giving the various sects ample opportunity and scope of provoking each other unto good works, a position which, happily, scarcely any one would dare to occupy in our days. The evil of division is recognized by all, and however little faith we may have in the efficiency of the means so far adopted to bring about the longed-for unity of believers, the recognition of the evil itself we hail as a good omen, as one of the signs of the times, especially as it is universal. The invitation of Pius IX, extended to the Greek Church, and to Protestants, to attend the Ecumenical Synod, which is now in session at Rome, deserves our attention. There may be the unmitigated arrogance of the Vatican in it, the invitation proceeding on the supposition that all Christians outside of the pale of the Church of Rome are necessarily in the wrong, and the invitation being but a magnanimous offer of pardon to undutiful and self-willed children, yet, notwithstanding all this, there is a change of Roman tactics unmistakable in it. Dissenters were, indeed, also invited to attend the sessions of the Synod of Trent; but then Protestantism was not yet, in every respect—at least not in the eyes of Rome—an accomplished fact; subsequently, fire and the sword; the destruction of every document favorable to Protestants; the suppres-



sion of every one of their rights; the dungeons of the Inquisition in Italy; *autos-da-fe* in Spain; the cutting in two of the grand charter of liberty, granted to the Bohemians by a German Emperor, at the bidding of Rome; gasconades in France; bloody wars in Germany, etc.; these were the means urged on by Jesuits, and practiced by Catholic powers, in order to bring back Protestants into the bosom of the only saving Church, but now they are invited by the Supreme Pontiff to attend a general council, which, moreover, the Pope has convoked of his own accord, contrary to the practice of his predecessors, who disliked nothing so much as general councils. Be it that the Roman Curia expects from the assembled prelates a mechanical assent to every proposition to be laid before them, especially the ratification of the favorite doctrine of certain parties, that the Pope acting in his official capacity is infallible, whereby all future general councils would become unnecessary, or mere deliberative bodies; or, that the Pope actually looks for support to believing Protestants against infidel Catholics—be it for these or other causes, there is certainly a change in the policy of Rome, in the invitation of the Pope extended to Protestants to attend a General Synod; and this change challenges the careful attention of every believer.

The Greek Church of Russia has awakened of late to a degree of life and activity that is quite commensurate with the political life of the Slavonic powers and tribes, and as the universal sway of the Slavonic power, so is also the supremacy of the Græco-Slavonic Church anxiously desired and labored for by these parties. Although there has never been much prospect of a peaceful return of the Protestants to Rome, yet attempts in this direction have not been wanting, as the union attempts headed by Leibnitz and Bossuet prove. Even all attempts to bring the divided Protestants, the Lutherans and the Reformed together, failed, until a partial union, dictated by the secular power of these bodies, took place a few decades ago. With the attempts that are now made in our own country to bring about the healing of the divisions of larger bodies, that had their origin in different views as to Church government, slavery, etc., as is the case with the numerous Methodist bodies, or in a different interpretation of the standards of the Churches, as was the case with the Old School and the New School Presbyterians, as well as to bring on a closer approach to each other of the larger bodies, such as Pres-



byterians, Congregationalists, Methodists, Episcopalians, etc., every one is acquainted, and a mere reference to them may, therefore, suffice here. However insufficient all attempts in the direction indicated may so far have been, and however little prospect of success they may hold out to the earnest Christian and student of God's Word for the future, still they are an encouraging sign, since conviction invariably and necessarily precedes conversion.

Before any reasonable hope of an ultimate success in the direction indicated may be entertained, or any means devised on which God's blessing may be intelligently invoked for success, it is absolutely necessary to know the nature of the disease, the cause of the division, and its extent, in every direction, and to the discussion of this point we would now invite the reader's attention.

It is often taken for granted that there was a time when the Christian Church was in its normal state, her actual state coming fully up to her ideal one, and the first three centuries are then referred to as the enviable period in question. But the whole is a mistake: there was this perfect harmony and unity not even in the apostolic times; nay, the Apostles themselves were not free from all strife and contention, of which the Acts of the Apostles and the various epistles of the Apostle Paul furnish abundant and conclusive evidence. Nor could it, from the nature of the case, be otherwise. Indeed, if the essence of Christianity consisted in the assent to some well-defined doctrines, and the observance of some clearly-defined duties, then there might have been this full harmony and unanimity. So the Roman Catholic and Greek Churches will have it; the Bible, as interpreted by the "unanimous consent of the Fathers," united with tradition, forms this sum total of the contents of Christianity. Yet the Greek Church alone carries this idea consistently out, allowing absolutely no change in doctrine or ritual, so that her present status may be considered as the status of the Greek portion of the Church of the third century transferred mechanically to the nineteenth century, while the Church of Rome convokes, from time to time, councils to settle disputes, to define doctrines, to declare articles of faith, etc. It is true, it is maintained by her champions that these councils merely define articles of faith, not create them, as, for example, the adoration of the consecrated host, the necessity of auricular confession, the reality of the purgatory, the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary,

etc., but the fact that in the Roman Church general councils are necessary, while they are dispensed with in the Greek Church, shows the radical difference between the two bodies.

This whole view, strange to say, passed over into the Protestant Churches, and is practically entertained by most of them to this very day, although the Protestant conception of Christianity differs so widely from the Catholic one. In the Catholic Church the relation of the individual to the Church determines his relation to his God and Savior, while according to the Protestant doctrine the individual's relation to his Savior determines that to his Church, so that a mere outward membership, without any change of heart and a holy life, is altogether unavailing before God; any *opus operatum* doctrine is plainly inconsistent with the genuine Protestant view, and a perversion of it. Yet the various Protestant parties went to work in the sixteenth century as if their views of Christianity were identical with those of the Catholic Church, and accordingly drew up *creeds* and *confessions* of faith, for which they practically claimed the same infallibility that was ever claimed by Jesuit or Dominican for the decrees of Trent or of any other council. It is true, they were partly driven by their Catholic opponents into framing these formulas in order to purge themselves of the charge that they believed nothing at all, that they were atheists, etc.; but their conduct was, nevertheless, inconsistent with their doctrine, inconsistent with their professed conceptions of Christianity, and a *backward step*. So Luther himself drew up, 1537, the Schmalkalden articles, to be laid, as the sum total of his doctrine, before the Council of Mantua, that was to convene, by order of Paul III, at Pentecost in 1537, after Melancthon had drawn up, in 1530, the Augsburg Confession, to be laid, for the same purpose, before Charles V and the Diet. In 1602 the Formula Concordiæ was drawn up, and by it Lutheran Protestantism condemned to the same strait-jacket to which the Synod of Trent had confined the Roman Catholic doctrine. Nor was it any better in the Reformed Churches, only that every prince, or free city, or canton drew up a confession which pretended to set forth, in infallible language, the quintessence of the teachings of the Bible, to which every subject or citizen of said prince or city must subscribe, on pain of forfeiting all rights of citizenship, and eternal bliss besides. So arose the several Helvetic confessions, the Gallic, the

Heidelberg Catechism, the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, the Westminster Confession, the Reformed doctrine having found in the decrees of the Synod of Dort, in 1619, the same fate that the Formula Concordiæ had prepared to the Lutheran, and the Tridentinum to the Catholic doctrine. All these Protestant symbols agreed in one point at least, in recognizing the Bible alone as of binding authority in matters of religion, and as the all-sufficient source of information for faith and practice. Says the Formula Concordiæ:

"We believe, teach, and confess that the only rule and norm of faith, by which all doctrines and teachers are to be judged at the same time, are the prophetic and apostolical writings of the Old and New Testaments. But other writings of the old and new teachers, whatever name they may have, are not to be set on an equal footing with the sacred Scriptures, but are to be judged by them, and to be received only as testimonies by which the doctrines of the apostles and prophets have been preserved."

Says the Westminster Confession:

"The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or, by good and necessary consequence, may be deduced from Scripture, unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men."

Again:

"All things in Scripture are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear unto all; yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation are so clearly propounded and opened, in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may obtain unto a sufficient understanding of them."

And again:

"The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself, and, therefore, where there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture, it may be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly."

Says the Church of England, and with her the Methodist Episcopal Church:

"The Holy Scriptures contain all things necessary to salvation, so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation. In the name of the Holy Scriptures we understand those canonical books of the Old and New Testament of whose authority was never any doubt in the Church."

And so throughout every Protestant denomination, however small, and however recently risen, re-echoes the same language concerning the Scriptures as being the only and all-sufficient rule of faith and practice. That all Protestants, thus standing on a common platform, should agree, at least in the main points, should form but one body, and recognize each other as brethren, as members of the same body, of which Jesus Christ is the Head, is a fair and legitimate inference from the premises given. But, in point of fact, it always has been, and still is, far otherwise. Not only that Protestants have persecuted and killed each other as heretics, but even in our more tolerant age, when fraternizing with members of other denominations has come to be looked upon as part of good breeding, the different organizations continue to exist, and only a few of them admit members of other Churches to their own communion table, while others, and that, apparently, consistently, admit only their own members to the same privilege. Nearly all efforts at a union have so far failed, and why they have failed, as well as whether this failure is to be considered a calamity or otherwise, may appear from the sequel. Schiller, the poet, indeed no professed Christian, but not without a deep insight into the nature of Christianity, has pronounced the very framing of the Augsburg Confession a misfortune; and, when we look at the fruits it bore, the altering of its tenth article by its venerable framer himself, and the strifes and wars that arose in consequence of this alteration, we can not but agree with the verdict of the great poet. Nor was it so with this venerable document alone: the Formula Concordiæ proved a real formula discordiæ, and killed almost all life from out of the Lutheran Church, to which "pure doctrine" became now the essence of Christianity, and the "*In cum et sub*" the shibboleth of orthodoxy. Says Dörner, in his admirable work, "*Geschichte der Protestantischen Theologie, nach ihrer principieller Bewegung*," pp. 520, *et seq.*:

"The character of the first part of our period (1580-1700) is no longer creative; intent not so much upon the cultivation and application as upon the keeping and preserving of the rich treasures of the Reformation. And this interest was mainly subserved by theological science which was almost identical with dogmatics, and the religious life assumed preponderatingly the form of a life conformable to traditional doctrine. The faithful preservation of these treasures was, in reality, no small task in the necessary and severe struggle with the Romish Church, especially the order of the Jesuits, and in the voluntarily undertaken struggle with the

Reformed, especially as the outward existence of the Lutheran Church was unsafe till 1648, and through the thirty years' war a state of barbarism was brought on which seemed to make the unity of the (Lutheran) Church absolutely necessary, and thus gave an importance to Church discipline and Church law, which had originally been foreign to the spirit of the Lutheran Reformation. What the Reformation period had given to the German mind was systematically rounded off by the architectonic intellect for offensive and defensive purposes during the seventeenth century. A systematizing and logical method labors hard to defend the Protestant truth on every side. The indefatigable application and ingenuity of the great dogmatists of this century surrounds it on all sides with fortifications, in order to make it an unconquerable citadel. In the interior of this citadel there was not wanting the power of a spiritual life that manifested itself mainly in sacred poetry and music. *But the idea of conquering the world for the Gospel, and of the moral development of the Protestant principle in every point of view, had almost entirely disappeared.* Yea, by the one-sided efforts for the preservation (of the truth), without a living reproduction, critique, and development, the thing itself changed by an inward law of necessity. Luther's principle of faith in its union with the Sacred Scriptures, instead of being the ruling center and the fructifying power of the whole, was made an individual article of faith, along with others, and the scholastic treatment which drew within its sphere also the Scriptural doctrine of justification by faith shows but too plainly an inward uncertainty about many individual points of the principle and its systematic position; and this was absolutely necessary wherever the life of religious experience was pushed into the background, instead of being the leading principle. In a certain formal productivity the period is not wanting. Its spirit is fruitful in inventing various methods, and from the books of the Old and New Testaments—yea, from the patristic and medieval literature—a vast mass is collected and used in the service of dogmatics. But, through the whole of these methods, one can not help perceiving a rupture with the fervor and intuitive certainty of personal faith, whose place is occupied by the faith of the Church or churchly objectivity. A Protestant tradition opposes itself to the Catholic one in order to replace, as outward authority, the inward certainty of the truth. And from the most pious men, such as Arndt, Lütkeemann, etc., loud complaints about the decline of true piety are heard."

The decrees of the Synod of Dort fared, if possible, still worse, making the very name of orthodoxy odious, doing no good whatever, and extorting from some of their authors, on their death-bed, the exclamation, "O, Dort, Dort, would to God I had never seen you!" Nor is this whole phenomenon in the least to be wondered at; not so much the drawing up of the formulas, *as the investing of them with normative authority, being plainly a gross violation of the first principles of Protestantism*; in so far as this was done—and it was done almost universally—it was a practical return to Popery; at all events the difference was not specific, but only gradual. Papal formulas appeal also to the Bible, as well as to tradition, and the "unanimous consent of the Fathers." What justifies an *à priori* inference that they

backed as they are by a majority of votaries and a long line of centuries, should be farther removed from the truth than when Protestant doctors sit in council? To maintain this is certainly a begging of the question, and is woefully disproved by the discordance of the different Protestant formulas themselves. For that the Lutheran, the Zwinglian, and the Calvinistic view of the Lord's-Supper and baptism, which were all embodied into some public and authoritative confessions, the Calvinistic and the Arminian views of election, grace, original sin, natural depravity, the resistibility or irresistibility of grace, etc., can not *all* be right is too self-evident to be stated, and who is to decide the controversy in such cases, all appealing to the Bible? The two schools of the Presbyterian Church of this country have the *same standards of faith*, and differ only as to *their interpretation*, and yet who is ready to condemn the course of Dr. Breckinridge, who protests with all his might against the union of the two parties, alleging that by the consummation of the plan of union the original difficulties that led to the separation are not removed, not healed, but only covered up for the time being? On this point the venerable doctor is evidently correct, and the history of the union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, brought about by the efforts of Frederic III, of Prussia, certainly counsels prudence and circumspection. The latter united on the basis of what "they had in common in their respective standards;" in this country this "United Church" drags a miserable existence, and is, at best, a third sect or party in addition to the two old ones, both of which are doing better than the first. In Germany the same would have been the fate of the "United Church," if other influences had not been at work before the union took place, and were not even now at work, which make a simple return to the symbolical books of the two Churches, that had their origin in the 16th century, simply an impossibility. When, in 1817, the third century of the Reformation was celebrated in Germany, after the country had so plainly seen, in the rise and fall of Napoleon, the hand of the God of their fathers, to whom they had returned in sincerity, the solemn question presented itself to every thoughtful mind: "What are we to do—are we to return at once to the symbolical books of the 16th century, or can we place something else in their stead?" However pious such a return seemed to be, on



mature reflection, it was found to be impossible. A return to them in good faith—and only such a return became earnest men and the solemnity of the occasion—would, of course, have brought back the whole status of the 16th century; would have converted the intervening three centuries into a vacuum, a void, in which the Church neither learned nor forgot any thing—in which the operations of Divine Providence effected nothing. And this was more than a moral impossibility. But were the vast treasures of those Pentecostal days of the Church to be thrown away? Were the voices of such men as Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, and others, to be silenced forever? Still less; what, then, was to be done? That which ought to have been done in the very beginning of the Reformation, as conditioning the very life of Protestantism, and growing with irresistible force from out of the very nature of Christianity, *these symbolical books were set down as venerable exponents of what the Church THEN believed, as helps for a better understanding of the Word of God, but the latter alone was proclaimed the unchangeable basis and rule of faith and practice.* On this basis have stood, and do stand to this very day, all prominent divines of Germany, no matter whether they incline more to the Lutheran or Reformed view, or walk in their own paths. This fact, we repeat, accounts for the measurable success of the United Church of Germany, and not the formal union formed at the bidding of a king sincerely pious, but who, in so doing, evidently overstepped the limits of his proper sphere. This royal union only impeded, but did not help in the least, the real union. This fact—that is, the position of the German union divines—accounts also for their freedom, sincerity, and impartiality, qualities which excite general wonder and astonishment in this country, because they are so rarely met with. But to return.

In this country a man's orthodoxy and religion are estimated by his closer or looser adherence to the symbolical books of his Church; what is laid down *there* is Gospel; what Calvin, or Luther, or Wesley have thought and taught, supersedes the thinking of all their followers for all time to come; and woe be to him who presumes to think for himself, or who is so unfortunate as to arrive at somewhat different conclusions from them! If he is a private member he may, indeed, hold his own peculiar views, provided he keeps them to himself; but if he fills a public place in the Church, he must either act the hypo-



crite—that is, conform himself in his teaching to the standards of his Church, from which he inwardly dissents—or he must, as an honest man, state the change of his views and resign his position. This picture is not overdrawn, but falls far short of the truth. For the Calvinist, then, it is eternally true, that God by the immutable decree of his mere good pleasure, without any regard to the foreseen faith and life, has elected a limited number out of the universal corrupted mass unto eternal life, while the rest are left to their wretched doom; for the Arminian no such decrees exist, and to believe in them would be converting God into a worse and more blood-thirsty being than Moloch ever was; for the Episcopalian of High-Church views, the three offices of deacon, priest, and bishop, are not only of divine appointment, but as separate offices of permanent force, while his Presbyterian brother is equally well off with one order in the ministry; to the one, baptism is regeneration; while this doctrine is to another, a hell-damning heresy. Does the truth of a doctrine or dogma depend, perhaps, on the views of him who holds it? Then what was said on another occasion and for another purpose is applicable here: “Be it unto thee, even as thou wilt.” Is there no such a thing as objective truth, independent of human views? To this fearful conclusion the position and practice of the so-called orthodox Churches of the day drive with almost irresistible force. Again, is the whole Bible, in all its parts and bearings understood? Has it entered into the self-consciousness of the Church? If not, what efforts are being made to supply this lack of knowledge? None; of course there are none needed. The quintessence of truth, necessary and sufficient for salvation, is laid down in the symbolical books; has been solemnly professed by the young preacher in his ordination vows; and if the infidel, rationalistic, and transcendental Germans, by their plodding and drudgery, bring any thing new to view that may throw more light on the historical parts of the Bible, their services—as hewers of wood and drawers of water—may be tolerated, and even respected, provided their results pass the ordeal of orthodoxy, and they do not presume to enter upon the forbidden ground of systematic theology. Hence exegesis and systematic theology have been cultivated for the last four decades almost alone by the Germans. Nor is it any better with Church-history. Christ and his inspired Apostles laid down a number of dogmas, and a system of

ethics, that are identical with the very words of the respective standards; but in the course of time heresies and schisms sprang up that marred the peace and harmony of the Church, until Popery, with all its abominations, arose, covering the fair field of God with poisonous weeds, persecuting the saints so that they were reduced to the small number of the Waldenses and Albigenses; at last the glorious day of the Reformation came, and Luther and Calvin, Cranmer, Elizabeth, Knox, and afterward Wesley, made every thing right for their respective followers. Now what an interest can Church-history have for those that hold these and similar views? It can only be a detailing of the follies and wickedness of men, who, from malice aforethought, wickedly and criminally rejected the counsel of God for their own salvation, and its cultivation may safely be left with the rationalistic Germans, and accordingly is left with them; and when their works have waited for decades—actual language of a *Quarterly* is here quoted—in the antechambers of American orthodoxy, they are at last graciously admitted to a hearing, and, perhaps, an occasional reference!

Nor is this all. Notwithstanding all professed reverence for the symbolical books, there is scarcely any large denomination of this country that honestly holds all the doctrines laid down in its symbolical books; they have all departed from essential points, and not always for the better. All these books of the 16th century recognize, for example, an objective force of some kind or other in the two sacraments of the New Testament—in baptism, some connection between the sacrament and the remission of sin of the baptized; in the Lord's-Supper, a mystical presence of some kind of the glorified Savior, which he vouchsafes only there to his Church. In what denomination are such views not branded as sacramentarianism and heterodoxy in our days? These, in many respects, venerable symbols, have been emptied, to a great extent, of their contents, and a shallow, common-sense religion, that rejects and ridicules every thing which it does not understand, which is, therefore, in its very essence, rationalism, has settled there; and thus modified, the symbolism is the harbinger of the millennium. Other important doctrines are left out in the cold; most of the symbolical books are silent on eschatological matters, although the Reformers themselves, and their immediate followers, held well-defined views on these subjects; in our days there

are views on this subject in vogue *in* the Churches that are vastly more Platonic than Biblical; the body is the prison-house of the soul, hence its laying off in death is a gain; the now free soul goes to heaven, and is supremely happy; the resurrection, if it is not spiritualized after the Swedenborgian fashion, is, indeed, not denied, because it is taught in the Bible, but it becomes an unnecessary, useless appendix. That such views are un—yea, anti—Biblical, is not dreamed of, and any efforts in that direction in order to develop the Bible teaching, are set down at once as heretical. The doctrine of the Incarnation, on which the whole fabric of the Christian religion rests, is, in the orthodox Church, in a most deplorable condition, being nothing more than ungarnished Nestorianism. A Savior with one self-consciousness is out of the question; he can speak of himself in the same moment as a man and as a God, because he is both a man and a God; not considering that such a Savior is foreign to the New Testament—is a mere fiction of the brain and in reality no Savior. Yet scarcely any thing is done in this direction, and if an effort is made to reproduce the Bible teachings on this subject, both from the self-testimonies of Jesus, and the testimonies of his inspired Apostles, it is branded at once by the great mass of the orthodox as presumptuous and heterodox, and, in some respects, consistently so. The teachings of the symbolical books are believed to be in harmony with truth; the minister was sworn at his ordination on these symbolical books, and this settles the matter for all time to come.

Nor are the legitimate results of such a state of things wanting. Against the Platonic eschatology reigning in the orthodox Churches there is a powerful reaction at work, which, contenting itself with a partial scriptural basis, degenerates into various errors, and we have, accordingly, Soul-Sleepers, Universalists, Restorationists, Annihilationists, etc., all of which isms emphasize some Bible truth that is not recognized in the Churches. The legitimate fruit of a lifeless Calvinism in New England is Universalism, and the reigning Nestorianism of the orthodox Churches will just so certainly lead to Unitarianism, or some other open denial of the fact of the Incarnation, as soon as reflection takes the place of the present traditional belief. Already, in many quarters, Christianity as the specific religion is renounced and allowed to be only one of many religious

systems, perhaps in degree different from others, but not in kind. Humanitarianism is already the watchword of the day; secret societies take upon themselves the care of at least their poor and needy which was done in her better days by the Church; hospitals, asylums, and other charitable institutions, that are managed by non-professors or professed disbelievers, do often better than those that enjoy the fostering care of Churches. Is this phenomenon accidental? Do the Churches cultivate and enforce Christian ethics as they ought? Is the Bible in reality made the sole basis of their ethics? Let any one explain Col. ii, 20-23, in a Christian temperance-meeting, and he will find out at once how much deference is paid to Paul, if he happens to be at variance with preconceived notions. And this is not an isolated case, but must suffice here.

This picture is not overdrawn but falls rather short of the actual state of things, as every competent witness will testify; and the question forces itself upon us with irresistible force: *How is this sad state of things to be brought to a close, and to be replaced by a better one?*

We have, so far, received three answers from Protestant authorities to this momentous question, to each of which we must now pay some attention. The High-Church party of the Episcopal Church, which sees safety only in an unqualified going over to Rome, which pronounces Protestantism a failure, we count no longer Protestant, and omit, accordingly, here.

One of the answers is the unmistakable longing of nearly all Protestant parties for a closer union, which shows itself in various ways, especially by Christian alliances, one of which convenes in New York in October, 1870. These meetings claim, indeed, to be only deliberative bodies, having nothing to do with defining doctrines or adjudicating ecclesiastical controversies; their effect can, therefore, be only a limited one, bringing the leading men of the different parties and countries face to face, creating confidence and increased activity, disarming prejudices, and devising, perhaps, ways and means of carrying on the efforts to evangelize the world more systematically and effectually. Any thing else can not be expected of them, and, even if they met in the capacity of ecumenical Protestant councils, their labors could scarcely justify the hope of much good being accomplished by them. We have already seen that both

the Formula Concordiæ and the decrees of Dort did much harm to the cause of the Gospel; it is no better with the general councils, both those that are recognized by Protestants and Catholics jointly, and those that are recognized by the latter alone. We now go a step further and say that even that council that is mentioned in Acts xv did not prove as beneficial to the infant Church in its workings as is often supposed. The principle that was settled by the council had been settled much better and been carried out more fully to its legitimate consequences by the Apostle Paul before, and the additional injunctions of the council fell soon into disuse and neglect, whereas the legitimate deductions from Paul's position have ever since been in force.

A second answer returned to our question is the position taken by the *Mercersburg Review*, inspired by Dr. Nevin. This close thinker and earnest theologian is perfectly satisfied about the fruitlessness of all the union attempts indicated, laments the present state of the Protestant Church, and especially of the Protestant theology of this country deeply, deplores the evil of the sect system, which he branded in one of his publications even as the antichrist of the New Testament; he recommends a return to the *symbolum apostolicum*, especially a making the Church an object of faith in the same sense as Christ is an object of faith. The incarnation is strongly emphasized by him, and an objective force vindicated to the sacraments; to baptism, a part in the remission of sin and regeneration; to the Lord's-Supper, a feeding of the believing communicant on the really present body and blood of the Savior. But, for a variety of reasons, we can not attach that importance to the Apostles' Creed that Dr. Nevin does. We can not find his mysticism in the Church of those days, that unconsciously expressed its Christian faith in that creed. We find the leading articles of the Christian faith not only not settled in those days, but we meet even with (partially, at least) dissenting views on the part of leading exponents of the Christian consciousness; in short, we find the mustard-seed of Christianity as yet in the incipency of its development, and can, therefore, not find the balm of Gilead in the advice under consideration.

A third answer is found in a *total discarding of all creeds, confessions of faith, decrees of councils, etc.*, and an unqualified falling back

upon the Scripture as the only guide, creed, confession, etc. We have seen already, in this paper, that this identical position was taken by the Reformers themselves and is embodied as *an* article of faith in every Protestant symbol; but also that this remained, for the most part, a mere theory, was soon contravened by a practice which inflicted almost a death-blow upon the principle of the Reformation of the sixteenth century. Theoretically, this position was retained, the all-sufficiency and perspicuity of the Scriptures were ably defended against the attacks of the Catholics; and this is, in fact, done to this very day in every controversy with Catholics, who, from the nature of the case, can have no faith in Protestant confessions of faith. This, then, it would seem, is genuine Protestant ground, but the history of the past teaches that even this is not unqualifiedly safe. The interpretation of the Scripture by an individual, or by a number of individuals, whether orally held or reduced to writing, is *essentially different from the written word itself*—is fallible, while the Bible itself is infallible. If, therefore, the position indicated as answer third means that the inspired authors had the same identical views of the subjects treated in their writings as are now held by certain parties, and that the views of these parties are to be handed down to posterity by a kind of tradition, to be held, at all times, in their present form—if, we repeat, this is the meaning of the position, its fate is already decided; it is a mere addition of a new creed to those already in existence, and deserves their fate. If it is claimed that the sense of the Bible is so plain that it can not be mistaken, this is true, in part, but only in part. The Bible, as the infallible word of God, conditions necessarily a certain state of the mind in the reader or hearer, which is humility, and a sincere desire to learn; to be taught from the Bible; a readiness and willingness to surrender itself at once, fully and unreservedly, to its influence. But even this disposition is not a full safeguard. It would be the very quintessence of pride and uncharitableness to suppose, for but one moment, that this disposition is wanting in all that do not understand the Bible in a certain sense. A question intimately connected with the momentous subject under consideration is, What is the Bible? What is the Word of God? Is it a mere faithful record of what God did miraculously on the earth, of what Christ was, of what he taught, did, and of where he is now? Is the relation of the Bible reader to the



subjects read the same as that of the student of Plato is to Plato and the influence of his teaching? If these questions are answered affirmatively, the specific character of Christianity is denied, and it is, in our opinion, of very little importance what views a man holds on the person of Christ, the Trinity, the personality and work of the Holy Spirit, and kindred topics; this position is, in our conviction, outside of the Bible, outside of Christianity itself. No, the Bible claims to be the Word of God, and "my words," says the Savior, "are spirit and life." The reader or hearer of the Bible, then, is introduced into the very presence, is brought under the influence of a powerfully working God and Savior, and by him is taught what he is to believe, to do, to be, etc. There can be no specific difference between the Word of God and the sacraments—both are possessed of the same power, of the same efficacy—and this, perhaps, is one of the worst features of modern Protestantism, one of the surest proofs of its apostasy not only from genuine Christianity, but also from its own standards, that it resolves both Word and sacraments into, in themselves, powerless, unavailing means, that receive their force only from an entirely independent source, the operation of the Holy Spirit, which is supposed neither to be confined to nor inseparably connected with the use of these means of grace, converting the Word of God thereby into human speech, and the sacraments into empty signs of an absent grace. This principle, if consistently carried out, where does it lead to? Plainly to a rejection of the Bible and its most precious contents, for it requires no exercise of a higher faith to believe in the efficacy of the means of grace than to believe in the reality of the incarnation; and the same reasoning that finds the belief in the objective force of the sacraments absurd, must find it equally absurd that the Logos should have been under the necessity of becoming a man, in order to redeem the sin-ruined human family.

Christianity, in its highest conception, is not a code of ethics; not a system of doctrines; not a statement of facts; but a new life in God, transfused from the God-man into the believer. This feature is made prominent, especially in the Gospel of John. Jesus says: "I am the life; I give unto my sheep eternal life." This life is not something that takes its beginning in the world of spirits; that is given from without to the disembodied spirit; nay, it takes its begin-

ning in this life. "If a man keeps my saying he shall never see death." "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but *have* eternal life." "Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that heareth my words, and believeth on Him that sent me, has everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death unto life." Life, in its very nature, is expansive, developing. By means of the Word, man is led to Christ through faith; the sacrament of baptism completes and seals this union with Christ, but as he was brought to Christ by faith, so his whole life is now a life of faith; by faith he keeps hold of the invisible world; through faith his old man, his sinful nature, is more and more given into death, and the principle of holiness changes, cleanses, and transforms him more and more, bringing him nearer the standard of perfection which we have in Jesus Christ. "Grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ" is the sum total of all Christian duties, and the end of all his efforts; where this growth ceases there is a mortal disease, and if not removed in time, death invariably follows. But not only is this the case with the individual believer, but with the whole body of believers—the Church; hence those incomparable parables: "The kingdom of heaven is like unto a grain of mustard seed;" "The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened;" "The seed is the word." The point of comparison can invariably be found not in the small beginnings of the Christian Church alone, but it must also be found in the nature of Christianity itself, both in the life of the individual believer and in that of the whole Church. Of this we have abundant proof in the New Testament itself. It is no idle talk to speak of a Pauline, of a Petrine, of a Jacobine conception of Christianity; these terms mean a reality, and no Christian scholar will question their legitimacy. All these three conceptions of Christianity are true, but the Petrine is higher than that of James, and the Pauline higher than the Petrine. On the important subject of the sinner's justification before God, Paul and James seem to differ. It is, indeed, true that when the two positions are thoroughly examined they do not really contradict each other; but it is, at the same time, equally true that they are not identical; and Paul could, from his stand-point, no more have employed the language of James than

James that of Paul. Both were right in their respective stand-points, but these stand-points differed. The same phenomenon presents itself also in the Acts; to the Jewish-Christian congregation of Jerusalem Jesus is what the Messiah of the Old Testament had been to the Jews, "the servant of God." So, Acts iii, 13: "The God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob, the God of our fathers has glorified his *παῖδα*, not *υἱόν*, servant, not son Jesus." Again, Acts iv, 27: "Of a truth against thy holy *παῖς*—ἐπὶ τοῦ ἁγίου *παῖδά σου* 'Ιησοῦ—thy servant whom thou didst annoint, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the children of Israel, were gathered together." As soon as Paul appears on the stage preaching Jesus, he calls him no longer *παῖς*—servant, but *υἱός*—son; see Acts xiii, 33. The Hebrew word for servant, when the Messiah is meant, is *ebedh*, in Greek *παῖς*; see Isaiah lii, 13; but where a son in the true sense of the word is meant, the Hebrew word *bhen*, and the Greek *υἱός*, are used; see Ps. ii, 7. So is the doctrine of the sinner's justification before God most fully developed in the writings of St. Paul, while that as to the divinity of Jesus, and the reality of his humanity, are most fully developed in the same writings, along with those of St. John.

If we study the writings of the apostolic fathers, and their immediate successors, we find, indeed, the greatest possible difference. Not only is the creative originality wanting, as we should indeed expect, from the nature of the case, but only a few elements of Christianity, so fully handled in the writings of the Apostles, are touched upon; the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith disappears almost entirely, while the Savior's mystical presence in the believer, and his second coming, are especially dwelt upon. Some of the subsequent leading (Greek) fathers seem to teach—at times, at least—justification by works, and are what was subsequently called Arian in their views, as to the divinity proper of Jesus, and Pelagian in their views on grace and free-will, until these subjects were in succession fully discussed, and the Scripture teaching approximatively, at least, defined and settled. The fruitful patristic period was followed by scholasticism, that labored hard to press every particle of life and power out of the Scriptures, as well as out of the writings of the fathers. This long period of stagnation and frivolity was followed by the remarkable fruitfulness of the Reformation period, and whatever these different periods of the Church have brought to light,

have established beyond doubt and cavil as the Word of God, the sincere and earnest seeker of truth will appropriate to himself, always falling back on the Scriptures, and testing every thing by this only infallible touchstone.

This procedure, in the way indicated, we would respectfully hold up as the proper means of putting a stop to the present deplorable state of Protestantism. All symbolical books should at once be divested of their normative authority, which ought to be vindicated to the Bible alone. At the same time the notion that any Creed or Confession embodies the quintessence of the Bible, or that the Bible itself is by any party or individual in all its parts fully understood, must be discarded as false in point of fact, and pernicious in its tendency. On the contrary, the Bible must be thoroughly studied with all collateral studies that are likely to throw any light on it; but, above all things, the student of the Bible must try to live himself into the spirit of the Bible; he must labor to have the life of the God-man transplanted into himself, that he can say of a truth with Paul: "I live, but not I, but Christ liveth in me; for what I live in the flesh, I live by faith in the Son of God," and this faith produces and increases knowledge. With such a state of things both in the individual believer and in the body of believers, all bigotry, narrow-mindedness, and censoriousness, are incompatible, and instead of what we have now so often to deplore, all would strive to excel their neighbor in humility, in goodness, and whatsoever closer insight into God's love and mysteries God may grant to any member, for that all will be really thankful.

## III.—THE BIBLE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

*The Bible in the Public Schools: Arguments in the case of John D. Minor, et al., vs. The Board of Education of the City of Cincinnati, et al. Superior Court of Cincinnati. With the Opinions and Decision of the Court. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1870.*

WE place at the head of this paper the title of a new book, advance sheets of which have been sent to us by the publishers. We do this, not intending a close review of the book, but because its appearance at this time indicates a wide-spread interest in the subject we propose to discuss, and a narration of the events that gave rise to such a work will furnish the best introduction to the discussion.

From the time the common schools of Cincinnati were organized, in 1829, until the first day of November, 1869—a period of forty years—the Bible has been in constant use, a lesson being read every morning, by teacher or pupils, as an opening exercise. This reading was in the common version, unaccompanied by note or comment. Until 1842 no objection whatever was made to this practice by Roman Catholic or Protestant, Bishop Purcell himself being active in support of the schools, and acting sometimes in the Board of Examiners. In 1837 the College of Teachers in Cincinnati passed a resolution to the effect, "That, in the judgment of the College, the Bible should be introduced into every school, from the lowest to the highest, as a school-book." Mr. Alexander Campbell moved an amendment that the Bible should be "without denominational or sectarian comment." *This was seconded by Bishop Purcell,* and was adopted. In 1842 there was some complaint about the children of Roman Catholics being required to read in a Protestant version of the Scriptures, whereupon the following proceedings were had in the School Board:

"COUNCIL CHAMBER, August 29, 1842.

"The Board met pursuant to adjournment. Present: Mr. Perkins, President, and Messrs. Bonsall, Mulford, Meader, Symmes, Morrison, and Poor.

"The President having informed the Board that the Bishop of the Catholic Church had told him, in private, that certain objections existed to the English

common schools, and also to the German common schools, on the part of the Catholics, namely:

"1. That the books used contained obnoxious passages.

"2. That the Catholic children are required to read the Protestant Testament and Bible; and,

"3. That the district libraries contain objectionable works, to which the Catholic children have access without the knowledge of their parents.

"Thereupon the following resolutions were submitted by him and adopted:

"1. *Resolved*, That the President of this Board be requested to inform Bishop Purcell that he is invited by the Board to examine the books used in the English common schools and the German common schools, or to cause them to be examined, and all obnoxious passages pointed out.

"2. *Resolved*, That no pupil of the common schools be required to read the Testament or Bible, if its parents or guardians desire that it may be excused from that exercise.

"3. *Resolved*, That no child shall be allowed to take books from the district libraries, unless at the beginning of each session its parent or guardian make the request, in writing or in person, that it may have that privilege."

No further objection was heard for ten years. In 1852, in view of additional objections, the Board resolved:

"That the opening exercises in every department shall commence by reading a portion of the Bible, by or under the direction of the teachers, and appropriate singing by the pupils; the pupils of the common schools may read such version of the Scriptures as their parents or guardians may prefer, provided that such preference of any version, except the one now in use, be communicated by the parents and guardians to the principal teachers, and that no notes or marginal readings be allowed in the schools, or comments made by the teachers on the text, or any version that is or may be introduced."

From the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Common Schools of Cincinnati, for the school year ending June 30, 1853, we make the following extract:

"But to the charges, on one hand, of using sectarian or obnoxious text-books, which render the schools intolerable by violating the rights of conscience, and, upon the other hand, that we are indifferent to religion and morality, and devote our schools too much to mental instruction merely—to charges of this nature, very freely, and, as it seemed to us, inconsistently used in the late discussion respecting the schools, we must be expected to answer, as the culpability, if any, attaches to this Board.

"Avowing this responsibility, we take occasion to say again that every thing in our power has been done to obviate the first of these complaints, so that our schools may be in fact what they are in law, free and common to all. Whatever in the text-books or administration of the schools is justly offensive, we have again and again consented, if it be inconsistent with the truth, or, even though true, if immaterial in its character or matter, to abrogate whenever it is pointed out."



That the School Board acted in good faith in carrying out the resolutions we have quoted is evident from two facts: (1.) In some of the schools the Douay Bible has been regularly used in the morning lesson. (2.) In 1857 the Jews, who had previously kept up schools of their own, abandoned these, and sent their children to the public schools.

Yet, although the resolutions of 1852 were offered by a Roman Catholic, and were passed by the Board, granting all that the Roman Catholics asked, the very next year the Catholic parochial schools were established, the Catholic children were withdrawn from the public schools, and the whole power of the Roman Catholic Church was arrayed against the public system of education. It is worth while to observe that about this time the movement was a general one among the Roman Catholics in this country, and was evidently in obedience to orders received from head-quarters. Since that time their opposition to our public schools has been constant and unrelenting, clearly proving that their objections were not against the particular features of which they complained, *but against the school system*, their determination being to break it up, if possible; and, if not, to obtain a portion of the public funds, to be used, in their own way, for the separate education of their own children. The entire unreasonableness and evident insincerity of these objections are well set forth in the following extract from the Thirty-Third Annual Report of the Common Schools of Cincinnati, made in 1862:

"We are forced, very reluctantly, to notice intimations from an influential quarter, that the division of the school fund must and will be again agitated and demanded. We should be relieved from any necessity of reply as to this point by the fact that the Constitution of the State imperatively prohibits the right or control of any part of the school funds by any religious or other sect. The threat is accompanied, however, by reproaches against our schools, so groundless and so easily refuted, that we need only state as facts that for twenty years our standing request that any offensive exercises, or books, or passages in books, used in our schools, be made known to us, has never been answered; that for nearly ten years we have offered to supply teachers and schools in every orphan asylum whatever having a sufficient number of children to warrant the employment of a teacher; that we have always carefully excused pupils whose parents desired it from attending the religious exercises with which our schools are daily opened, and that, in order to encourage pupils to attend the religious teachings which their parents prefer, we have expressly required that they shall be excused from school one half day, or two quarter days each week. It has also been suggested, and, doubtless, such an arrangement may be effected, if sufficient numbers encourage it, that at

the hours so allowed children of different denominations of religion might receive the instructions of the clergy in school-rooms temporarily set apart to them."

It must not be forgotten, however, that while the Roman Catholics withdrew their children from the public schools, they did not object to having a number of their members kept in the School Board; and these, together with a number of Freethinkers, or Rationalists, forming an unholy alliance, not more cordial, nor, we fear, more honorable, than that which brought Pilate and Herod together, precipitated the action which gave rise to the legal investigation reported in the book we have mentioned.

Under cover of a representation that the Roman Catholics could be induced to abandon their parochial schools if certain concessions were made, the whole subject was reopened for discussion in the School Board, and after ineffectual attempts at negotiation with the authorities of that Church, Catholics and infidels united their forces and passed the following resolutions:

"*Resolved*, That religious instruction, and the reading of religious books, including the Holy Bible, are prohibited in the Common Schools of Cincinnati, it being the object and intent of this rule to allow the children of the parents of all sects and opinions, in matters of faith and worship, to enjoy alike the benefit of the Common School Fund.

"*Resolved*, That so much of the regulations on the course of study and textbooks in the Intermediate and District Schools (page 213, Annual Report), as reads as follows: 'The opening exercises in every department shall commence by reading a portion of the Bible by or under the direction of the teacher, and appropriate singing by the pupils,' be repealed."

Application was made to the Superior Court for an injunction to restrain the Board from carrying these resolutions into effect. The injunction was granted, and after a full hearing of the case, has been made perpetual.

We have read, with some care, the pleadings in this case. Considering that the lawyers were taken out of their beaten track into new fields of investigation, and that their work, so far as the bar is concerned, was largely that of pioneers, it must be owned that a creditable amount of learning and tact is exhibited in the speeches. The novelty of the question in Court, and the consequent lack of precedents, allowed a wide range in the arguments, and a good deal of irrelevant matter was brought in which smacks more of infidel propagandism in some instances—and of political and religious preju-

dice in others—than of devotion to constitutional principles. Yet as an exhibition of manifold learning and legal acumen, and as a source of varied and much-desired information on a subject which is destined to be agitated all over our country, the book will be regarded with unusual interest. We shall have occasion to refer, in the course of our investigation, to some of the positions taken by the distinguished legal gentlemen who bore a part in this discussion.

In the presence of the facts we have already submitted, we are compelled to reach certain conclusions so far as this school question has *local* bearings; and these conclusions may help to guide us when the question is lifted out of local influences and viewed in its bearings on the interests of education at large.

1. The union of Roman Catholics with Freethinkers to exclude all religious instruction from the public schools can only be regarded as a piece of Jesuitical policy. We can see no *good* reason for the presence of Roman Catholics in the School Board. Avowedly hostile to the system of public instruction, as they are known to be, their presence, and influence, and official power can only be wielded for its destruction; and we hold that there is neither justice nor manliness in this acceptance of a solemn public trust with secret aims in view entirely subversive of that trust. They do not and can not represent the interests of the community at large on the school question; nor can they represent the interests of the Roman Catholics except by treachery to the trust they have accepted; for the Roman Catholics, as a body, *are at war with our school system*—denounce it, repudiate it, and refuse to be known in it, except as seeking its overthrow.

In the Encyclical Letter of Pius IX, dated December 8, 1864, we have, in the enumeration of "the monstrous portents of opinion which especially prevail in this age," the following:

"For you well know, venerable brethren, that at this time not few are found, who, applying to civil society the impious and absurd principle of *naturalism*, as they call it, dare to teach that 'the best interests of public society and civil progress absolutely require that human society be constituted and governed *without any regard to religion*, as though religion did not exist, or at least without any discrimination between the true religion and false ones.' . . . Proceeding from this totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal to the Catholic Church, and to the salvation of souls, which was designated by our predecessor, Gregory XVI, of recent memory, as '*insane*

nonsense,' namely, that '*liberty of conscience and worship is the personal right of every man*, which ought to be proclaimed by law, and asserted in every rightly constituted society; and that citizens have an inherent right to the complete liberty, which must not be restrained by any ecclesiastical or civil authority, of openly and publicly manifesting and declaring any of their thoughts whatever, either in speech, or in print, or in any other manner.' . . . For, teaching and professing the most fatal error of Communism and Socialism, they assert that '*domestic society, or the family, derives the whole ground of its existence from the civil law alone; and consequently that from the civil law alone issue, and on it depend, all rights of parents over their children, and especially the right of providing for instruction and education.*'"

In the Syllabus of Errors condemned by the Pope, we have the following:

"XLVII. The best constitution of civil society requires that the public schools, which are open to the children of all classes, and that public institutions universally, which are devoted to higher literary and scientific instruction and to the education of youth, be released from all authority of the Church, from her moderating influence and interference, and subjected wholly to the will of the civil and political authority [to be conducted] according to the pleasure of the rulers and the standard of the common opinions of the age."

We have nothing to do at present with the correctness or incorrectness of the Pope's estimate of these doctrines. It is undisputed that these are the doctrines avowed by the Freethinkers in the School Board, and that *on just such considerations*, pushed to their extremest limit, was based the exclusion of the Bible and of religious instruction from the common schools. In this the Roman Catholic members of the Board joined, and by means of their votes the measure was carried.

Pius IX says of such doctrines and practices:

"Amidst, therefore, such great perversity of depraved opinions, We, well remembering Our Apostolical office, and full of solicitude for our most holy religion, for sound doctrine, and the salvation of souls, divinely committed to us, and for the welfare of human society itself, have decided to raise again Our Apostolical voice. Therefore, by Our Apostolic authority, *We reprobate, proscribe, and condemn* the evil opinions and doctrines, all and singular, severally mentioned in this Letter, *and will and command that all children of the Catholic Church hold them in every respect as reprobated, proscribed, and condemned.*"

Now we ask, how can Roman Catholics, accepting the authority of the Pope, allow themselves to be brought under these terrible ecclesiastical censures? How can they, with a full knowledge of the errors condemned in the Encyclical Letter and Syllabus, *yet with*

*the consent of the priests and bishops of the Church*, deliberately accept and promote, by their official acts in the School Board, these damnable heresies? The *Catholic Telegraph*, of Cincinnati, was very severe on one Catholic member of the Board whose course was likely to bring about a reconciliation between the Catholics and the School Board, by an arrangement which would have allowed of the religious instruction of Catholic children by the priests; but when the Catholic members of the Board went over to the infidels and enabled them to banish religious instruction altogether, said *Telegraph* not only failed to censure, but actually exulted in, the accomplished fact.

We repeat, that we fail to see any evidence of good faith in this course. They complained that the schools were "godless," even when the Douay Bible could be read in them; yet they assist to banish "all religious instruction" from the schools. Did they thus vote, expecting to send their children to the schools when they were thus abandoned to Atheism? Certainly not. When the School Board had so far humbled itself as to consent to open negotiations with Archbishop Purcell—the representative of a foreign politico-ecclesiastical potentate—this prelate replied to them:

"The entire government of public schools in which Catholic youth are educated can not be given over to the civil power.

"We, as Catholics, can not approve of that system of education for youth which is apart from instruction in the Catholic faith and the teaching of the Church."

But he promised to consult the Pope, and learn from his master whether any thing could be done! What business, then, we ask, have these men in the School Board, except to work mischief and ruin to our school system? *If, by creating strife among the friends of the school system—arraying the friends and enemies of the Bible against each other—they can succeed in alienating the affections of the mass of the people from the schools as Atheistic, and thus pave the way to a dissolution of the school system,* their end is gained.

That they intend this is evident from the uniform and emphatic declarations of their journals, as well as from the official utterances which we have quoted. We quote just a few extracts from the columns of Roman Catholic papers, which teem with this sentiment:

"This teaching every one to read is bearing its fruits in our days, and a very unwholesome fruit it appears to be. If the Catholics ever gain the ascendancy in

this country, as they certainly will, religious freedom in this country is at an end. Heresy and unbelief are crimes—that's the whole of the matter—and where the Catholic religion is an essential part of the public laws of the land, they are punished as other crimes."—*The Shepherd of the Valley*, St. Louis.

"It will be a glorious day for Catholics in this country when, under the blows of justice and morality, our school system shall be shivered to pieces. Until then, modern paganism will triumph."—*Catholic Telegraph*, of Cincinnati.

"We tell our respected contemporary, therefore, that if the Catholic translation of the Books of Holy Writ, which is to be found in the homes of all our better educated Catholics, were to be dissected by the ablest Catholic theologian in the land, and merely lessons to be taken from it—such as Catholic mothers read to their children, and with all the notes and comments in the popular edition, and others added, with the highest Catholic indorsement—and if these admirable Bible lessons, and these alone, were to be ruled as to be read in all the public schools, this would not diminish, in any substantial degree, the objection we Catholics have to letting Catholic children attend the public schools.

"This declaration is very sweeping, but we will prove its correctness:

"*First.* We will not subject our Catholic children to your teachers. You ought to know why, in a multitude of cases.

"*Second.* We will not expose our Catholic children to association with all the children who have a right to attend the public schools! Do you not know why?

"There is no possible programme of common school instruction that the Catholic Church can permit her children to accept. The Catholic Church claims no power to force her instruction on the children of people not Catholic. But she resists the assumption of whomsoever to force on the little ones of the Catholic fold any system of instruction that ignores her teaching, according to which the whole of this life is to fit children, and older people, for an eternal life.

"It is not we that declare so. It is the Catholic Church. In the famous 'Syllabus' of modern errors, condemned by the Catholic Church, and which neither bishop nor layman can dispute without the reproach of rebellion against the Church, is the following, CONDEMNED as against faith:

"That Catholics may approve the plan for teaching youth in schools apart from the inculcation of the Catholic faith, and from the control of the Catholic Church, while such teaching regards only, or, at least, chiefly, the mere knowledge of natural things, and the purposes of our social life here on earth."

"This proposition is CONDEMNED by the Catholic Church, and no Catholic is at liberty to hold it. The *Express*, therefore, may understand how impossible it is for Catholics ever to come to an agreement with persons not attached to any religion, in regard to schools, that she requires to be positively and continually dominated by the Catholic religion."—*From the Freeman's Journal*, November 20th.

"The State must either leave the whole question of education, as it does religion, to the voluntary principle, or it must divide the schools into two classes, the one for Catholics, and the other for Protestants, with the education in each under the supervision and control of its respective religious authority. Nothing less than either the one or the other will secure to Catholics their equal rights, or satisfy the Catholic conscience."—*The New York Tablet*.



We are right, then, in declaring that the union of Catholics with infidels to exclude religious instruction from the schools was a piece of Jesuitical policy. To yield the point would not silence their clamor; to resist it will be to divide and alienate the friends and supporters of the school system, and thus open the way, in time, for the Roman Catholic proposition for a division of the school funds. Let not the friends of popular education be deceived. Their enemies will accept no compromise. Any concessions made to them, short of the entire destruction of our present system, will simply tend to create strife and division among the friends of public education.

2. All this cry of injustice and oppression is nothing better than a trick to gain a purpose. The facts show that there is not the shadow of a cause for it. *They were allowed all they asked.* They were at liberty to use their own version of the Scriptures. If they did not desire this, their children could be excused from attendance at the morning lesson. If there were objectionable passages in any of the text-books, they were respectfully asked to point them out, with a view to their removal. There was no discrimination against them in the selection of teachers, or in the management of the business of the School Board. We defy any man to tell what more could have been done without entirely subverting the constitutional provision that "no religious or other sect or sects shall have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this State."

And does any intelligent man suppose that, even if their demands were all granted, and they were allowed to have separate schools for their children, they would be content? If so, he certainly has a superabundance of that charity that "believeth all things," and, could his charity have sway to grant them all they at present ask, he would soon need a full supply of that charity that "*endureth* all things." Let him look at the unprincipled grasping for wealth and power on the part of this body in New York, and he may learn how readily they can override all considerations of justice to gain their ends.

A law was passed in that State, May 12, 1869, known as Section 10 of the Tax Levy School Law, in these words:

"SEC. 10. Hereafter an annual amount, equal to twenty per cent. on the excise moneys received for said city (New York) in 1868, to be distributed under the

direction of an officer to be appointed for that purpose by the Board of Education of said city (whose compensation shall be paid from such amount), for the support of schools educating children gratuitously in said city, who are not provided for in the common schools thereof, excepting therefrom schools receiving contributions for their support from the city treasury."

Now, it appears from the report of a special committee appointed by the Board of Education, September 15, 1869, that, after a thorough examination of the seating capacity of the school buildings in the city, they found the number of seats to be 125,987, while the average attendance of the year ending December 31, 1868, was but 86,154, thus showing an excess of seats over the average attendance of 39,833. They add that "no additional school buildings will be required during the year 1870, nor for some years to come." Yet here is special legislation for a class of scholars having no existence—scholars "who are not provided for in the common schools"! Under this law \$220,000 were distributed to Catholic and Protestant schools *in nearly the proportion of four to one*. That begins to reveal the *animus* of this strange legislation.

A committee of the Union League Club, Dr. Francis Lieber, chairman, report, after a searching investigation, that in the single year 1869 there was voted from the city treasury for sectarian institutions no less a sum than \$528,742.47! Of this sum the lion's share, of course, went to the Roman Catholics. They received \$412,062. Enough was given for Protestant purposes to throw over the transaction a delusive air of impartiality. To the Episcopalians \$29,339.05 were granted; to the Jews, \$14,404.49; to the Reformed (Dutch), \$12,630.86; there was tossed to the Presbyterians the pittance of \$8,363.44, and a little less (\$7,861.21) was divided between the Methodists, Baptists, and German Evangelicals.

This same committee pushed their investigations further, and brought to light some startling facts touching the grasping avarice of this sect, and the power they have already gained over the civil authorities:

"In addition to this, in 1866, for one dollar a year, the City Government gave to the Archbishop of this sect half a block of ground on Madison and toward Fourth Avenues, worth now \$200,000.

"In 1852 they gave to the same sect the fee of a whole block of ground running from Fifth to Fourth Avenues, and from Fiftieth to Fifty-First streets, by changing a lease into a fee, for the sum of \$83.32, and then, in 1864, paid this same sect \$24,000 for the privilege of extending Madison Avenue across this block, and also

made this sect a donation of \$3,928.84 to pay all assessments on this block for opening Madison Avenue! A moderate estimate of the present value of this block of ground is \$1,500,000.

"In 1846 they gave the same sect, for one dollar, four hundred and fifty feet of the Fifth Avenue end of the block of ground adjoining the last, and between Fifty-First and Fifty-Second streets, and then, in 1857, for one dollar a year rent, gave this sect the rest of this block, thus practically donating the whole block running through from Fifth to Fourth Avenues, which block is now estimated to be worth another \$1,500,000.

"The City Government has thus given \$3,200,000 worth of real estate to a single sect for sectarian purposes!"

In the light of these facts we ask the reader to decide whether any thing is to be gained by concessions to a power that steadily grasps at all it can get, without regard to justice, and continually asks for more?

3. Turning for a moment from the Roman Catholics to the other parties enlisted in this war on the Bible, we are constrained to say that their course indicates any thing else rather than the high regard to the rights of conscience which they so noisily profess. One would think, to read some of the speeches made in the meetings of the School Board, and especially in reading many of the eloquently indignant paragraphs in the speeches of Messrs. Stallo and Matthews before the Superior Court, that the liberties of the people had been ruthlessly invaded, and that the scenes of the Star Chamber or the Spanish Inquisition were about to be repeated in our land. One of them talks very indignantly, indeed, of the people having the Bible crammed down their throats. We are inclined to think that the poor, oppressed people must feel under a heavy debt of obligation to these learned gentlemen for enlightening them on the question of their bitter oppressions, for they are like the client who wept bitterly under the eloquent and pathetic pleadings of his lawyer, declaring that he never had an idea before how badly he had been used. We are very sure that the comparatively insignificant number of signers who petitioned the School Board to take this action were not aware of any grievous oppression, or, if they were, *they were at a loss how to utter it*, as it is said a majority of them could only express themselves in a + or an ×. Pray where was the ruthless invasion of rights? Who were the sufferers? Not the Jews, for they voluntarily abandoned their own schools, and sent their children to the public schools as altogether preferable. Not

the Nullifidians, for they could have their children excused from the morning lesson. Not the Roman Catholics, for they could have the Douay Bible for their children, or they could have their children excused from attendance at the morning lesson, or they could have arrangements perfected by which, at stated times, their children could be withdrawn into separate rooms, to receive religious instructions from their own priests. Every conscientious scruple, and every dictate of prejudice, even, was thus fully met. What, then, was this action of the School Board for? Not to secure the rights of conscience to Nullifidians, Jews, or Roman Catholics—for these were already secured—but to *compel Bible-loving Protestants to sacrifice their rights of conscience by coercing them into an utterly godless system of education.* So far, then, from being a war *for* the rights of conscience, it is a war *against* these rights, an effort to compel others to *their* standard of right, a refusal to allow to others the same liberty that was already granted to themselves. Now, when it is remembered that the number of people who demanded this surrender of the rights of others was only about 1,000,\* and of such refinement of culture as to indicate their aristocracy in the world of letters by the signature of X, and that the petitioners against this change, who simply asked for themselves that the Bible be continued in the schools, without the least desire to compel any to use it who were conscientiously opposed to its use, amounted to some 12,000, it must be regarded as the most *enlightened* championship of the rights of conscience on the part of the Nullifidians, and the most *delicate* and *tender* devotion to the doctrine of *perfect equality* of rights of which the present age can boast!

Seriously, we are compelled to say, with all these facts before us, that a more unprovoked, unreasonable, and intolerant attempt, under the mask of Liberty, to force the pet Atheistical notions of a handful of people into legal dominion over the consciences of a community whose traditionary memories and historical antecedents link them with the Bible as the very charter of their liberties, has never been attempted in this land. It is the very quintessence of irreligious intolerance. "If they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" The men who can coolly engineer such

\*The present number on record is 800. Of these a Roman Catholic presented the names of 264, and an unbeliever 536.

proscriptive measures through a School Board, in the heart of a Christian community, in the face of the public sentiment of this age, and attempt, under the sacred name of Liberty, to rob the mass of their fellow-citizens of a treasured right, when their own rights and prejudices have been carefully guarded, would be very Torquemadas of inquisitorial intolerance and cruelty if power were once lodged in their hands.

We are aware that this view of the case spoils many fine passages of declamatory eloquence in the speeches before the Superior Court; but we can not help it. It is all very fine to declaim against tyranny—to expose the intolerance of sects—to drag out of the past the bloody records of persecuting intolerance—and to invoke the Spirit of Liberty, under whose ægis this broad and glorious land is protected from every invasion of civil or religious despotism, to save us, in this dark and portentous hour, from the threatening assumptions of ecclesiastical tyranny, and spare the tender consciences of unbelievers from the terrible doom of having “the Bible crammed down their throats;” but when this aid is invoked simply to enable infidels to rob Christians of the Bible, and to assist Roman Catholics to teach their doctrines at the public expense, and that, too, when the record shows that there has been no interference with the conscience of either Roman Catholic or Infidel, the whole dramatic and pathetic display degenerates into a most laughable farce, and our heroic defenders of Liberty are simply first-rate comic actors. It may be well that the case of their clients be presented with all possible skill, and its weak points as adroitly concealed as forensic art will admit of; but surely these learned gentlemen did not expect that either the honorable Court or an intelligent public would be alarmed by these fanciful representations of an inchoate politico-ecclesiastical Protestant despotism!

Having said thus much on the local bearings of this question, we proceed to the consideration of it as a question affecting the interests of popular education in our country.

The persistent agitation of the subject by the Roman Catholics, and their growing power in our country—already felt in their control of municipal and State politics—have caused the proceedings in Cincinnati to be watched with painful interest in all parts of the land. It is evident that these proceedings have been invested with more

than local interest; they are regarded but as the skirmishing of advance forces preparatory to a great battle in which the people at large will be called to bear a part. The newspapers, therefore, are already teeming with discussions of the subject, and the people are preparing to range under different banners.

There are three principal theories of public education broached.

1. That the State is the creature of the Church; and can not educate, except under the direction and for the benefit of the Church. This is the Roman Catholic theory.

2. That the State is entirely separate from the Church, and from religion; is purely a secular institution—a social compact. Any education by the State, therefore, must be purely secular; religious instruction, and, in the main, moral instruction also, must belong to the Church and the family. This is the Nullifidian theory, in which they are joined by some Protestant religionists.

3. That while Church and State are rightfully separated, and made to occupy entirely independent spheres, Religion and the State are *not* divorced. Religion is essential to the well-being and well-doing of the State; and in as much and in as far as morality and religion are essential to the State, in so much and in so far must any education fostered by the State be moral and religious. This is the Protestant theory.

4. There is yet another theory broached, which is destined, in a certain contingency, to secure a large body of adherents: That the right of the State to educate is at least questionable; and that, in the event of a failure to harmonize Catholics, Protestants, and Nullifidians in the support of a general system of education, it will be desirable to cut the Gordian knot by the abolition of State education, leaving every family and every sect to provide for its own.

What we have called the Protestant theory is that which generally prevails in our country. Our public school systems are based on this theory, which is now assailed by the ecclesiasticism of Rome on one hand, and by the anti-ecclesiastical, anti-religious forces of Nullifidianism on the other. The ecclesiastical pretensions of Rome find little favor in this land. They are mainly influential and dangerous through the unity and increasing numbers of that Church, to which immigration supplies yearly a large force of blind adherents. The theory of the Nullifidians has a much better prospect of adop-



tion. The generous freedom granted in this country—the great benefits resulting from the separation of Church and State—the protection of all classes of religionists in their respective faiths, and the dark and bloody records of the past touching religious persecution, showing that no religious party can be safely trusted with political power, and that the safety of our Republic depends on a suspicious watchfulness against all encroachments of religious sects on political rights and privileges; all these considerations lead our people to lend a willing ear to every suspicion of sectarian usurpation, and to entertain the most radical ideas of the divorce of religion and politics. To speak, therefore, of Christianity as a part of the common law of the land, or to declare religion to be essential to the permanency and prosperity of the State, sounds harshly in the ears of a liberty-loving people. There are immediate visions of racks, dungeons, and gibbets; of spies, inquisitors, and executioners; of Star Chambers, and Courts of High Commission, and Smithfield fires; and it is easy to nurse these fears into wicked enthusiasm against the most wholesome conservative influences at work in society, until, like Sampson, in a blind zeal and with insane strength, they are ready to pull down the pillars which protect themselves as well as their enemies, and involve all in one common ruin. We must step carefully here, for grave consequences depend on every step we take.

The writer is disposed to be quickly and passionately jealous of every doctrine and of every movement that even squints toward politico-ecclesiastical despotism. He has gone over the ground of this educational controversy, predisposed to favor the Nullifidian theory. All his own educational proclivities lead him in that direction. He hates Protestant tyranny as cordially as he does Papal tyranny; and Infidel tyranny not less than either. If he had to be subjected to ecclesiastical censures and tortures, he would prefer to fall into the hands of the Roman Catholics as being the most experienced and most accomplished ecclesiastical tyrants, with whom the whole matter of oppressing the conscience and torturing the body is reduced to such perfection of system, that he would expect a thoroughly scientific exploration of his heresies, excruciation of his body, and condemnation of his soul. He would hate to be delivered over to mere apprentices at the trade of ecclesiastical coercion, to be annoyed by the bad taste, ungraceful bunglings, and pretentious impudence

which they must necessarily, from sheer inexperience, exhibit. He would rather, therefore, if we must have an ecclesiastical tyranny in this country, hand it over to those who are "to the manner born," and who have carefully studied murder as one of the fine arts, than impose the awful trust on either the Evangelicals or the Nullifidians. Yet, in examining the arguments on this question, on all sides, with as much impartiality as possible, and with whatever partiality possessed him inclining decidedly in the direction already indicated, he has been compelled to accept the Protestant theory as decidedly preferable to any of the others mentioned, for which he will now proceed to give some of his reasons.

*1. The free institutions of this country are the legitimate offspring of Christianity.*

The force of this statement was so keenly felt by one of the counsel for the defendants (Judge Stallo), that he made a strenuous effort to disprove it. After quoting from Lecky's *History of Rationalism* to show the prostrate condition of society in Europe before the seventeenth century, he says:

"These words of Mr. Lecky, the truth of which no one with the book of history before him can successfully question, sufficiently show how erroneous is the assumption that human freedom is the product of Christian civilization; that Christianity has nursed the growth of spiritual or temporal independence. Christianity, like every other institution, must submit to the judgment of history; it must be tried by what it has done and avouched when it had the power to assert itself. I have already admitted that Christianity proclaimed the universal brotherhood of men; if this, its cardinal principle, had in time proved to be the principle of its development as an institution, as an authoritative and efficient teacher and disciplinarian of men, as a producer of human civilization, its history would have been a continued assertion of liberty, and our opponents would be right in maintaining that our free institutions are founded upon Christian civilization. But unfortunately the history of Christianity has been, in all its phases, and at all times, the continued assertion of despotism. This is true not only of Christianity in the middle ages, but of Christianity in the earliest as well as the most recent times."

Now we beg leave to say that even Mr. Lecky does not bear Judge Stallo out in his broad statements. In the very quotation made by him, Mr. Lecky says: "From this frightful condition Europe was at last rescued by the intellectual influences that produced the Reformation, by the teaching of those great philosophers who clearly laid down the conditions of inquiry, and by those bold innovators who, with the stake of Bruno and Vanini before their eyes, dared to

challenge directly the doctrines of the past." And as to his statement that "the history of Christianity in the earliest as well as the most recent times has been the continued assertion of despotism," his quotation from Lecky is wide of the mark. Lecky says: "*From the very moment the Church obtained civil power under Constantine, the general principle of coercion was admitted and acted on,*" etc. Ah! "from the time the Church obtained civil power under Constantine"! But the Church had a history back of that—a history of triumphs so extensive and mighty that it became the interest of the politic Constantine to take it under the patronage of the State. Why does he not judge of Christianity *on its own merits*, and in its legitimate workings before it was corrupted by State patronage? Judge Stallo has conceded, in his own estimate of Christianity, a regenerative and emancipating power as essentially its own:

"Before proceeding to say what I desire to say upon this subject, I beg leave, at the outset, to disclaim any intention to derogate from the just claims of Christianity for its achievements in history. I yield to no man in reverence for the institutions and forms which have perpetuated the great moral traditions of the human race, which have developed its blind, groping instincts of right into consciousness of duty, and by their discipline hardened the precepts of God or man into habits of virtuous life. I revere Christianity as being one of these institutions, and, in the days of its purity, the noblest of them. I revere it, because to Christianity I owe a part, at least, of that little moral culture which enables me to-day to bow with becoming humility under the commiseration so tenderly expressed for the unbelievers by my Christian friend on the other side. Above all, I revere Christianity because, in proclaiming the spiritual dignity of man, and asserting the accountability of the human soul for agreement between life and conviction, it has established—in theory, at least—beyond the possibility of denial, the freedom of thought and conscience."

Christianity is, then, "in its purity"—not when corrupted by political alliances—the "noblest" of the institutions that have developed the blind, groping instincts of the race into consciousness of duty; it proclaims "the spiritual dignity of man," the brotherhood of the race, and establishes by its doctrine, beyond the possibility of denial, "the freedom of thought and conscience;" yet it is not to be admitted as a factor in the production of our present civilization, and the book which teaches all this is not fit to be read in our schools!

Let the reader carefully contemplate the moral portraiture of the pagan world furnished by the pencil of inspiration in the first chapter of Romans—a portraiture abundantly verified from pagan sources,

and in view of the material Christianity had to work on, the opposition it had to encounter, the time-honored systems it had to subvert, the political and ecclesiastical powers it had to overcome, the might of the civilization it sought to overthrow—reflect that within three centuries it had so far revolutionized society as to make it a matter of policy, on the part of the Roman Emperors, to constitute it the religion of the empire; and then say whether Mr. Stallo has a right to ignore this matchless moral and religious revolution, and begin with Constantine as furnishing the “earliest” development of this religion. It is the old rhyme of skeptics—the array of the *abuses* of this religion as if they were its legitimate *uses*. Christianity was corrupted. The incorporation of the very philosophies which Rationalists admire above the Gospel, corrupted it. Pagan religions, Judaism, the union of Church and State, the incursions of northern barbarians, all contributed to a growing apostasy, until the inspirations and genius of this religion were almost entirely lost. But one fact is worthy of note: every step in this degeneracy was a step away from the Word of God; the farther you get into the depths of this fearful apostasy, the farther you get from the Bible, until at last the Bible is entirely withdrawn from the knowledge of men. And when we come to the revival of the spirit of liberty and a new era of progress, we come to a period when the Bible is restored to the people. Just in proportion as it becomes the book of the people do we witness the growth of nations in freedom and progress; just as it is withheld do we witness the growth of despotism, the stagnation of public spirit, the political and moral degradation of the masses. Italy, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, France, England, Scotland, Ireland, Mexico, South America, the United States, all bear witness to the truth of these statements. *The growth of Freedom has been among Christian nations, and especially in Bible lands.* Paganism yields no civilization like ours. Mohammedanism does not. Roman Catholicism does not keep pace with Protestantism in freedom and progress. Those Protestant nations are farthest in advance which most reverence and honor the Bible. Yet in the face of these undisputed facts it is boldly asserted that we do not owe our civilization to Christianity, but that its history is a history of subservience to despotism! We have no space for a connected argument on this question, and simply condense the facts of history into a few brief statements.

2. *Our American civilization is the offspring of Protestant Christianity.*

We need not spend many words on this. We know all that is said about the Roman Catholics in Maryland, and, to avoid controversy, we admit it all. But that is an exceedingly unimportant factor in the problem of American civilization. The country at large was settled by Protestants. They brought their religion with them. Many of them came here on account of their religion, and planted the institutions of the New World in the fear of God and a profound veneration of the Bible. They inwrought their religious convictions with all the affairs of State, and shaped their institutions in harmony with the ideas of human nature, its dignity, its rights, and its wants, which they had inherited as Protestants, or which had been learned by them in the furnace of affliction. They succeeded; and we inherit their land, their religion, and their free institutions. They planted the tree, and we eat the fruit. Perhaps Judge Stallo, who denies to Christianity the credit of this civilization, and who talks quite philosophically about "the ethics of society as a part of the grand order of the universe," and of "the laws of the evolution of morals," can tell why, in this Christian land, among a Bible-loving people, a mere handful succeeded in effecting a revolution against all the power of England, while infidel France, with abundant force, in the midst of grand military achievements, with a bright array of philosophers, orators, statesmen, and military chieftains, aided by the prestige of our success, ingloriously failed. There was a civilization that had no Christ and no Bible in it. It was a failure in the midst of all the means of success. Ours was a success in the midst of the strongest tendencies to failure. By what "part of the grand order of the universe," and owing to what phase of "the law of the evolution of morals" did we succeed and they fail? It is surely a significant contrast; and it is somewhat significant, too, that in the pains-taking array, on the part of counsel, of all the ugly facts they could muster of persecution and intolerance, on the part of Roman Catholics and Protestants, there should have been so careful a reticence as to the horrors of the French Revolution—the insane cruelty and intolerance of the anti-Bible, anti-Christian Nullifidians! Frenchmen talked as learnedly of the "grand order of the universe," and "the law of the evolution of morals," of human rights, and freedom of conscience, as

our present opponents of the Bible in the schools; and they had an opportunity of demonstrating, once for all, what an Atheistic nation is capable of. It is yet too soon to lull the American people into forgetfulness of the fearful lesson.

3. *The Christian religion is recognized by the National and State Governments as the religion of the people of this country.*

We do not care to enter on a consideration of the question whether Christianity is a part of the common law or not. It is so regarded in most of the States, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio to the contrary is hardly more than the expression of an opinion, when the case to be decided did not call for nor rest on such a judgment. But we do not intend to discuss it, because, if so held, it is held in so loose a sense—so different from the meaning attached to the same phrase in English Courts—as to diminish its importance. In the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the celebrated Girard Will case, we have what may be regarded as a fair statement of the sense in which the Christian religion is a part of the common law:

“It is also said, and said truly, that the Christian religion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania. But this proposition is to be received with its appropriate qualifications, and in connection with the Bill of Rights of that State as found in its Constitution of government. The Constitution of 1790 (and the like provision will, in substance, be found in the Constitution of 1776, and in the existing Constitution of 1838) expressly declares ‘that all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.’ Language more comprehensive for the complete protection of every variety of religious opinion could scarcely be used, and it must have been intended to extend equally to all sects, whether they believed in Christianity or not, and whether they were Jews or infidels. So that we are compelled to admit that, although Christianity be a part of the common law of the State, yet it is so in this qualified sense, that its divine origin and truth are admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers, or the injury of the public.”

But this is, after all, not an unimportant matter. “The divine origin and truth” of Christianity are admitted; the divine origin and truth of other religions are not admitted; and, although the adherents of other religions have protection from persecution and



equality as fellow-citizens, they labor under the disadvantage that the truth of their religion is not legally admitted, while that of Christianity is, and they must accept whatever of disadvantage or annoyance this fact occasions.

Some stress is laid on the fact that, while most of our States recognize the Christian religion in some way, the National Government does not so recognize it, the Constitution and the oath of office carefully excluding all reference to it. We think it due to candor to admit that there is some force in this. Mr. Jefferson's influence in the affairs of the nation was controlling. Through his sympathy with France he became enamored of Jean Jacques Rousseau's idea of society as a social compact, and was disposed to ignore religion entirely so far as the State is concerned; and in this he was not alone. Yet the National Government did and does recognize the Christian religion as the religion of this country. In the appointment of fast-days and days of thanksgiving, in the employment of chaplains in Congress and in the army and navy, in the cessation of business on the Lord's Day, and in the general drift of legislative enactments to harmonize with the demands of Christian morality, there is a constant recognition, however quiet and unobtrusive, of the fact that the Christian religion is recognized as the religion of this country. As an instance, October 12, 1778, Congress passed the following resolution:

*"Whereas, true religion and good morals are the only solid foundations of public liberty and happiness;*

*"Resolved, That it be and it is hereby earnestly recommended to the several States to take the most effectual measures for the encouragement thereof."*

Another resolution, on the 7th of March, 1778, appoints a day of fasting and prayer to God, that, among other blessings, "it may please him to bless our schools and seminaries of learning, and make them *nurseries of true piety, virtue, and useful knowledge.*"

In the celebrated ordinance of 1787, which gave to us of the North-West our glorious domain, in the "articles of compact between the original States and the people and States in the said territory," we have the following:

"ARTICLE III. Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."

Here is unmistakably a National recognition of *religion*—of the *Christian* religion—because this is the religion of the people; and, as Chief Justice Clayton said in one of his decisions, “The decision is a sound one between a religion preferred by *law*, and a religion preferred by *the people* without the coercion of law; between a legal establishment which the Constitution expressly forbids, and a religious creed freely chosen by the people themselves.”

In the State governments, however, the recognition is more explicit, as may be seen in the speeches of counsel in the Cincinnati School case. While there is a clear recognition of a “natural and indefeasible right” on the part of all men to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and a protection guaranteed to all men in the exercise of that right, even that does not so completely divorce the State from religion as many seem to imagine. It recognizes their right to *worship* God, but not their right to deny him, or blaspheme his name, or worship idols; so that even here, while providing the amplest protection for freedom of conscience in the matter of worship, a most religious sentiment breathes in every word of the utterance, and not the slightest countenance is given to irreligion, atheism, or idolatry. But, while sacredly guarding the rights of every worshiper of “Almighty God,” it does not follow that the Mohammedan, or the Hindoo, or the Deist, stands on the same footing, in all respects, with the Christian. In penitentiaries, asylums, reform schools, and other institutions under State patronage, the Bible is used, chaplains are employed, preaching and teaching from the Bible are had, and Christian worship is conducted. This is done at the public expense; and every Mohammedan, Hindoo, or Deist must pay his proportion of the expense for this worship, while he may be, in conscience, opposed to it. When legislative or national aid is given to colleges or universities, on the ground that religion and morality are essential to the well-being of the State, the Christian religion is the religion meant, because it is the religion of the people of this country. Judge Matthews objects to the word *toleration*; but it is a fact, and must be a fact, that so long as the majority of the people of this country are Christian, other religions are simply *tolerated*. They do not and can not, in law, any more than in public opinion, stand on an equal footing. All sects of Christians stand on an equal footing; but adherents of other relig-

ions are tolerated. The toleration is large and generous, as it ought to be; but so long as we are true to our traditionary heritage, we can not consent to admit other religions to an equality with Christianity; *for we owe our liberties to Christianity*—no other religion could have given birth to them; *and their preservation depends on the perpetuation of the religion to which we owe them.*

It was in view of the fact that "religion, morality, and knowledge are *necessary to good government*," that schools were to be established. Congress says so. Such was the language of the ordinance of 1787. The Constitution of Ohio adopts the language. The same sentiment belongs to most of our State Constitutions. It is impossible, therefore, to ignore the fact that the Christian religion is recognized alike in the State and nation as the religion of the people of this country, and that this religion is held by legislatures, by courts, and by the people at large, to be essential to the maintenance of good government.

This brings us to a troublesome point. "If Christianity is the religion of the people of this country," it will be said, "and the State recognizes that fact, where is our boasted equality of rights? Why may not the State become an engine of persecuting tyranny? What protection have those of other religions against trespasses on their conscientious convictions?" The answer is—and we solicit special attention to this answer—our whole theory of government is permeated with an idea which other governments have not recognized, namely: *that religion does not need the State, but the State needs religion.* The governments of the Old World are pitched on the principle *that religion needs the State.* The State is subservient to religion—religion is an end, the State is the means; and hence becomes an engine of religious despotism. That idea has never brought forth liberty. France proceeded on the principle that the State did not need religion, and therefore banished it. The result was fatal to liberty. Our Government places religion and the State in different attitudes. It denies that the State is necessary to religion, but admits and contends that religion is necessary to the State. *The welfare of the State is the supreme end*, so far as civil government is concerned; religion is only valuable to the State as a means to that end. That far it has to do with encouraging and promoting religion, but no farther. The State, therefore, never legislates about religion

*for the benefit of religion*, or of any sect; indeed, knows no sects; but all its legislation touching religion is with a view to derive benefit to the State, because, as already quoted, "religion, morality, and knowledge are necessary to good government."

In the discussion of this question in Court, this distinction was not brought out as it should have been. The counsel for the defense proceeded on the assumption that certain sects were seeking the aid of Government for their peculiar notions of religion—that religion was a suitor for State patronage. Far from it. Religion needs no *such* indorsement or patronage. Her supernatural charms are infinitely superior to any gaudy decorations or adornments the State can provide for her. The Bible does not rest its claims on the fact that the schools adopt it. It rests on its own divine credentials, and craves no poor attestation such as School Boards can furnish. But it is on the ground *that the State needs religion*—that the schools need the Bible—that a godless, atheistic education will not make good citizens—that the demand is made for the Bible in the schools.

The only ground on which the State has a right to educate at all is, *that it is for its benefit*. Apart from the consideration that education is necessary to make good citizens, we have failed to find any good reason why the State should take this work out of the hands of parents. *And the same reason stands for moral and religious education*. It is essential to the well-being of the State that her citizens be morally and religiously educated. Mere intellectual culture will not make good citizens. The *heart* must be developed; the moral nature, which is the higher nature, must be trained aright. To talk of educating, while that nature which is the chief glory of man is left uncared for, is as if the State would attempt to educate the *feet* of its citizens, while leaving the *head* entirely unprovided for.

Here, we think, is the main defect in the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs. They failed to make what ought to have been made of this important distinction. Mr. King saw it, and used it with some effect; but failed, we think, to give it the prominence it deserves. The only writer we have read who seems to appreciate fully its importance is Rev. J. H. Seelye, who, in a number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* (Vol. xiii, No. 52), deals with it in a masterly way. We are pleased to see that Judge Hagans, in his opinion, quotes from this article, and gives to this distinction its just prominence. *The*

*welfare of the State*—not the welfare of the Church—is the rule. As far as the legitimate purposes of the State need to be subserved by religion, the State employs this aid; but one legitimate purpose of the State being protection to all in their rights of conscience, the State can not rightfully employ religion in such a way as to oppress or persecute any. As far as any religion, or even irreligion, can exist *without injury to the State*, just so far it is free and entitled to protection; but if they make demands or attempts that interfere with the welfare of the State, or subvert its peace or security, such demands must be refused, such attempts must be prevented. Hence, if *polygamy* is detrimental to the welfare of the State, no plea of the rights of conscience can prevail against the welfare of the State. They have no business in this country with such a conscience, and must go elsewhere to enjoy it. If proceedings are not had against such a practice, it is merely *toleration* on the part of the State, and not an obligation arising from the rights of conscience. If a heathen were to attempt, in this land, to drown his children in a sacred river, or to immolate himself, no difference how conscientiously, the welfare of the State requires that it shall be stopped. And so, *if it is settled that religious instruction in the schools is essential to that education which makes good citizens, no man's conscience can be allowed to stand in the way.*

There has been much earnest talk about the rights of conscience. It is well. There is need of jealous watchfulness. In the light of all past history—the pope in every man's heart, the larger pope in every party, the numerous and powerful popes in Church and State, whose intolerance is only equaled by their sincerity, and only to be measured by the power in the hands of its asserters—and in view of the stealthy approaches and plausible disguises of this spirit of despotism, it is not possible to be too vigilant in detecting the slightest intimations of its presence. But there is another side to this question. The rights of conscience are sacred; but the safety and perpetuity of a government that protects the rights of conscience are also sacred. There are limits to the rights of conscience. *Salus populi suprema lex.* The safety of the *people*—not of an individual or a handful against the people—is the supreme law. When a man's conscience conflicts with the public safety, his conscience, and not the public safety, must yield; and that for the best of reasons. He

owes the protection of his rights of conscience to the State; and if, for the sake of his conscience, in some particular, he invades and destroys the peace of the State, he has destroyed the only power that protects his rights of conscience, and has lost those rights in all particulars. It is, therefore, suicidal. Sometimes the individual conscience will conflict with the general good. The cases are not infrequent. The individual right must be waived, not only for the sake of the general good, but for the good of the sufferer himself, since the advantages he reaps from a free government vastly outweigh the individual evil he is called to suffer. The Atheist must forego the privilege of testifying in a court of justice. The Jew must be content to suffer loss from the stoppage of his traffic on Sunday. Quakers must remain in exile from the honors of judgeship, and pay the penalty of their conscientious scruples about going to war. Up to the point of interference with the welfare and security of the State every man's conscience is respected, and all stand on a common level of freedom; but the moment a man's conscience arrays itself against the safety of the State—no difference what may be his religion—the State asserts its power against his conscience, and that, too, in the interests of freedom. Men of all religions and of no religion may share all the blessings of freedom together in one common political brotherhood, and follow their own consciences as long as they do not trespass on the rights of others. Even idolaters—though this, we incline to think, is by mere tolerance—may come and build their temples, and burn incense to their gods. But if any religious rite of theirs—say that of human sacrifice—interferes with the general weal, no plea of conscience will have the weight of a feather against the demands of the law.

Now, although the reader may have been startled at the first announcement of this doctrine, by this time, we presume, he is prepared to admit its justness. It is no new doctrine; it is not the argument of despots, but of enlightened freemen. Says the Supreme Court of Maine:

"*'Salus populi suprema lex'* is a maxim of universal application, and when liberty of conscience would interfere with the paramount rights of the public, it ought to be restrained. Even Mr. Jefferson, than whom a more resolute champion of liberty never lived, claimed no indulgence for any thing that is detrimental to society, though it springs from a religious belief, or no belief at all. His position is that civil government is instituted only for temporal objects, and that spiritual



matters are legitimate subjects of civil cognizance no farther than they may stand in the way of these objects. As far as the interests of society are involved, its right to interfere on the principle of self-preservation is not disputed."

Now, Roman Catholics are welcomed, in this country, to equal citizenship with all others. But their conscience, it seems, arrays itself against our common schools, and, if the truth were known, against freedom of the press and of speech, and against the very genius of our government. We grant their sincerity. We desire them to enjoy the largest liberty. But the moment they array themselves against the institutions of the country, and make demands which assail the safety of the State, the State is not bound to respect their conscience. They must be content to suffer; and if they do not choose to suffer, they are at liberty to depart to any other country where they can be better suited. The history of the Cincinnati schools proves that the utmost concessions that can be made do not relieve their conscience—for their conscience varies according to orders from Rome. Archbishop Purcell's conscience is not to-day what it was in 1837. To comply with their demands is to interfere with the safety of the State. It can not be done. They must accept the best that a free government can do for them, without sacrificing its own existence; or, if that is not possible, seek a home under some more congenial Government. The government of the United States, or of Ohio, does not propose to cut its own throat, nor allow them to execute such a task. *Salus populi suprema lex.*

We have not thought it worth while to examine the Roman Catholic scheme for a division of the school funds. It is evident, at a glance, that it can not be done in Ohio. The Constitution forbids it. It would necessarily prove fatal to our school system—the *very thing the Catholics desire*. In England, and on the Continent, the experiment of sectarian schools under State patronage creates intense dissatisfaction; and for us to adopt it, at the very time that their experience makes them weary of it, would be folly indeed.

Now, as to the conscience of the Nullifidians, we have already shown that they are not sufferers. They are allowed to keep their children away from the morning lesson; and this rule will generally prevail in their behalf, in communities where they make the request. Their trouble is that they can not coerce the consciences of others into submission to their demands. But we venture now to say that

while we approve of the lenity exercised toward them in excusing their children from religious instruction, *they have no right to insist on it*. Like the Roman Catholics, if their conscience comes in conflict with the general good, they must yield to the State, as good citizens, and consent to suffer such an amount of wrong as is inflicted in the effort of the State to make good citizens of their children. We hope they may never have any thing more serious to complain of than that of having their children well instructed in the valuable knowledge and pure morality of the Bible.

It is sometimes asked, what if a majority of unbelievers, or of Roman Catholics, were to gain possession of the country? Unquestionably, in that case, according to the genius of our republican institutions—and if not in accordance with it, the result would be still the same—Christianity would no longer be, as it now is, the religion of the people; the laws and institutions would change, *and our liberties would perish*; for the liberties guaranteed to us here can co-exist with no other religion than that which is now recognized. Such, at least, is our firm conviction.

We have said nothing in this paper on the claims of the Bible—the question, as it has been urged on us, being a much broader one, namely, whether any moral or religious instruction should be imparted in the public schools. The question of religious instruction being once settled, it will no longer be a question whether the Bible should be *the* book for moral and religious instruction. We make an extract from an argument by R. H. Dana, which so well expresses, in few words, what needs to be said of the Bible as a school-book, as to supersede the necessity of farther labor in this direction :

“As a well of pure English undefiled, as a fountain of pure idiomatic English, it has not its equal in the world. It was fortunately—may we not, without presumption, say providentially?—translated at a time when the English language was in its purest state. It has done more to *anchor* the English language in the state it then was, than all other books together. The fact that so many millions of each succeeding generation, in all parts of the world where the English language is used, read the same great lessons in the same words, not only keeps the language anchored where it was in its best state, but it preserves its universality, and frees it from all material provincialisms and *patois*, so that the same words, phrases, and idioms are used in London, New York, San Francisco, Australia, China, and India. To preserve this unity and steadfastness, the Book of Common Prayer has done much; Shakspeare, Milton, and Bunyan have done much; but the English Bible has done tenfold more than they all.

"From the common English Bible we derive our household words, our phrases and illustrations, the familiar speech of the people. Our associations are with its narratives, its parables, its histories, and its biographies. If a man knew the Bible in its original Greek and Hebrew by heart, and did not know the common English version, he would be ignorant of the speech of the people. In sermons, in public speeches, from the pulpit, the bar, and the platform, would come allusions, references, quotations—that exquisite electrifying by conductors, by which the heart of a whole people is touched by a word, a phrase, in itself nothing, but every thing in its power of conducting—and all this would be to him an unknown world. No greater wrong, intellectually, could be inflicted on the children of a school, ay, even on Roman Catholic children, than to bring them up in ignorance of the English Bible. As well might a master instruct his pupil in Latin, and send him to spend his days among scholars, and keep him in ignorance of the words of Virgil, and Horace, and Cicero, and Terence, and Tacitus. As a preparation for life, an acquaintance with the common English Bible is indispensable."

We make no apology for the length of this paper; for we have been handling a question of very grave importance, and one which will be forced on the people of the United States for decision. We see nothing but mischief in the course of the Roman Catholics; and in view of their avowed hostility, not only to common schools, but to freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and to a government which does not own the supremacy of their Church, as well as in view of their proclaimed intention to possess this country for their own, we feel a necessity laid upon us to contribute according to our ability to unmask their designs on this school question, and call public attention to the rapidly approaching crisis when it must be decided. Nor can we see any promise of good in the atheistic theory of education and government. Under a noisy profession of devotion to the rights of conscience, we perceive a stubborn purpose of infidel propagandism, and an entire want of respect for the consciences of others. An atheistic government can not prosper; and atheistic schools will rapidly prepare the way for an atheistic government. We ask nothing for the benefit of religion at the hands of the State, but we know that the State much needs the conservative and purifying and ennobling power of religion to sustain it. In the clash of interests, the rage of selfish passions, and the corrupting influence of material prosperity, no godless government can long maintain the interests of freedom against the violence of the mob, the wiles of the demagogue, and the tyranny of majorities. The fear of God once lost, the sense of accountability deadened, the conscience left unenlightened and uneducated, and all divine sanctions withdrawn from government, our

gallant ship of State, abandoned to the winds and waves, no longer guided by a light from on high, nor steered by a divine chart and compass, would soon be driven to destruction.

We are making a bold and hazardous experiment in this country. Continually enlarging our domain and multiplying conflicting interests, we are at the same time clothing with sovereignty every ignorant and degraded specimen of humanity that reaches our shores, and trusting the destinies of the land to the prejudices, whims, and caprices of an uneducated mass of people of every conceivable shade of morals and religion. We are vigorously pushing material enterprises for the increase of wealth, and spending much for intellectual culture. We are inviting into full play all the selfish instincts of our nature, and plying every art for the accumulation of riches. Unless moral and religious culture shall keep pace with our material prosperity and our extension of domain, and a wise system of education shall lift up the constantly inflowing masses of population to intelligence, virtue, and piety, it is impossible that the experiment can succeed. It is not a time to emasculate the moral forces at work in our schools, nor is it a time to encourage such distraction in our councils as shall endanger the prosperity, and perhaps the existence, of our public school system. The amount of moral instruction afforded in these schools is, at best, quite limited, and needs to be increased, rather than diminished. The instinct of self-preservation should prompt us to reject every proposition and resist every movement tending either to Romish sectarianism or the practical Atheism with which, in Cincinnati, it has formed so unholy an alliance.

## IV.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF FAITH.

THAT the world by wisdom or philosophy knows not God is one of the firmest convictions of our heart. The religion of God is a matter of divine revelation, and must be received, if received at all, through faith; there is, however, a philosophy of receiving the things of God through faith that should be considered, and considered profoundly, by all who wish to have consistent views of God's plan of justifying the ungodly. It pains us, therefore, to observe in many quarters a disposition to ignore philosophy in the discussion of this vital subject. It may be true that the Gospel is not offered in the Scriptures as a philosophy, or a system of philosophy—it is nevertheless the most truly philosophic subject ever submitted to human thought. If men think at all, they will have a philosophy true or false, complete or incomplete; how important that they have a sound one when God, religion, and human destiny are the deep problems upon which they are called to reflect!

It is common, even in the pulpit, for metaphysics to be decried, and that, too, by men who have no small tincture of speculation. In this they are like skillful orators, who never fail to begin an appeal to the feelings with a disavowal of all oratorical skill. "I am no orator as Brutus is," is the cunning exordium of him who aims to stir men up to sudden floods of mutiny. If you mark well the phraseology of those whose opinions about metaphysics are worth any thing, you will discover that they are no strangers to the pages of Brown, Stewart, and Reed, or, it may be, of Hamilton, Cousin, and Kant. Let this foolish prattle against "divine philosophy" cease, and let us reverently apply ourselves to the high and worthy task of grappling with the problems of thought—the themes of prophets and apostles—themes that more vitally concern us, and should more powerfully interest our hearts than all else besides.

Because men differ, and differ essentially, about subjects with which philosophy is concerned, many are inclined to eschew all philosophizing, as if the same reason would not compel them to cease thinking about almost every thing. But we apprehend that it is the

reckless manner in which men have speculated upon the mysteries of divine revelation, and the erroneous conclusions they have reached, that have made philosophy a *monstrum horrendum* to those of limited mental culture. We think, and are happy in the thought, that the more the Gospel and its requirements, its facts and its blessed promises, are subjected to the canons and rules of a consistent religious philosophy, the more their nice adaptation to man's spiritual nature will be perceived. It is the glory of our religion, and a fine point we have made in the plea submitted to the world, for a return to the Apostolic standards, that both the religion itself and our philosophy of it are suited to man as he is, and that no new faculty is to be given him, none destroyed, neither is any violence to be done those he has, before he can become a Christian. Light is not more nicely adapted to the eye, nor the concord of sweet sounds to the ear, than is the Gospel of the blessed God to us as subjects of his moral government, fallen from original righteousness, and under the curse of a violated law. *A priori* we might argue as much, for as all true religion has for its object the restoration of man to the image and favor of his God, who alone made the human heart, and is acquainted with all its hidden springs of action, he only has the knowledge requisite to devise, the love and power to make effective, a remedial system that shall meet the demands of his own justice and the necessities of our fallen nature. Infinite benevolence only could make the sacrifice through which the sinner's heart might be reached, and his stubborn will subdued to the will of his condescending and merciful Father.

It is confessed, on all hands, that faith is the *principle* upon which the provisions of God's grace for our regeneration are to be enjoyed by guilty man, while there are many means, facts, testimonies, of faith, all of which are necessary to produce, to perfect, and to perpetuate it. These shall be noticed in due time, but the question first to be settled is, what is the Scriptural idea of faith, and how far is that idea in harmony with the philosophy of mind as it is taught by the best and clearest thinkers of this age?

It is now eighteen centuries since Jesus and his Apostles discoursed upon the wonderful potency of this principle. With them it is a simple thing; and were it not that we have formed a false religious philosophy of man, and in doing so have departed from the well-established principles of mental action, this attempt to clear up



the confusion of some minds upon so plain a matter would be superfluous. With the writer of this, faith, in its essence, is simply belief, neither more nor less, while belief is accepting testimony as true. Let us not be misunderstood. Faith is as purely and simply an intellectual act as is consciousness, attention, conception, perception, memory, or imagination. We need hardly defend the three-fold division of the mind into the intellect, the sensibilities, and the will, or the powers of thought, feeling, and volition. How distinct and yet how intimately connected are these powers in man's complex mental nature! An object is presented to thought—it arouses feelings in harmony with its nature, and we resolve to act in harmony with our feelings. The moral quality of our action is primarily in this resolution and the motive leading us to form it. Whatever moral quality, then, there may be in believing is in the volition by which we are induced to attend to the testimony producing our belief.

Literally and properly speaking we no more believe with our hearts or wills than we perform any of the intellectual acts above mentioned with these powers. There is a moral quality in our active intellectual states just in so far as they are the result of volition, and no farther. Faith is the result of attending candidly to testimony adequate to produce it; this we can do or refuse to do, and herein is the moral quality of faith. It affects the heart according to the nature of the thing believed. It is thus we are said by Paul to believe with the heart.

It is sometimes charged against us that we rob faith of its saving efficacy by making it an assent of the understanding to the truth of testimony. We admit the fact that faith is an assent of the understanding, but deny the inference that this robs faith of its efficacy. Some theologians admit that the assent of the understanding is faith, as far as it goes, but, say they, this is merely *historic* faith. Now we contend that there can be no other, in the fair meaning of the word "historic," namely, as implying that the faith rests upon testimony; and when in reply it is urged, "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness," we damage our position by admitting the quotation in their sense of it, instead of sticking, as we should, to our principles, and showing that in Paul's sense of the word heart we are right in our teaching upon the nature of faith. Any one at all

acquainted with his Greek Testament should know that Christ and the Apostles used the word *Kardia* (heart) in a great variety of meanings. It is made to represent almost every division of our mental nature, and it is so used also in classic Greek authors. It may refer to the intellect, the sensibilities, or the will, or to the various powers of these great divisions. Thus we are said to think, understand, reason, imagine, ponder, conceive, purpose, etc., with the heart. Now these are not properly acts of the heart, or emotional nature, but of the understanding and the will, and as they are active, and, therefore, possess a moral quality through the volition, as shown above, they are rightly enough said to be done with the heart. In the same way we are said to believe with the heart, not because believing is an act of the sensibilities, but that through it the latter are reached. The heart is hence affected by belief, and it is for this as a final cause that the faculty of belief is given. It were a useless faculty without this; and as this quickening of the sensibilities is the end, so faith must be regarded as God's appointed means to accomplish it. Some look upon faith too much as an end. We regard it as of little account only as it is God's appointed channel through which the truth that awakens, regenerates, and sanctifies, reaches the heart. Thus it is also with sensation, perception, and the other presentative, representative, reflective, and intuitive faculties; they are the avenues, so to speak, through which truth and error, fact and fiction, reach our sensibilities, and in this respect faith is co-ordinate with them, being the channel through which the unseen verities of the eternal world reach our spiritual nature. There is no other known or knowable by us. It is by faith that the heart is reached, pierced, purified, and exalted to divine communion. We walk by faith, not by sense; we receive the Spirit through faith, not faith by the Spirit—except it be faith to work miracles, with which we have here nothing to do.

Without holding any man or class of men responsible for his views, the present writer maintains that faith is just the assent of the understanding to the truth of testimony; that if it be followed by certain changes in our hearts, or emotional nature, these latter are no more a part of the act of faith than they are of memory, imagination, perception, or any other purely mental act, which they as often follow as they do faith. The difference is in this: the former pre-

sent and represent objects of earthly and finite interest, of the actual or the ideal, as the case may be; the latter, through the revelation of God, brings the supernatural, but not less real and eternal interests of the world to come, within the apprehension of the soul.

Having laid down without reserve, and, as we think, sufficiently illustrated our doctrine, we are prepared to advance to the confirmation of it from Scripture and the constitution of the human mind, confident that to those not blinded by the popular theory of abstract spiritual operations, it will appear both Scriptural and philosophical that God produces faith in us mediately through his words and not immediately by his Spirit. If we deal in certain truisms of psychology, and oft-repeated texts of the New Testament, let it be remembered that we aim at conviction, and shall proceed on the sure ground of self-evident principles or admitted conclusions.

First, then, we state it as a fact that the words faith and belief are equivalents in the New Testament. The formula  $a=a$  is not more certain to the mathematician than that faith is belief to one familiar with the oracles of God in either Greek or English. It would undoubtedly sound strange to our ears, were the word faith eliminated from the Scriptures; nor do we recommend such an elimination; but it were no difficult task to show that there is really no need for the word faith in an exact translation of the Bible into our vernacular. The word belief might be made to represent the Scriptural idea of faith in all cases of its occurrence in the oracles of God. A few words will make this plain.

In the original for believe, the verb, is πιστεω; for the noun, faith, it is πίστις. Even the unlearned reader can see that these are paronymous words, related as are believe and belief, presume and presumption, refer and reference. The verb πιστεω occurs about two hundred and fifty times in the Greek New Testament, and is almost uniformly rendered believe. It is the common, ordinary word in Greek for that mental act denoted by our English word believe; and it is conceded that this is an act of the understanding when religion is not concerned in the discussion. When we give credence to testimony we may be said to trust in it, and so also when the object of that testimony is a person, or is a thing of the future. It is thus that in several well-known passages the word is in the passive rendered, to be put in trust with, as, "Who will intrust you with—put

you in trust with—the true riches.” In the same style Paul says a dispensation of the Gospel was committed to him. The word means to believe, and if the object be a person or a promise worthy of it, we trust, repose confidence in it or him. There can be no trust where there is no belief; there may be much belief not accompanied with trust; that will depend altogether upon what is believed. The act of believing is a simple act, and the word denoting it is faith; it follows the rule of all the operations of the intellectual faculties. It is not perceiving, remembering, conceiving, that affects us so and so, but the objects of these faculties that fill us with joy or depress us with fear, that awaken sorrow by the creations of a morbid fancy or transport us with ecstasy through the anticipations of immortal hope.

By a broader generalization we might affirm that this great law, of which we have given only a few examples, governs all sensation as well as the finer operations of the human mind. It is not seeing, hearing, eating, drinking, etc., that affects us, but what we see, hear, eat, and drink. We eat what is wholesome and live; we believe the truth and are saved. We eat what is poisonous and die; we believe a lie and are lost. Man's physical nature is not more certainly affected by the primary and secondary properties of matter apprehended through sensation, nor his intellectual powers by abstract and concrete truth presented to his reason, than is his spirit purified by the facts, precepts, and promises revealed to his faith through the testimony of God. Such being the nature of the act indicated by the verb, let us consider its cognate noun.

The noun corresponding to the verb πιστεω is πιστις; it occurs in the Christian Scriptures about as often as the verb, namely, two hundred and fifty times, and is uniformly rendered by the noun faith, as the other is by the verb to believe. There are many passages in which the noun and verb occur in close connection, showing that the inspired penmen attached the same meaning to these words, differing only as noun and verb. Thus we have in Heb. xi, 6, “But without faith it is impossible to please Him; for he that comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who diligently seek him.” The force of this language is lost to the English reader, because he can not trace the connection between to believe and faith that there is to the Greek scholar between πιστεω and πιστις. These are paronymous words, as explained above, and are well represented

by the words believe and belief. We may then read the passage thus: "But without belief it is impossible to please Him, for he that comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who diligently seek him."

If this argument needed confirmation, we have it all through the New Testament, for example, Matt. viii, 10. The centurion had faith such as Jesus had not found, no, not in Israel; and yet it was to be done to him as he believed. Again, he that believes and is baptized is to be saved from his sins, or justified; and at the same time we are said to be justified by faith. Paul says faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God; that is, faith is produced by hearing the testimony of God, and, confessedly, this is the way belief is produced. Again, he says in his letter to the Hebrews: "Faith is the foundation of things hoped for; the conviction of things not seen." If belief be not this, what in the name of reason is it?

If it be objected that our view degrades faith, by robbing it of the power and efficacy attributed to it in the Scriptures, we reply, the very reverse is the fact. It certainly can not detract from its power, its fruits, or its saving efficacy, to define it as Christ and his Apostles have defined it, placing it in the relation it properly holds in the scheme of redemption, rather than involving it in the mist of theological subtilty. This consent of the mind to the truth of the divine testimony brings the object of that testimony near the soul, and He (the Christ) is seen, in all his goodness, wisdom, and power, to be our prophet, priest, and king, to enlighten, sanctify, and save us. He is apprehended by reliance on the witness of God, and thus the sinner sets to his seal that God is true, and is filled with all joy and peace in believing; he is, indeed, thus chosen, as Paul expresses it, to salvation, by sanctification of the Spirit and belief (*πιστις*) of the truth. With this agree the words of Peter, in his first epistle: "Whom, though you have not seen him, yet you love; on whom not now looking, but *believing*, you rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory, receiving the end of your *faith*, the salvation of your souls."

It is faith thus produced by the testimony of God that exalts to deeds of noblest heroism, steadies the soul in this world of strife, of doubts, and fears, giving it self-possession and affectionate trust in God, and in the final triumph of truth and goodness. We are often thrown off our equilibrium by the confusion wrought by sin in the

world and our own hearts, and we often stagger at the strange dealings of God with us in this probationary state, as well as by the movements of his mysterious providence, often permitting innocence to suffer and villainy to go unpunished; we are depressed at the flourishing state of those who have joined field to field by fraud and violence. But when we are led by faith into the sanctuary of the Lord our God, as David was, we are made to understand and to bless the wisdom of Him who does all things well, and who, in due time, will bring deliverance to his oppressed and persecuted people.

In closing up the first part of our argument upon the philosophy of faith as drawn from the plain declarations of Scripture, we are prepared to state a few things that may sound strange to ears accustomed to the popular definition of faith, its unscriptural division into several kinds, and the contradictory and destructive accounts of its genesis, as that it is wholly *opus operatum*—a work wrought in us by the Spirit of God—and becoming in the elect alone *opus operans*, enabling them to believe in Christ and appropriate the promises of the Gospel, and much more to the same effect, equally unscriptural and unphilosophical, contradicting, at once, the plainest teachings of Christ and the first principles of psychology.

In the first place, the faith that saves the soul is the belief that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ, the Son of the living God. "Many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book; but these are written, that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that by believing you may have life through his name." Whatever else may be said of this passage, one thing is intuitively certain: the faith that brings life to the soul is the belief of the christological proposition, "Jesus is the Christ."

The matter of this proposition is its meaning, and its quality, logically speaking, is that it is true; it is, hence, to be received as such upon its evidence. Like all propositions, this expresses a judgment; two conceptions are compared, and agreement pronounced; it is, accordingly, affirmative; the subject is a person, and therefore it is a singular proposition, in quantity universal. To understand and consent to the truth contained in this proposition is, in Scripture phrase, "To believe on the name of the only-begotten Son of God." "These things have I written to you who believe on the



name of the Son of God, that ye may know that ye have eternal life; and that ye may continue to believe on the name of the Son of God." Again: "This is the victory that overcomes the world, even our faith." "Who is he that overcomes the world, but he that believes that Jesus is the Son of God?" "He that believes on the Son of God has the testimony in himself." This proposition, then, is not an abstraction, but in it a divine person is held up to the soul, and, when received by faith as the Messiah, he awakens in that soul emotions consonant with his own ineffable grandeur. Held constantly before the heart by faith in the testimony of God, Christ is found in that heart, the hope of glory; we are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord. The whole Gospel is summarily comprehended in this grand utterance from the mouth of God, "This is my beloved Son," and hence in it, and in it alone, is found his power to save. It saves when we do really accept it as true.

Turning now to the philosophy of the human mind, does it agree with this Scriptural representation of the nature, origin, and power of faith? Will the patient reader bear with us a little, while we attempt to show that a true theology and a true philosophy are in strictest accord in their teachings about faith.

Judgments expressed in words are propositions, and, as there can be but three kinds of judgments, our proposition concerning the Christ must express one of these. Every judgment must be,

1. Problematic, yielding opinion; or,
2. Assertive, yielding faith; or,
3. Apodictic, yielding knowledge.

The forms in our English speech to express these respectively are, 1. "It may be;" 2. "It is;" 3. "It must be." The first of these is certain neither subjectively nor objectively; that is to say, a problematic proposition is not certain to him who holds it, nor can he make it appear so to others. The last is certain to both him who holds it, and can be made so to all others who understand the terms; it is, therefore, certain, subjectively and objectively. The second, the kind of proposition with which we have to do in this discussion, is certain subjectively, but not objectively; it is certain to him who holds it, but he may not make it such to those of different moral dispositions.

As we regard this classification both scientific and useful, tending to clear up many difficulties in honest minds, and settling some fundamental points about *opinion*, *faith*, and *knowledge*, let us be at some pains to be understood.

There are, according to the nature of the case, but two kinds of matter in thought, namely, necessary and contingent. We may affirm or deny in either case, but this affects not the character of the matter. The predicate agrees or disagrees with the subject necessarily, or it does so contingently; the first is to be made evident by demonstration and intuition, the last by testimony, analogy, induction, etc.; the first includes all supersensible truths, axioms of mathematics, facts of consciousness, etc., the last the facts of everyday life, of experience, of observation, of revealed religion, and of all matters of opinion as distinguished from matters of fact. Contingent propositions, again, may be divided into problematic and assertory, and this gives us our original trichotomy, and is exhaustive.

It is admitted that the sources of our knowledge are threefold: 1. Intuition; 2. Testimony; 3. Reasoning. The first two are original, the last derivative. Consciousness, perception, axiomata, are here included under the first; all signs, oral and written, symbols, and whatever communicates intelligence of what has fallen under the cognizance of others, are included under the head of testimony; the third embraces abstraction, generalization, conception, and judgment—in a word, all the operations of our discursive faculties.

Now, the great truth of our religion, that which makes it what it is, and differentiates it from every thing else, that is, makes it pre-eminently *the faith*, depends for its acceptance, not upon intuition on the one hand, nor upon reasoning on the other, but upon testimony, and that the testimony of God. The proof and the proposition are homogeneous, which is a fundamental law of evidence. Were the proposition a necessary truth, it could be made absolutely certain, and there would be no moral quality in believing that "Jesus is the Christ." There is no virtue in acknowledging that an angle inscribed in a semicircle is a right angle, which, to those acquainted with the definitions, axioms, and previously demonstrated theorems of geometry, is intuitively certain. So with the facts of sense-perception; to acknowledge that we see the sun shining in his strength gives no title to commendation. The fact is, as there is no moral quality, no

warmth, no drawing of the soul to its Maker in intuition, to have rested our religion upon it would have been unsuited to our nature, and therefore unworthy of God, while to have made it depend upon the discursive faculty, subject, as it is, to so many fallacies, prejudices, and mistakes, requiring extraordinary care and ability to guard against what Bacon, in his graphic style, calls the idols of the tribe, of the den, of the forum, and of the theater, would have made it too uncertain to serve for a rule of life, a support in trial, and a consolation in distress. We hence conclude that the Christological proposition contains neither a necessary truth, addressed to our intuition, nor a problematic one, to be reasoned out speculatively, but an assertory one, offered for our acceptance through faith. It is first asserted from the excellent glory when the Everlasting Father, in the audience of Israel, said, "This is my Son, the beloved, in whom I delight." It is confirmed by the descent of the Holy Spirit at his baptism, and the miracles of grace and mercy wrought by the Lord and his disciples. It is sealed with the blood of the Cross, and made irrefragable by the Resurrection. The Holy Spirit comes in tongues of fire, and illumines the minds of the witnesses of Jesus, to embolden them to deliver without fear the things they had seen and heard, and to confirm their word with the signs and wonders that were to follow them that believe; then, and not till then, was the Gospel to be preached for the obedience of faith among all nations, God asking no man to believe the proposition concerning the Christ till his testimony to its truth had received all the confirmation it needed to enable men to accept it. We believe, then, this, as we believe any other assertory truth, on the evidence submitted to our understanding; the proposition contains a supernatural truth, and it is sustained by supernatural proof; it affects the heart in harmony with its nature when it is cordially received, and it saves because it induces all who thus receive it to come to the Savior and trust in him alone for salvation.

There is infinite benevolence in making all the benefits of religion depend upon faith rather than on either knowledge, strictly so-called, or on opinion; the former would not develop in us the proper spirit, even were it attainable by all; the latter is too unstable as a basis for hope, and to be a guide to the pilgrim over the pathless, treeless, waterless wastes that stretch far away between him and the Canaan

for which he sighs. Faith is one of the most general, most potent, and yet most simple, of all the principles of the human mind. It is called into exercise in earliest life, and continues with us to the grave. Its value is practical; if we depart from the Scriptural philosophy, we may speculate about it until we are lost in metaphysical distinctions wholly unknown to the sacred writers, and then, after all, we must return to the simple statements of the Word of God. A leading object in this article has been to show that between the Scripture representations on this subject and a sound philosophy there is no discrepancy. It is clear to our mind that between these representations and the view of faith accepted by the current theology there is a chasm that no philosophy can bridge—that, before we can receive the account of faith given in sectarian theology, we must ignore some of the simplest and best attested facts in the whole science of mind.

All faith is one, and there is but one faith, are axioms in our philosophy upon this subject. If there appear to be several kinds of faith, the difference lies in the objects, not in the nature of the mind's act; and if to any of our readers, bewildered by the multiplicity of religious faiths objectively considered, it should appear contrary to palpable fact to say, with Paul, there is but one faith, even as there is but one Lord and one baptism, let him bear in mind that we have been looking at faith subjectively, as an act of the mind, and not as a system of truth to be received. But, even in this sense, Paul is right, for there is but one system of faith revealed by God through his Holy Spirit. What purport to be systems of faith, as laid down in confessions, symbols, and articles of religion, are but systems of opinions as to what the Christian faith is or should be. In their day they may have been noble protests against the errors of Popery and its abominable usurpations, but, having served their purpose, they belong to the past of effete theologies, and should pass away.

The great question that now agitates the minds of men, and is calling forth their mightiest intellectual energy, is—Who is Jesus? What relation did the historic Christ sustain to his own age, and what to ours? With the writer of this Jesus sustains the same relation to all the ages. He is the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end of all God's revelations to guilty man. To receive

him—not speculations about him, but *him*—in his divine personality as the Christ of God, is the greatest, as it is the most reasonable, act of the human mind. Without this there can be no perfect theology, no reasonable philosophy, no rest for the troubled soul in its yearnings for peace here amid the warring, jarring, discordant elements of the moral universe, and no hope of a glorious immortality when life's fitful fever is over.

We plant, then, our telescope of faith on the immovable rock of the divine testimony; there stands the Church founded by the Christ, and through her portals crowd the wise, the great, the good of all ages, and, as we sweep the broad areas of God's spiritual universe, we bring together the past and the future, angels and men, the Church below and the Church above, in one eternal fellowship.

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## V.—THE RISE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PAPACY.

IN his once famous essay on "*Ranke's History of the Popes*," Lord Macaulay expresses the opinion that "there is not, and there never was, on this earth a work of human policy so well deserving of examination as the Roman Catholic Church." This opinion is sustained with such an array of argument as convinces every one of its truth. Hence it is at any time legitimate to make this vast theological and ecclesiastical system the subject of philosophical discussion; at special periods in its history it even becomes a necessity. The present is one of these periods. The supreme representative assembly of the Church, a council that is Ecumenical in a fuller sense, perhaps, than any that has gone before it, is now in session at Rome. At first the world did not clearly see why this Council was called, but the veil has been lifted, all doubt has fled. Some months before the Bishops left their dioceses for Rome, the *Civiltà Cattolica*, the organ of the Jesuits, and, in some sense, the *Moniteur* of the Roman court, informed them why they were wanted. "Catholics will accept with delight the proclamation of the Pope's dogmatic infallibility. . . . It is hoped that his infallibility will be

defined unanimously, by acclamation, by the mouth of the assembled fathers, under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost."\* The Council will be amused with a pretense that the interests of the Church needed attention, but the Pope's desire to secure a decree declaring his own dogmatic infallibility alone called the Bishops together. Now when it is proposed by the Catholic hierarchy, in solemn council assembled, to declare their chief invested with one of the divine attributes, assuredly it is a fitting time to review the history of that hierarchy, and to trace the steps by which its chief has been exalted to so bad an eminence.

The mission of Christ involved a twofold work: the giving of the Gospel, consisting of a belief and a life, and the founding of a spiritual society, called the Church; in other words, to make disciples and to gather them into an organized body. Jesus must therefore be regarded as the founder of a new institution, as well as the author of a new religion.

The existence of a society implies subordination and authority—a necessity that is fully recognized in the constitution of the Christian Church. Accordingly subordinate and governing classes are recognized in the New Testament, and are instructed in their duties to each other. To the one the Holy Spirit says: "Remember them that have the rule over you, who have spoken unto you the word of life;"† to the other: "Let him that ruleth, rule with diligence."‡

The constitution of the Church does not imply servility on the one hand, or oppression and official self-consequence on the other. The primitive churches were governed by a personal influence, growing out of virtue, piety, and dignity of character, rather than by official power. The world has seen no other governing body like that contemplated by the Divine Founder. It is a ministry—a ministry of the Word, of the Spirit, of Righteousness, of Reconciliation. Its genius breathes in the words of Christ: "Whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant: even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many."§

The organization of the Apostolic Church has been the occasion of much heated controversy, and has given rise to wide differences

\* *Civiltà Cattolica*, February 6, 1869. † Heb. xiii, 8. ‡ Romans xii, 8. § Matt. xx, 26-28.



of opinion ; but any man who will study it in the original documents, the Acts of Apostles and the Epistles, ignoring the disputes of later times, need have no difficulty in determining its essential features. The governing body, or ministry, consisted of two classes: the one general, or extraordinary; the other congregational, or ordinary. The first served the Church rather than the churches; the second the particular congregations that had elevated them to their responsible positions. The first class consisted of three orders: Apostles, Prophets, and Evangelists; the second of two, Bishops and Deacons.

The first of the two orders of the congregational ministry is known in the New Testament by several names, for that the terms Elder, Bishop, and Pastor describe one functionary is established beyond successful controversy by the following proofs:

1. Elders, bishops, and pastors are nowhere named together as being orders distinct from each other.

2. Bishops and deacons are named as apparently an exhaustive division of Church officers. (Phil. i, 1; 1 Tim. iii, 1-8.)

3. The same persons are described by the names bishop and elder (Acts xx, 17-28; Titus i, 5); while the function of the pastor is expressly ascribed to them. (Acts xx, 38.)

4. The elders discharged duties which belonged to bishops, one of them being pastoral superintendence. (1 Tim. v, 17; 1 Peter v, 1, 2.)

Such was the simple but efficient organization of the Apostolic Church, but such, unfortunately, it did not long remain. The Christian ministry afforded a wide field for activity and usefulness; also, as the event proved, an unbounded sphere of ambition. Very naturally the Eldership, rather than the Diaconate, became the basis of the stupendous hierarchical system developed during the early centuries of the Church—very naturally, we say, for by a law in nature the mountain chains are thrown up from the high table-lands, and not from the plains which are but little elevated above the sea. Accordingly a process began by which the Elder's office and the Bishop's—the Presbytery and the Episcopate—became wholly differentiated. At what time this process began it is impossible to determine. Whether some trace of it is found in the Book of Revelation—that is, whether the angels of the seven churches are the bishops of the second century in embryo—is a question that can not be here discussed. Clem-

ent, of Rome, in his first epistle to the Corinthians (written as early as 97, probably), writes in the style of the New Testament epistles. "And thus preaching through countries and cities they [the Apostles] appointed the first-fruits [of their labors], having first proved them by the Spirit, to be bishops and deacons of those who should afterward believe."\* "For our sin will not be small if we eject from the episcopate those who have blamelessly and holily fulfilled its duties. Blessed are those presbyters who, having finished their course before now, have obtained a fruitful and perfect departure."† This epistle shows that in Rome, and probably throughout Western Europe, the terms bishop and presbyter were still used interchangeably at the close of the first century. But Ignatius, of Antioch, in the early part of the second century, wrote in a very different style. "See that ye all follow the bishop, even as Jesus Christ does the Father; and the presbytery as ye would the Apostles; and reverence the deacons as being the institution of God."‡ "I exhort you to study to do all things with divine harmony, while your bishop presides in the place of God, and your presbytery in the assembly of the Apostles, along with your deacons, who are most dear to me."§ Many other quotations from the writings of Ignatius, similar in tenor, could be made; these, however, are sufficient to establish several conclusions: (1.) That in the churches to which his epistles were directed, and probably throughout the East, the Presbytery and the Episcopate were differentiated as early as the first quarter of the second century. || (2.) That the episcopal hierarchy did not originate on the soil of Italy, but in Syria. (3.) That Ignatius deserves Dr. Schaff's characterization: "He stands out in history as the earliest advocate of the hierarchical principle in both its good and evil points."

It is proper to say that the Ignatian Epistles have furnished the subject of a long and heated controversy.¶ Some hold that they

\* Chap. xlii.

† Chap. xlv.

‡ Epistle to the Smyrnians, Chap. viii.

§ Epistle Magnesians, Chap. vi.

|| Ignatius died a martyr at Rome in 107; or, as others say, in 116.

¶ In all there are fifteen epistles that bear the name of this Father, of which eight are now universally conceded to be spurious. Of the seven accounted genuine we have two Greek rescensions, a longer and a shorter. The shorter rescension, from which we have quoted above, the critics hold to be the purer. During the present century a Syriac version of three of the epistles has been discovered, and the discovery has opened up the whole controversy again. Neander is disposed to discredit the Ignatian documents altogether. "In the so-called Epistle of Ignatius I perceive, besides that which took its shape without any preconceived design, an evident purpose. As the tradition of Ignatius's journey to Rome, where

are not historic. But even in case they should be proved unhistoric, the argument would not be materially affected. The second century saw the Ignatian ideas fully embodied in Church organization. Before the close of that century, the ministry universally consists of three orders, Deacons, Presbyters, Bishops. The congregation is no longer presided over by a Presbytery, but by a Bishop; the subordinate presbyters, however, acting as his counselors. The government of the Church is no longer democratic, but aristocratic. Traveling on the high ecclesiastical road that leads from Jerusalem to Rome, the rise of the Episcopacy marks the close of the first stadium.

Ecclesiastical ambition was not yet satisfied, nor were opportunities for preferment exhausted. Bishops were not contented to preside over single congregations; they aspired to more commanding positions. Besides, the condition of the Church and of society seemed to invite them forward. Accordingly, the Bishop next appears as the head of a cluster of churches, called a Diocese. His exaltation to this position is the second mile-stone on the road that leads to the Papacy.\*

The same causes that subordinated a number of churches to a Bishop, thus forming the Diocese, soon subordinated the Bishops of the smaller Dioceses to those of the larger ones. Hence the capitals

he was to be thrown to the wild beasts, appears to me, for reasons already alleged, extremely liable to suspicion, so his letters [written during the journey], which presuppose the truth of this story, inspire me with as little confidence in their authenticity. That a man with death immediately before him could have nothing to say more befitting than such things about obedience to the Bishop, I can not well conceive, at least when I transfer myself to the time when these letters profess to have been written."—*History of the Christian Religion and Church*. Boston Edition. Vol. I, pp. 192-3.

\*The formation of the Diocese is thus clearly explained by Milman:

"1. In the larger cities the rapid increase of the Christians led, necessarily, to the formation of separate congregations, which, to a certain extent, required each its proper organization, yet invariably remained subordinate to the single Bishop. In Rome, toward the beginning of the fourth century, there were above forty churches rendering allegiance to the prelate of the Metropolis.

"2. Christianity was first established in the towns and cities, and from each center diffused itself, with more or less success, into the adjacent country. In some of these country congregations Bishops appear to have been established, yet these Chorepiscopi, or rural Bishops, maintained some subordination to the head of the Mother Church, or, when the converts were fewer, the rural Christians were made members of the Mother Church in the city. In Africa, from the immense number of Bishops, each community seems to have had its own superior, but this was peculiar to the province. In general, the churches adjacent to the towns or cities either originally were, or became, the Diocese of the city Bishop; for, as soon as Christianity became the religion of the State, the powers of the rural Bishop were restricted, and the office, at length, was either abolished or fell into disuse."—*History of Christianity*, Harpers' Edition, pp. 446-7.

of the imperial provinces became religious capitals as well, the Bishop thereof becoming the head of an Archbishopric or Province, with the title, Archbishop or Metropolitan. The appearance of this functionary marks the third stage in the progress of the hierarchy.

But the hierarchy was not yet fully developed. Hence there was formed, in the fourth century, the Patriarchal System, according to which Christendom was ultimately divided into five grand divisions, called Patriarchates. The heads of these were first called Exarchs, but the inventive faculty of the Church finally hit upon the more ecclesiastical title of Patriarch.

At first there were but three Patriarchal Sees—Rome, Alexandria, Antioch. From their antiquity, the churches in these were called *Ecclesiæ Apostolical*, *Sedes Apostolicæ*, *Matrices Ecclesiæ*, and were regarded with great affection—a fact that explains, in part, why they contained the Patriarchal thrones, but a fact that explains it only in part. The grand reason is, these cities were the three great capitals of the empire; these churches were wealthy and powerful;\* their heads had excellent opportunity, always improved, to form alliances with the political authorities. After the founding of Constantinople, in 330, the Bishop of that city (he held the old See of Byzantium), who had been a subordinate of the Metropolitan of Heraclea, in Thrace, aspired to a Patriarchate. Certainly the Bishop of the New Rome, who, of ecclesiastics, stood next to the Imperial Majesty, must be something more than the head of a Diocese! Accordingly the second Ecumenical Council (Constantinople, 381) officially recognized him as a Patriarch, and assigned to him the "next prerogative honor after the Bishop of Rome," giving as a reason, according to Sozomen, that Constantinople was New Rome. This was recognizing to the full the principle of conformity to political arrangements. Sozomen continues: "Constantinople was not only favored with this appellation, but was also in the enjoyment of many privileges, such as a senate of its own, and the division of the citizens into ranks and orders; it was also governed by its own magistrates, and possessed contracts, laws, and immunities similar to those of Rome in Italy."† These are the only reasons assigned for the action taken.

\*Especially was this true of the Roman Church. In the year 252 the staff of the Roman Bishop was thus constituted: Forty-six Presbyters, seven Deacons, seven Subdeacons, forty-two Acolyths.—*Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History* vi, 43.

† Sozomen vii, 9. See, also, Socrates v, 8.

The Council of Chalcedon (451) confirmed the Decree of Constantinople, and recognized even more fully the principle of conforming ecclesiastical to political organization. "For with reason," the decree runs, "did the fathers confer prerogatives on the [episcopal] throne of ancient Rome on account of her character as the imperial city, and, moved by the same consideration, . . . [the Council of Constantinople] . . . recognized the same prerogatives also in the most holy [episcopal] throne of New Rome, with good reason judging that the city, which is honored with the imperial dignity and senate, and enjoys the same privileges as the ancient imperial Rome, should also be equally elevated in ecclesiastical respects, and be the second after her." These business-like decrees not only prove the political pater-nity of the Patriarchal System; they also shatter the historical basis on which the Catholic Church founds the Papacy. The subsequent elevation of the Bishop of Jerusalem to the rank of a Patriarch, on the ground that he presided over the Mother Church, completed the Patriarchal System of the old Græco-Roman Church.

The Patriarchs wielded vast powers. They had immediate oversight of one or two Dioceses and as many Provinces; they ordained the Metropolitans, rendered the final decisions in Church controversies, conducted councils, published the decrees of councils and the Church laws of the emperors; they united, in themselves, supreme legislative and executive powers; they acted independently of each other—though sometimes holding consultations—and kept resident ambassadors at the Imperial Court. Surveying the ground passed over, we see the Church has now passed through both the democratic and aristocratic stages; the Patriarchal System is oligarchical in both form and spirit. We have reached the fourth remove from the primitive order. Before taking the single short step that separates us from the Papacy, we must glean some useful lessons that lie along the way we have traveled.

1. It is not difficult to discover the principal causes that produced this rank growth of ecclesiasticism. They were partly external, partly internal; partly in the condition of the Church and its relations to heathen society, partly in human nature. After the death of the Apostles and the Evangelists whom they had chosen, the ablest Presbyters were imperatively called into great prominence by influences beyond their own control. The desire to be service-

able, the love of preferment, the zest of ruling, all prompted those Presbyters, who were conscious of intellectual and moral power, to press into these responsible places—nay, in some cases, we fear, even to create them. But, in no long time, the moral power and prominence that superior ability and activity, united with weight of character, had given, were transformed into an official power and prominence. Besides, the forces that had begun to change the constitution of the Church continued to act, and even with increasing power. For two centuries the times were dark; persecution raged without; schism lifted its hateful head within; the ark of Christianity rode a stormy sea. If ever there was a time when it was pardonable to confer unusual powers on the commanders, assuredly that was the time. We do not doubt that, in the beginning, the interests of the Church were advanced by the course pursued; had it not been for the gross ignorance of the times, and for the inexperience of the Church, the experiment might possibly have been safely tried. But the times *were* dark, and the Church *was* inexperienced, and this doubtful step, once taken, was never retraced. The men who had assumed the superior positions, or who had been thrust into them, appropriated to themselves the more dignified of the two titles conferred by the Scriptures on the shepherds of the flock, and left the other to their humbler brethren. The Episcopacy soon became so firmly established that no one thought of calling it in question, and its establishment furnished the basis for the next encroachment of ecclesiasticism on the ancient constitution of the Church.\*

2. The principle that controlled the form of the hierarchical development, was that of conformity to the organization of the Roman Empire. According to the Imperial System, the unit of political

\* It is supposed by some that a Presidency of the original Presbytery was the stepping-stone to the Episcopacy. Neander thus presents this hypothesis:

"Since the Presbyters constituted a deliberative assembly, it would of course soon become the practice for one of their number to preside over the rest. This might be so arranged as to take place by some law of rotation, so that the Presidency would thus pass in turn from one to the other. Possibly, in many places, such was the original arrangement. Yet we find no trace, at least in history, of any thing of this kind. But neither, as we have already observed, do we on the other hand meet with any vestige of a fact which would lead us to infer that the Presidency over the Presbyterial College was originally distinguished by a special name. However the case may have been then, as to this point, what we find existing in the second century enables us to infer, respecting the preceding times, that soon after the Apostolic age the standing office of President of the Presbytery must have been formed; which President, as having pre-eminently the oversight over all, was designated by the



power and organization was the City, or Municipality; cities were combined into the Province; provinces into the Diocese; dioceses into the Prefecture; prefectures into the Empire. Over each one of the one hundred and twenty provinces was placed a President; over each of the thirteen dioceses a Vicar; over each of the four prefectures a Prætorian Prefect; while at the head of the whole, the *Imperium Romanum*, stood the Imperial Majesty. The Imperial Church was a later growth than the Imperial System, and its correspondence to it in form, in structure, and in spirit, can be explained only upon the hypothesis of a conscious imitation. The princes of the Church copied the princes of the Empire.

3. The politico-ecclesiastical constitution of the Imperial Church was a growth, and not a piece of manufacture. Hence the student must not expect to put his finger on definitely-established dates, or clearly-marked lines of demarkation. It is impossible to determine when the evolution of the Episcopacy from the Presbytery began; impossible to discover when the upheaval of the Metropolitan mountain chain from the Episcopal table-land commenced; impossible to ascertain when the Patriarchs, the highest summits of the hierarchy, began to lift their heads above the Metropolitans—impossible, because a process of historic evolution is commonly slow; and while we can discover stages of rapid development, as well as periods of comparative rest, it is not possible to fix definite dates.

4. The establishment of the hierarchy was attended by the development of a numerous and powerful sacerdotal caste. Clergy and Laity became widely-separated classes. The New Testament idea of a priesthood was lost, and the Judaic idea, intensified, was substituted in its place. The Church was swallowed up by the ecclesiastic. Thus Cyprian, the magnificent Bishop of Carthage, so early as the

special name of *ἐπίσκοπος*, and thus distinguished from the other Presbyters. Thus the name came at length to be applied exclusively to this Presbyter, while the name Presbyter continued at first to be common to all; for the Bishops, as presiding Presbyters, had no official character other than that of the Presbyters generally. They were only *Primi inter pares*. . . . . Amidst circumstances so embarrassing; amidst conflicts so severe from within and from without—for then came forth the first edict of Trajan against the Christians—the authority of individual men, distinguished for piety, firmness, and activity, would make itself particularly availing, and would be augmented by a necessity become generally apparent. Thus the predominant influence of individuals, who, as moderators over the College of Presbyters, were denominated Bishops, might spring of itself out of the circumstances in which the Christian communities were multiplied without any necessity of supposing an *intentional* remodeling of the earlier constitution of the Church." Vol. i, pp. 170-71.

third century said: "The Bishop is in the church, and the church in the Bishop, and if any one is not with the Bishop he is not in the Church"—which, in the mouth of Cyprian, meant he is no Christian. The Bishop no longer rules chiefly by a personal influence, but by official authority. Almost all Church power is in his hands. He is regarded as the vehicle and propagator of the gifts of the Spirit; he is the teacher and lawgiver in all matters of discipline and doctrine; he opens and shuts the doors of the Church, thus virtually holding the keys of the kingdom; he utters the dreadful decree of excommunication, by which the trembling offender is hurled into the outer darkness; he sits on a splendid throne, erected in the most conspicuous part of the Cathedral Church; he is called *Beatissimus, Sanctissimus, Reverendissimus*. To his spiritual functions and powers important political rights and privileges have been added by the Christian Emperors, so it is no wonder that all classes kneel to him, kiss his hands, and show him other similar tokens of respect. It must be added that the Episcopate has also become a self-perpetuating caste or guild. The participation of the people in episcopal elections, having first degenerated into a mere formality, has now ceased altogether. The Bishop fills his own vacancy, and selects and ordains his own clergy. No wonder Chrysostom, so early as the close of the fourth century, has said: "The heads of the Empire and the governors of provinces enjoy no such honor as the rulers of the Church. They are first at court, in the society of ladies, in the houses of the great. No one has precedence of them." No wonder the heathen historian, Ammianus Marcellinus, thinks it not strange that men should strive with the utmost passion and persistence for so splendid a prize as the Bishopric of Rome, since a more than imperial sumptuousness invites them; or that the Prefect Prætextus, in bitter jest, says to Damasus, who has just obtained it after a bloody strife: "Make me Bishop of the city of Rome, and I will immediately become a Christian!"

5. Surely the pastors of the primitive flocks would not now recognize themselves in these their pretended successors! How great the change since an Apostle wrote: "The elders which are among you I exhort . . . feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint, but willingly; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind; neither as being lords over God's

heritage, but being examples to the flock."\* It is not possible that the contrast seemed so marked to the Bishops of the fourth and fifth centuries as to us. Self-interest and a long association have a wonderful power to obscure the intellectual vision, and yet if those Bishops were accustomed to read the New Testament, some of them must have felt that they stood in a false position. And this feeling, no doubt, had something to do with introducing the idea of an apostolic succession. The spiritual chiefs of wealthy and populous Sees were not content to base their offices on Church usage; to do so might put them in jeopardy. But plainly the magnificent Episcopate of the fourth century could not be identical with the humble Presbytery of the first; so the original identity of the presbyterian and episcopal offices was denied, and the Bishop held his place as a pretended successor of the Apostles. Clearly the idea of an apostolical succession was an afterthought. We do not mean to say that the episcopal mind consciously put forth a pious fraud; but that the Bishops, finding themselves in a false position, naturally sought the most plausible arguments with which to defend themselves. Before we condemn them too severely, we should remember that other men, in similar circumstances, have surrounded themselves with defenses as unsubstantial as that of the Apostolical Succession.

6. The student who studies the organization of the Græco-Roman Church must be impressed with a sense of its incompleteness. It lacks a head—it is not a pyramid, but only a frustum. The logic of politico-ecclesiasticism demands something higher than the patriarchal office. As the combining of cities into provinces, of provinces into dioceses, of dioceses into the four prefectures, logically looked to the union of these in the *Imperium Romanum*, dominated by a single absolute will, so the binding of churches into dioceses, of dioceses into archbishoprics, of archbishoprics into patriarchates, logically pointed not only to the organic union of the Church, but also to a single spiritual potentate presiding over the whole. Every generous mind sympathizes with the strenuous efforts put forth by the East to prevent the establishment of the Papacy, so far as they were made in the spirit of liberty; but we can not conceal the fact that the logic of history was unmistakably on the side of Rome. It was now too late to resist the influences which had carried the Church from democracy

\* 1 Peter v, 1-3.

to aristocracy, from aristocracy to oligarchy; the ultimate conclusion must be deduced, the frustum of the pyramid must be surmounted with an apex, the hierarchy must have a single chief. Granted the first, second, third, and fourth centuries of Christian history, the Papacy was inevitable.

We pass now to the last stage in the growth of ecclesiasticism. Here we find a human will exalted to the headship of the Church; a man enthroned in the seat of Christ.

According to the constitution of the old Catholic Church the five patriarchs were equal in official character. They differed, however, in rank. At the head stood the Bishop of Rome, *primus inter pares*; second, the Bishop of Constantinople; third, the Bishop of Alexandria; fourth, the Bishop of Antioch; finally the Bishop of Jerusalem. The question of precedence was not settled without much heart-burning and contentiousness. "Would to heaven there were no primacy," are the words wrung from the pious heart of Gregory Nazianzen, as he beheld the sad results of these strifes, "no eminence of place, and no tyrannical precedence of rank, that we might be known by eminence of virtue alone; but, as the case now stands, the distinction of a seat at the right hand or the left, or in the middle; at a higher or a lower place; of going before or aside of each other, has given rise to many disorders among us to no salutary purpose whatever, and plunged multitudes in ruin." Very naturally the Alexandrian Patriarch protested against the elevation of his Constantinopolitan brother; the Bishop of Cæsarea denounced the erection of Jerusalem into a Patriarchal See; Leo, of Rome, demurred to the Chalcedonian decree, by which his own prerogatives were made to depend on the political rank of his city. But in the Roman Empire the Church never attained to supremacy over the State; accordingly all these questions were settled by the firm hand of imperial power. The Emperor persuaded Alexandria to yield to the elevation of Constantinople; he also, speaking through his legates, thus summed up at Chalcedon: "From the whole discussion, and from what has been brought forward on either side, we acknowledge that the primacy over all and the most eminent rank are to continue with the Archbishop of Old Rome; but that also the Archbishop of New Rome should enjoy the same precedence of honor, and have the right to ordain Metropolitans in the dioceses of Asia, Pontus, and Thrace."

Despite the protestations of Leo's legates, this dictum received the emphatic approbation of the assembled fathers, and on it was based the famous twenty-eighth canon, which stands on the historic page the eternal protest of the ancient Church against the assumptions of the Papacy.

The Sees of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria fell into comparative insignificance at an early day. In the fifth and sixth centuries they were the theater of endless theological controversies, and were, of course, greatly weakened thereby; while in the next century the Mohammedan came and moved their candlesticks out of their places. Thus the Patriarchs of Old and New Rome were left the prominent actors on the hierarchic stage. For a time the issue was doubtful. It may be said to have been a question whether the Papal throne would be erected on the banks of the Tiber, or on the shores of the Bosphorus. But it was not long in doubt; when, at length, there was a Pope, he dated his bulls from Rome, and not from Constantinople. It will be space well used to sketch out some of the causes that decided the issue. Let it be first remarked, however, in the words of Dr. Schaff, "that the Papacy, as a historical fact, or so far as it has been acknowledged, is properly nothing more than the Latin Patriarchate run to absolute monarchy."

1. *The antiquity of the Roman Church.* It is probable that the Gospel was preached in Rome soon after the Pentecost; certainly there was a church there as early as the year 58, when Paul wrote the Epistle to the Romans. An ancient and probable tradition says the Apostle Peter met his death in that city, and Paul certainly there sealed his faith with his blood. No one not well read in the history of ancient Christianity can understand with how much reverence, superstition even, the *apostolicæ ecclesiæ* were regarded. There is no difficulty in accounting for the traditions that assign to every important church an Apostolic origin. Now to the reverential minds of the ancient Christians, the fact that Peter and Paul—whose abundant labors entitle them to the appellation, Princes of the Apostles—had been associated with the Roman Church, gave to that See an unsurpassed dignity and moral authority. Besides, Rome had been the center of extended missionary operations; she was the Mother Church of the whole West. Hence, on the basis of the *Petrine* tradition, and the superstitious veneration characteristic of the ancient

Church, was erected, by interested parties, the stupendous structure of the primacy. But the necessity of a Scriptural basis was keenly felt. Hence the origin of those monstrous perversions of Scripture by which it has been sought to maintain the Papal claims. In the second half of the third century Cyprian first gave a Papistic interpretation to the famous passage in the 16th of Matthew, and brought out the idea of a *Cathedra Petri*. The Roman Bishops thankfully accepted the tender, and afterward requited the African Church by reducing it to absolute subjection. But it was not enough to pervert the Scriptures; history was also falsified. Touching this point, suffice it for the present to say, there can be no question that the dogmatic assertion of a primacy, always adhered to with unyielding tenacity, apparently sustained by the *Petrine* tradition, in ages ignorant and superstitious, powerfully aided the Roman Bishops in the attainment of their ends.

2. *Political influence.* The mere fact that the Western Patriarch was Bishop of Rome was of immense advantage to him in the struggle for supremacy. There was a sense of fitness in the head of the hierarchy residing in the metropolis of the world. Men had so long looked to the City of the Tiber for political direction that they the more naturally looked there for ecclesiastical authority. Nor must the great size of the Western Patriarchate be overlooked. While the East was divided into four great Sees, the West contained but one; the latter probably containing as many elements of intellectual, commercial, and political power as the four combined. This gave the Latin Bishop a preponderance of power so decided that the issue would have been settled in his favor long before it was, had it not been for the rapid growth, under imperial auspices, of the Constantinopolitan See. When the rivalry was reduced to the two contestants, Rome and Constantinople, the former had several advantages over the latter. It was an old, an Apostolic See. The division of the Empire left each of the two Bishops the ecclesiastical head of a great capital. The fall of the Western Empire deprived the Western Patriarch of imperial support; it also left him to consolidate his power without interference or restraint. Thus the Pope came to stand in the place of Cæsar. In the words of Hobbes, "He was the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof." Contrary to what might have been expected, the irrup-



tion of the barbarians proved no serious obstacle in the way of the Papacy. The savage Northern chieftains left the Popes unmolested, apparently standing in a sort of awe of them.\* So far from the decay of the Empire having been a disadvantage to the Papacy, it was an advantage rather. The imperial throne would have stood in the way of the pontifical. Had the Western Empire stood as long as the Eastern, it is impossible to tell how greatly the course of ecclesiastical history had been changed.

3. *The practical character of the Western mind.* The mind of the East and the mind of the West are strikingly dissimilar. The one revels in speculation; the other has a genius for organization. Aristotle set the savage energy and freedom of Europe in contrast with the intellectual repose and apathy of Asia. "While the Western Church prides itself on the title of the Catholic," says Stanley, "the Eastern claims the title of Orthodox." "The East," says Milman, "enacted creeds, the West discipline." "The first decree of an Eastern Council," says Stanley, "was to determine the relations of the Godhead; the first decree of the Pope of Rome was to interdict the marriage of the clergy." The one is satisfied with nothing short of soundness; the other is generally content with obedience. So, while the Easterns pursued their theological refinements, the Westerns perfected ecclesiastical organization. To this general fact it must be added that the Roman Pontiffs were generally embodiments of the Western tendency; besides, the Latins followed the logic of the hierarchical system more rigorously than the Greeks. The Roman legion always proved an overmatch for the Grecian phalanx.

The above are the leading facts that explain why the Papal throne was erected in the West rather than in the East. The victory of the West, however, was but a partial one. The Eastern Church has never submitted to the Papacy. The price paid for the establishment of the ecclesiastical monarchy was the hopeless division of

\* There are few adventures in history more striking than the visit of Leo the Great to the camp of Attila. When the fierce Hun, "the scourge of God," had destroyed Aquileia, and was preparing to move on Rome, the Bishop, with only two companions, crozier in hand, ventured into his camp and changed his purpose, an incident that recalls the procession of the Roman *pontifices*, which, if we might trust the mythic narrative, visited the camp of the Volscians to induce the desperate Coriolanus not to destroy the city of his fathers. No wonder that out of the adventure sprang a legend, put on canvas by the pencil of Raphael, which made a visible appearance of Peter and Paul accompany the Bishop, and with drawn sword compel the Hunnish king to retire!

Christendom. In the East ecclesiastical arrangements still conform to the Patriarchal constitution of the Græco-Roman Church.

A remark upon the date of the Papacy. We have said the hierarchical system was a growth; no less was the Papacy. Some call Leo the Great (440-461) the first Pope, others Gregory the Great (590-604). To us the question is as difficult as to determine when a boy ceases to be a boy and becomes a man, and we shall not essay a decision.

But, wherever the date of the Papacy is fixed, the Pope himself is found a stripling as compared with the colossus that, a few centuries later, bestrode the world. Not content with being the spiritual head of the Latin Church, he aspired to the dominion over the mind, conscience, and general concerns of Europe; and, amazing as the fact is, he actually succeeded in attaining to this position. What Europe was when it was ruled by a priest every man ought to know. We quote from Milman:

"Education, such as it was, (and in many cases, for the times, it was a high education,) had become, with rare exceptions, their exclusive privilege. Whoever had great capacities or strong thirst for knowledge could neither obtain nor employ it but in the peaceful retirement, under the sacred character, with the special advantages of the churchman, or in the cloister. The whole domain of the human intellect was their possession. The universities, the schools were theirs, and theirs only. Then the one strife was between the secular clergy and the regulars—the monks or the friars, the disciples of St. Dominic and St. Francis. They were the canon lawyers, and for some centuries, as far as it was known or in use, the teachers and professors of the civil law. They were the historians, the poets, the philosophers. It was the first omen of their endangered supremacy that the civil lawyers in France rose against them in bold rivalry. When, in the Empire, the study of the old Roman law developed principles of greater antiquity, therefore, it was asserted, of greater authority than the canon law, it was at once a sign and a proof that their absolute dominion was drawing toward its close, that human intellect was finding another road to distinction and power. Physical science alone, in general, though with some famous exceptions, they unwisely declined; they would not risk the popular suspicion of magical and forbidden arts, a superstition which themselves indulged and encouraged. The profound study of the human body was thought inconsistent with the fastidious modesty of their profession. The perfection of medicine, and of all cognate inquiries, indeed, in general, of natural philosophy itself, was left to Jews and Arabs; the great schools of medicine, Montpellier and Salerno, as they derived their chief wisdom from these sources, so they freely admitted untoured, perhaps unbaptized students. It is difficult to calculate the extent of this medical influence, which must have worked, if in secret, still with great power. The jealousy and hatred with which Jews or supposed unbelievers are seen at the courts of kings, is a secret witness to that influence. At length we

find the king's physician, as under Louis XI, the rival in authority of the king's confessor. In this alone the hierarchical caste does not maintain its almost exclusive dominion over all civil, as well as ecclesiastical transactions.

"For it is not only from their sacred character, but from their intellectual superiority, that they are in the courts, in the councils of kings—that they are the negotiators, the ambassadors of sovereigns; they alone can read and draw up State papers, compacts, treaties, or frame laws. Writing is almost their special mystery; the notaries, if not tonsured, as they mostly were, are directed, ordered by the clergy; they are, in general, the servants and regents of ecclesiastics. In every kingdom of Europe the clergy form one of the estates, balance or blindly lead the nobles, and this, too, not merely as churchmen and enrolled in the higher service of God, but from their felt and acknowledged pre-eminence in the administration of temporal affairs.

"To this recognized intellectual superiority, arising out of the power of selecting the recruits for their army according to their mental stature, their sole possession of the discipline necessary to train such men for their loftier position, and the right of choosing, as it were, their officers out of this chosen few, must be added their spiritual authority, their indefeasible power of pre-declaring the eternal destiny of every living layman. To doubt the sentence of that eternal destiny was now an effort of daring as rare as it was abhorrent to the common sense of men. Those who had no religion had superstition; those who believed not trembled and were silent; the speculative unbeliever, if there were such, shrouded himself in secrecy from mankind, even from himself; the unuttered lawless thought lay deep in his own heart. Those who openly doubted the unlimited power of the clergy to absolve were sects, outcasts of society, proscribed not only by the detestation of the clergy, but by the popular hatred. The keys of heaven and hell were absolutely in the hands of the priesthood—even more, in this life they were not without influence. In the events of war, in the distribution of earthly misery or blessing, abundance or famine, health or pestilence, they were the intercessors with the saints, as the saints were intercessors with heaven. They were invested in a kind of omniscience. Confession, since the decree of the Lateran Council, under Innocent III, an universal, obligatory, indispensable duty, laid open the whole heart of every one, from the Emperor to the peasant, before the priesthood; the entire moral being of man, undistinguishable from his religious being, was under their supervision and control, asserted on one side, acknowledged on the other. No act was beyond their cognizance; no act, hardly any thought, was secret. They were at once a government and a police, to which every one was bound to inform against himself; to be the agent of the most rigid self-delation; to endure the closest scrutiny; to be denied the least evasion or equivocation; to be submitted to the moral torture of menaced, of dreaded damnation; if he concealed or disguised the truth to undergo the most crushing, humiliating penance. Absolution, after which the soul thirsted with insatiable thirst, might be delayed, held in suspense, refused; if granted, it was of inestimable price. The sacraments, absolutely necessary to spiritual life, were at their disposal. Baptism to the infant would hardly be refused; but the Eucharist, Christ himself offered on the altar, God made by consecrated hands, God materialized down to the rudest apprehension, could be granted or withheld according to the arbitrary, irresponsible judgment of the priest. The body, after death, might repose in consecrated ground with the saints, or be cast out, to be

within the domain, the uncontested prey of devils. The Excommunication cut the man off, whatever his rank or station, from the Church, beyond whose pale was utter impossibility of salvation. No one could presume to have hope for a man who died under excommunication. Such were the inculcated, by most recognized, at least apprehended doctrines. The Interdict, the special prerogative of the Pope, as the antagonist, the controller of Sovereigns, smote a kingdom with spiritual desolation, during which the niggardly and imperfect rites, the baptism sparingly administered, the rest of the life without any religious ceremony, the extreme unction or the last sacrament coldly vouchsafed to the chosen few, the church-yard closed against the dead, seemed to consign a whole nation, a whole generation, to irrevocable perdition.

"Thus throughout the world no man could stand alone; the priest was the universal lord of the universal human conscience. The inward assurance of faith, of rectitude, of virtue, of love of man or love of God, without the ratification of the confessor; the witness of the Spirit within, unless confirmed, avouched by the priest, was nothing. Without the passport to everlasting life, everlasting life must recede from the hopes, from the attainment of man. And by a strange, yet perhaps unavoidable anomaly, the sacredness of the priest was inalienable, indelible, altogether irrespective of his life, his habits, his personal holiness or unholiness. There might be secret murmurs at the avarice, pride, licentiousness of the priest; public opinion might even in some cases boldly hold him up to shame and obloquy, he was still priest, bishop, pope; his sacraments lost not their efficacy, his verdict of condemnation or absolution was equally valid; all the acts of John XVIII, till his deposal, were the acts of the successor of St. Peter. And if this triumph over the latent moral indignation of mankind was the manifestation of its strength, so its oppugnancy to that indignation was its fall; it was the premonition, the proclamation of its silent abrogation in the hearts of men. The historian has to state the fact, rather than curiously and judicially to balance the good and evil (for good there undoubtedly was, vast good in such ages of class tyrannizing over class, of unintermitting war on a wide or a narrow scale, of violence, of lawlessness, brutality), in this universal sacerdotal domination."\*

These paragraphs are taken from Milman's powerfully drawn picture of the state of Europe in the middle of the fifteenth century. Europe is now the Church, the Church is the Priesthood, the Priesthood is the Pope. Ecclesiasticism has not only absorbed all Church life, it has absorbed all intellectual, social, and political life as well. But the triumph has not been achieved without resistance. There has been the most strenuous opposition to the Papacy within the Church and without. The Bishops of the great Latin Sees—those of Milan and Ravenna, for example—have not tamely surrendered their Episcopal independence. But they have succumbed in the unequal struggle. Nor have kings and emperors always been pleased to see a politico-ecclesiastical authority growing up to overshadow

\* *Latin Christianity*, vol. viii, pp. 134-39.

themselves. Hence many and long conflicts between the Papacy and the temporal power. The warfare has been waged with changing fortunes, sometimes the Pope, sometimes the king in the ascendant; but in the end the interdict proves mightier than the sword. Among the superstitious, even if the basis of their superstition be Christianity, the priest is not unfrequently a more powerful personage than the king.

Had we time to trace them out, we should probably find some compensations. Perhaps, after all, the Priest ruled Europe because he was the fittest man in Europe to rule. The question was not, shall man be maltreated, oppressed, crushed? but, who shall maltreat, oppress, and crush him? The alternative was the Papacy or Cæsarism. To say, however, that the Pope was preferable to the Kaiser is not to say that the Protestant Reformation came a moment too soon. Milman touches this point thus:

"But after all, none of these accessory, and, in some degree, fortuitous aids, could have raised the Papal authority to its commanding height, had it not possessed more sublime and more lawful claims to the reverence of mankind. It was still an assertion of the eternal principles of justice, righteousness, and humanity. However it might trample on all justice, sacrifice righteousness to its own interests, plunge Europe in desolating wars, perpetuate strife in States, set sons in arms against their fathers, fathers against sons—it was still proclaiming a higher ultimate end. It was something that there was a tribunal of appeal, before which the lawless kings, the lawless feudal aristocracy trembled, however that tribunal might be proverbial for its venality and corruption, and constantly warped in its judgments by worldly interests. There was a perpetual provocation, as it were, to the Gospel, which gave hope where it did not give succor; which might, and frequently did, offer a refuge against overwhelming tyranny; something which in itself rebuked rugged force, and inspired some restraint on heinous immorality." \*

But to argue that there were compensations in the Papacy of the Middle Ages, is not to deny that it is an incubus on the nineteenth century. We pass to notice two causes that led to the extension of Papal domination.

One is found in the practical ability of the Pontiffs, the tenacity with which they pursued their ends, and the dexterity with which they improved every favoring opportunity to extend and consolidate their power. "Times of emergency," says Milman, "call forth great men—men at least, if not great in relation to the true intellectual, moral, and spiritual dignity of man, great in relation to the State

\* *Latin Christianity*, vol. iv, pp. 466-67.

and to the necessities of the age; engrossed by the powerful and dominant principles of their time, and bringing to the advancement of those principles surpassing energies of character, inflexible resolution, the full conviction of the wisdom, justice, and holiness of their cause, in religious affairs of the direct and undeniable sanction of God."\* This is a faithful portrait of the great Roman Popes, the number of which was surpassingly large.

The other cause is found in the number and power of the monastic orders. In these the Papacy had a powerful and constant advocacy. The Pope could put forth no claim so far-reaching, assert no prerogative so arrogant, that the monks—that vast army of spiritual janizaries who, bound to the world by no domestic, social, or political ties, had, after a severe struggle, been recognized as the regular clergy of the Church—would not give it an unhesitating support.†

When the Popes had finally succeeded in getting Western Europe in a shape to please them, then came the Revival of Learning and the Protestant Reformation. The causes of the latter, the results that flowed from it—the intellectual and social upheavals, the moral revolutions, the new political and military combinations, the repression and the fanaticism, the tumult and the bloodshed, the diets and the councils, the persecutions, like the Piedmontese, which wrung from the great soul of Milton the Hebraic prayer,

"Avenge, O Lord, thy slaughtered saints, whose bones  
Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold—"

all these are written in the books that contain the history of modern Europe. So stupendous was the change wrought by the forces that

\* Latin Christianity, vol. ii, p. 42.

† "The janizaries of the Porte were Christian children, recruited by the most degrading tribute which tyrannical ingenuity has invented. Torn from their homes in infancy, every tie severed that bound them to the world around them; the past a blank, the future dependent solely upon the master above them; existence limited to the circle of their comrades, among whom they could rise, but whom they could never leave; such was the corps which bore down the bravest of the Christian chivalry, and carried the standard of the Prophet in triumph to the walls of Vienna. Mastering, at length, their master, they wrung from him the privilege of marriage; and the class, in becoming hereditary, with human hopes and fears disconnected with the one idea of their service, no longer presented the same invincible phalanx, and at last became terrible only to the effeminate denizens of the seraglio. The example is instructive, and affords grounds for the assumption that the canon which bound all the active ministers of the Church to perpetual celibacy, and thus created an impassable barrier between them and the outer world, was one of the efficient instruments in creating and consolidating both the temporal and spiritual power of the Roman hierarchy."—*History of Sacerdotal Celibacy*, by Henry C. Lea, pp. 19, 20.



constitute the Modern Era that, a half century ago, Hallam could write: "Those who know what Rome has once been are best able to appreciate what she is; those who have seen the thunderbolt in the hands of the Gregorys and the Innocents will hardly be intimidated at the sallies of decrepitude, the impotent dart of Priam amidst the crackling ruins of Troy."

And yet, through all these changes, Rome has retracted none of her claims, abated none of her pretensions. As a theory, the Papacy still stands in its fullest amplitude. Nay, so far from any subtraction having been made or proposed, the present year is likely to see perfected a piece of work that has required centuries to prepare for. We refer to what the Gregorys and the Innocents, no doubt, sighed for, but did not attain—the proclamation, under conciliar auspices, of the Pope's dogmatic infallibility. The rise of this dogma, its growth through centuries, the means by which its extension has been promoted, the means by which it will be carried in the Council of the Vatican, we had intended to discuss. To do so would require a comparison of the constitution of the Catholic with that of the ancient Church, would necessitate a brief history and an analysis of the long succession of forged historic documents by which the constitution of the Church has been changed, together with a sketch of the career of Pius IX. But these are topics too important and too difficult to be satisfactorily treated in a few paragraphs. Besides, our space is exhausted. We resign the pen, hoping to resume it at no distant day.

VI.—DOES THE NEW TESTAMENT DETERMINE THE  
ELEMENTS OF THE PUBLIC WORSHIP?

NEXT to the question, What shall a sinner do to be saved? none is of more vital interest to Christians than the question of the public worship. On the former the Christian brotherhood are a unit. There is not to be found in their ranks anywhere two who differ as to the terms of pardon, or the mode of entrance into the kingdom. They have made it generally the principal subject of investigation. It, indeed, is *the* theme of the masses of the brethren. They have arrived at settled convictions and methods on the question, not only because of the plain teachings of the New Testament, but also because of earnest and candid inquiry in the premises. On the question of the public worship, I am pained to say there is not such unanimity of sentiment and harmony of methods. It is agreed that the former question—and, indeed, that all questions usually placed in the category of first principles—is determined, and infallibly, by the New Testament. The public worship is not supposed, at least in all of its elements, to belong to said category, and, therefore, the New Testament is not regarded as adequate to the task of determining any thing very definite in the premises. Much, just here, it is thought, has been left to the wisdom of the Church. Here, it seems to me, is where a serious mistake is made in investigating the sacred record. Most inquirers come to its pages with opinions already formed as to the sphere in which it is designed to give light.

The object of this paper is to show that all the elements of the public worship are infallibly determined by the New Testament writings—that the Church is not left to expedients and uninspired judgments in a single act of public worship. This will appear from some considerations induced by reflections on the character and objects of organized institutions, and from the teachings of the book of inspired records and truths.

An institution without an organization is a nondescript—we can not conceive of an institution without involving the idea of its organization. An unorganized institution is no institution at all. The

Christian, or New Institution, must, then, have an organization, and this to enable it to execute the purposes for which it was founded. Every organization must have some mode of exhibition or style of manifestation by which it may be known by foe as well as by friend, provided it is not wholly esoteric, like Masonry, or other societies with secrets. Further, every such organization must have a constitution containing, when accepted as such, all authority in the objects and purposes of the organization, and also clear and definite instructions as to its method of public manifestations. That is, the constitution must contain every thing necessary to it as an organization; and since its mode of public exhibition is necessary to it, this must be contained in said constitution.

This is but stating the question in regard to the Church. Does its constitution—the New Testament—determine the elements of its public service? We can give no other than an affirmative answer to this, unless the New Testament loses ground as a rule of faith and practice. Let it be remembered that no more is claimed than that the elements or acts of worship are determinable; it is not claimed that the hour of the day, or the exact order in which they come, is prescribed. Let it be remembered, also, that reference is had only to the Lord's-day service, and not to private and social worship. Whatever is determined in reference to it holds good for every occasion on which any acts of public worship may be performed.

But suppose the mode of worship not established by divine authority—that no pattern was given in Mt. Zion, as was the case in Mt. Sinai—that it is impossible to determine, from what has come to us from Jesus and the Apostles, the things to be done on the Lord's day, in the Lord's house, which constitute acceptable service. What is the result of such a supposition? It is that every one may invent a method for himself. As the education, taste, and proclivities of each, so their methods of service. Each worshiper is at liberty to do as he may think best in the premises; and what a medley of odd things might be done under such a rule! This is no idle supposition. Out of the notion that the public worship is left even in part to expediency, or to fallible men, has grown a multitude of evils to the Church. To suppose that the public worship is determined in spirit only, and not in form also, in the New Testament, is to suppose that only the germs of it are there, and that these may be

cultivated and trained in any manner human fancy may please. Any ritual, in this view, may be adopted. In rural districts we may have a very simple one, but in cities and centers of influence we may introduce more attractive features. On this ground all modern ritualism is justified, and the door is left wide open for any other innovations that esthetical taste may suggest. Such a hypothesis must be seen to be absurd, as it would lead to all sorts of odd performances—holy dances, death-like groans, and frantic shouts would take their places under it as acceptable acts of worship.

Now, as still further introductory, let a few principles be noted which are of the nature of facts, and are fundamental in any proper investigation of the question under consideration. The fundamental thought in all true religion is that the human will, in *all things*, must be subject to the divine will. This is almost axiomatic, and so evidently true that it needs no elaboration. It is the basic principle of each dispensation. A change of law necessitates a change of administration, but not of principle. In the Patriarchal, Mosaic, and Christian administrations of the divine government, subjection of the human to the divine is fundamental. Whatever *was* God's will under either of the former *was* man's duty. So, now, under the ecumenical administration, whatever *is* God's will is our duty. Without this there can be no true worship, and no true individual piety. Without attempting to ascertain the divine will on all the points of our soul's interests, let us see what it is on the subject of serving Him in His holy temple—to see what is the method of our public homage to the King of kings and Lord of lords. So far we have *presumed* that this question is unfolded in the Word of Life. An appeal will now be made to but three passages to prove that such is the case. In the Savior's conversation with the woman of Samaria, at Jacob's Well, on the subject of worship, the following passage occurs: "God is Spirit; and they who worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth." The Savior passes rapidly from the nature of God to the character of the worship due him. He is Spirit; and worship of Him must be *in* spirit. That is, worshipers must bring their spirits into activity when before God. It must be with the spirit. Were the phrase "in spirit" all, then, so far as this passage testifies, the question of worship would be an open one indeed. The devotee at the shrine of Joss worships in spirit—with all the energies of his

spiritual nature does he pay his devotions to his false god. He worships with his spirit—his heart is in it; and this is what is really meant by “in spirit.” But unfortunately for such a devotee his worship is not *in truth*. “In spirit” and “in truth” do not, as some suppose, mean one and the same thing. There are no such rhetorical flourishes in the Savior’s discourses. We conclude from this memorable passage, (1.) That worship must be spiritual—done with the spirit—must be real, and not in form only. (2.) That worship must be in truth, or in accordance with the dictates of the truth. The Jewish *cultus* was not false—only it is not now *true*—not the prescribed worship. In a word, the latter phrase “in truth” warrants us in asserting that the method to be observed in worshipping God is presented somewhere and somehow in the New Testament.

The second passage, which it is thought sustains the preceding conclusion, is found in Colossians ii, 23, and in the common version reads as follows: “Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in will-worship, and humility, and neglecting of the body; not in any honor to the satisfying of the flesh.” The whole connection is given by Conybeare as follows: “If, then, when you died with Christ, you put away the childish lessons of outward things, why, as though you still lived in outward things, do you submit yourselves to decrees founded on the precepts and doctrines of men.” “For these precepts have a show of wisdom in a self-chosen worship, and in humiliation, and chastening of the body, are of no value to check the indulgences of fleshly passions.” This rendering brings out very fully the sense of the passage, and from it we learn two very important things: (1.) There is a true worship, founded on the commandments of God, based on his will, and that there is a false worship, a will-worship, a self-chosen worship. (2.) That this self-chosen worship is of no value in checking sinful indulgences. Any form of worship, or any element of it, which is self-chosen, is wrong, and, of course, unscriptural, and displeasing to God. If we are not to choose a form of worship, to select our own method of worshipping God, it follows that it must be chosen for us, and this in his Word.

Let us examine one more passage on this part of the subject, which, it is thought, will be found conclusive in all the premises. The passage is in 2 Timothy iii, 16, 17, and reads thus: “All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for

reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." The "man of God," with this passage in his mind, can have no doubt as to the sufficiency of the Scriptures in all matters of the Christian life in its subjective, as well as in its objective aspects. Much less can he doubt as to their guidance in all things pertaining to acceptable service in the public assembly of the saints on the Lord's day. It could not be said of him, when he enters the house of worship on the "holy, happy day," that he is furnished, *thoroughly* furnished, unto all good works, if, on crossing the sacred threshold, he is left to choice and the vagaries of expediency as to the things to be done in order to that worship which is well pleasing in the sight of God. These passages are sufficient to show that the New Testament fixes the elements of the public worship of the saints.

We are now to see *how* this is done. It is generally conceded that there are but four ways in which a duty is enjoined or a doctrine set forth in the New Testament Scriptures. A fifth method is not conceivable. 1. By an express command. 2. By an example having the Divine approval. 3. By precept or statement of the duty or doctrine in so many words. 4. By necessary implication. By at least one of these must the proposition be sustained, if at all. On the second and third methods chief reliance is placed in the present investigation. As an instance of the second method of enjoining a duty, let us examine a few items in the history of the first Church—that at Jerusalem. All that was done here had the Divine approval. Here the law of the new order of things was first proclaimed. The facts that transpired here in the introduction of three thousand persons into the kingdom are supposed to be, and justly, too, final as to the method in which the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation. Those other facts, few though they be, which transpired in the body of the saved shortly after the former events, are none the less final. They are decisive of four out of five acts of the public worship. The narrative, as given in Acts ii, 42, is as follows: "And they continued steadfastly in the Apostles' doctrine [teaching] and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers." All this belongs to the category of the ordinary in the case, and determines for us, (1.) Teaching. (2.) Fellowship. (3.) Breaking of the loaf. (4.) Prayers. It is claimed by some that these latter were set forms of prayer, uttered



by the Apostles, and repeated by the people. Two incidents in the history of this congregation, shortly after the events recorded, show what is meant by this passage. When it became necessary, in order to the better management of the interests of the Church, to set apart certain men as Deacons, it is stated that the Apostles, being now relieved of the care of tables, gave themselves to prayer and to the ministry of the Word. It is not said "to prayers," but "to prayer." That they did not monopolize the praying is shown by another incident in the history of this congregation. When Peter was cast into prison many of the disciples met together for prayers in his behalf, others besides Apostles taking part in them. By giving themselves to prayer and the ministry of the Word no more can be understood than that they led in the public teaching and in prayer on Lord's day. Thus this example, having the approval of heaven, fixes for us four of the elements of the plain, simple worship enjoined by Christ and the Apostles. The presumption is, though there is no statement to that effect, that the fifth element—praise—was also a part of the public service of this, the true "Mother Church." This is necessarily implied in the other items being present. But this most interesting and important item of the public worship does not rest on this case only. There are other cases which now demand notice, and which lead us to some very definite and satisfactory results on this point. We take the case of the Church at Corinth, established at least a decade after the Mother Church at Jerusalem. Time sufficient had elapsed between the establishment of these two congregations to give rise to all exigencies that would likely occur in the history of the new reign. The Apostolic Era was sufficiently long for establishing and setting in order all things necessary for the continuance of the kingdom in the world all its appointed time. This side of that era there is no authoritative legislation. Legislative power was vested by the King only in the Apostles of his choosing. All enactments, either in articles of faith or in items of public worship, which have not their sign manual, belong to that character of worship described in the Colossian letter as self-chosen, and founded on the precepts and commandments of men. The Apostle Paul, in his letter to the Church at Corinth, to which reference has been made as an example in the Gentile world, having the Divine approval, gives instruction respecting the Lord's-Supper, and cites his Corinthian brethren to

the example of Jesus and his disciples on the occasion of the "Last Supper"—or, more properly, the *first* one. On that occasion, after the eating of the emblematic loaf and the drinking of the emblematic wine, *they sang* a hymn. *They*—not one only of the company, as some assert was the case in the first assemblies of the disciples—*sang* a hymn. This example an inspired Apostle directs a congregation of disciples in the refined and polished city of Corinth to follow, more than a decade after the setting up of the kingdom. From this we reasonably conclude that, in connection with the Supper, there was praise, by singing a hymn. If, in this part of the service, praise was by singing only, the inference is very direct and necessary that it was by singing only in all other parts of it. If an example having the Divine approval is adequate to establish a proposition, it is now established that that part of the public worship known as praise is by singing only. In Ephesians v, 19, 20, and in Colossians iii, 16, we have an Apostolic exhortation to teach and admonish one another in psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs; and this, it is generally conceded, refers to the manner and means of praise in Christian worship in the public assembly of the saints, as well as around the home altar. The prerequisite to this, as learned from the first passage, is to be filled with the Spirit; and from the second passage we learn that the "Word of Christ must dwell in us richly in all wisdom." To perform this part of worship, as well as all other parts, there is needed the proper frame of mind. These passages are decisive on this point, and should be studied and pondered by every disciple when he opens his lips in praise to the King of kings and Lord of lords, whether in the holy temple or around the altar at home. Hearty appreciation and diligent practice of these Apostolic injunctions would do much to remove the objections urged by many against this part of the worship. In a word, these objections lie against the abuse of congregational singing, which arises from neglect of the Scriptural injunction to which allusion has been made, rather than to the singing of psalms as the only Scriptural expression of praise. In addition to the prerequisites mentioned, the Apostle shows that the singing must be from the heart by the expressions "singing and making melody [or psalmody] in your *hearts* unto the Lord," and "singing with grace in your *hearts* unto the Lord." "With the heart man believes unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is

made unto salvation." So with the heart melody or psalmody is made unto praise, and with the voice it is given forth unto Him unto whom all praise is due.

Praise, we conclude, is within the limits of psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs or odes, and in order to spirituality, as in the case of faith, it must come from the heart. That congregational singing is not thus spiritual in many instances throughout the Church is conceded, but it by no means follows that the introduction of any other means of making melody will remedy the evil. When it is generally understood and felt, as it evidently should be, that this element of the pure and simple worship of the New Testament is amply provided for therein, and that it does not belong to the category of expediency at all, there will arise a better state of things regarding it. Taking, in connection with the preceding, the fact that during the entire Apostolic Era, and during the first three or four Christian centuries, praise found expression only in the psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs of the saints, we have a pretty strong case, showing that we may safely conclude that it finds proper expression now in no other way.

As further suggestive of remedy for the evils that often infest this part of the public service, let it be felt by teacher and people that thorough preparation, by study and prayer, should be made before appearance within the sanctuary on the Lord's day; for every act of worship there is need of previous preparation. Rushing into the presence of God unprepared is a crying sin of the whole Church.

Those who have the spiritual oversight of the Churches should urge attention to these things. They may be considered of *secondary* importance now, but when we come to see the King, to whom we do homage, in the fullness of his glory, a much larger reckoning may be taken of them than we now imagine. As none but those who can edify a congregation in the ministry should undertake the task, so none but those who can edify in making melody should take the lead in it. And as it is the duty of all, if possible, to prepare for the first, so it is equally the duty of all to prepare for the latter, as far as possible. In many congregations there is a painful sameness of tune and hymn observable. In season and out of season are sung the regular set, and in the regular way. We have often felt like taking the part of certain tunes and hymns, and begging for them a few inter-

vals of quiet rest. "Old Hundred," "Coronation," "Iowa," and one or two others are doubtless immortal, or they would have been annihilated long since. There is one hymn of two stanzas that has often enlisted my liveliest sympathies, beginning with

"'Tis religion that can give."

This is thought to be appropriate on all occasions, even when no other hymn can be remembered so as to be easily found. It is sure to be sung if there is a *hurry* for a song. The editors of hymn-books would do a great service to psalmody in the Churches if in future editions they leave out this hymn altogether, or, which is better, add some three or four stanzas to it. Then it would be too long to sing when the congregation is in a *hurry* "to get through," and so have much more rest than it can hope for as a hymn of two stanzas.

In conclusion, let us recapitulate briefly the main points of this essay. 1. The Scriptures contain every thing necessary to the faith and practice of the Church. The public worship being a very important part of the practice it is certain that all that is essential to it is ordained therein. 2. This is shown by a fair, natural interpretation of John iv, 24; Col. ii, 23; and 2 Tim. iii, 16. 3. Precept and examples are found substantiating the proposition which has been made the subject of investigation. 4. Remedies suggested for the evils that plague that element of the public worship known as Praise. Let there be a vigorous prosecution of the studies in relation to the internal affairs and interests of the Lord's house just as there has been on "elementary subjects," and in less than a decade there will be as much harmony of view and oneness of sentiment on the former as there is on the latter.

## LITERARY NOTICES.

1.—*The Pope and The Council.* By JANUS. Authorized Translation from the German. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 12mo. pp. xxviii-346. 1870.

THE present is an eventful period in the history of the Roman Catholic Church. Never, since the Lutheran Reformation, has that Church been so ill at ease. The promulgation of the Syllabus, in 1866, developed in the Church a feeling of hostility to extreme measures, the extent of which was little dreamed of before. Then followed the call for an Ecumenical Council, whose ostensible object was to give sanction to the doctrines contained in the Syllabus, and to erect into a dogma of the Church the doctrine of Papal infallibility. These events have called out the full strength of the two opposing parties in the Church—the “Liberals” and the “Ultramontanists,” as they are called. The controversy has waxed decidedly warm, and the result has been the issuing of a large number of books, pamphlets, and sermons on both sides. Among these the celebrated letter of Père Hyacinthe, the Pastoral of Bishop Dupanloup, and the volume whose title is at the head of this notice, have attracted most attention.

“The Pope and the Council” is truly a remarkable book. From whatever stand-point we may regard it, it is one of the most significant signs of the times; and that such a book should have been written by men who are in full fellowship in the Catholic Church seems almost incredible to those who are unacquainted with the actual state of things in that Church. The book professes to have been written by more than one person, though it is generally understood to have been chiefly the work of a distinguished Catholic theologian of Munich. The following extract from the Preface will suffice to indicate the stand-point of the work:

“To us the Catholic Church and the Papacy are by no means convertible terms; and, therefore, while in outward communion with them, we are inwardly separated by a great gulf from those whose ideal of the Church is a universal empire spiritually, and, where it is possible, physically, ruled by a single monarch—an empire of force and oppression, where the spiritual authority is aided by the secular arm in summarily suppressing every movement it dislikes. In a word, we reject that doctrine and idea of the Church which has for years been commended by the organ of the Roman Jesuits as alone true, as the sole remaining anchor of deliverance for the perishing human race.”

The book is divided into three chapters, severally canvassing the three points to which the attention of the Vatican Council is directed, namely, the denunciatory propositions of the Syllabus, and the two new articles of faith

to be imposed upon the Church: First, The Assumption of the Body of the Virgin into Heaven; and, second, The Infallibility of the Pope. The introductory chapter sketches the programme which is claimed to have been beforehand drawn up for the consideration of the Council. Then the Syllabus and the new dogma about Mary are subjected to a brief, but searching investigation. But by far the greater portion of the book is devoted to the discussion of the dogma of Papal infallibility. This is evidently the *piece de resistance* of the volume, and it is upon this that the learning, arguments, and eloquence of the writer, or writers, are expended. It is here that we find the real value of the work, and no candid reader who will carefully examine this part of it, can fail to be impressed with the overwhelming arguments which are brought to bear against the infallibility of the Pope. In fact, it is impossible to read the facts brought to light in this volume without feeling amazed at the audacity and recklessness of the Ultramontane party, who seem bent on making the Papacy commit suicide. On pages 40 and 41 we have some of the consequences of the dogma stated:

"Papal infallibility, once defined as a dogma, will give the impulse to a theological, ecclesiastical, and even political revolution, the nature of which very few—and least of all those who are urging it on—have clearly realized, and no hand of man will be able to stay its course. In Rome itself the saying will be verified: 'Thou wilt shudder thyself at thy likeness to God.'

"In the next place, the newly-coined article of faith will inevitably take root as the foundation and corner-stone of the whole Roman Catholic edifice. The whole activity of theologians will be concentrated on the one point of ascertaining whether or not a Papal decision can be quoted for any given doctrine, and in laboring to discover and amass proof for it from history and literature. Every other authority will pale beside the living oracle on the Tiber, which speaks with plenary inspiration, and can always be appealed to.

"What use in tedious investigations of Scripture, what use in wasting time on the difficult study of tradition, which requires so many kinds of preliminary knowledge, when a single utterance of the infallible Pope may shatter at a breath the labors of half a lifetime, and a telegraphic message to Rome will get an answer in a few hours or a few days, which becomes an axiom and article of faith? On one side the work of theologians will be greatly simplified, while on the other it becomes harder and more extensive. A single comma in a single Bull (of Pope Pius V against Baius) has before now led to endless disputes, because it is doubtful whether it should precede or follow certain words, and the whole dogmatic meaning of the Bull depends on its position. But the dispute, which has gone on three centuries, can never be settled now, not even by examining the original document at Rome, which is written, according to the old custom, without punctuation. And how will it be in the future? The Rabbis say: 'On every apostrophe in the Bible hang whole mountains of hidden sense,' and this will apply equally to Papal Bulls; and thus theology, in the hands of the Ultramontane school, which will alone prevail, promises to become more and more Talmudical."

It would be difficult to overestimate the influence of this book upon the religious tendencies of the age. Appearing, as it does, just as all eyes are turned toward the Council at Rome, and at a time, too, when the old forms of Protestantism are rapidly breaking down; when religious liberty is every-where the watchword of the people, and when there is manifested



all over the world a strong and earnest desire to bring the religion of the present more nearly into harmony with Apostolic Christianity, such a work as "The Pope and The Council" must and will produce a very decided impression upon the minds of all earnest and thinking men. Its value is not chiefly in its masterly discussion of the subjects considered in it, but rather in what it indicates as to what is the direction of thought among some of the leading minds of the Church of Rome. We can not intelligently comprehend the present *status* of religion in the world without considering the Roman Catholic Church as an important factor in all our calculations. And it surely ought to be a source of great encouragement to those who are earnestly contending for the faith once delivered to the saints, if men are found in the very bosom of the Roman Catholic Church who are brave enough and strong enough to grapple with some of the fearful abuses into which the Papacy is rapidly leading its millions of votaries. Who knows but that such men as Döllinger, Hyacinthe, and their associates, may begin a reformation from the extremes of Papal assumption which will ultimately reach the true Christian stand-point? However this may be, of one thing we are persuaded, that religious society is just now passing through a period when all these movements have a portentous significance.

We close this hasty notice with the following, on the personal attitude of the Popes, which shows conclusively that, practically, the Pope is already invested with infallibility, though the position has been gained through the most unwarranted usurpations:

"The means used by the Popes to secure obedience, and break the force of opposition among people, princes, or clergy, were always violent. The interdict, which suddenly robbed millions, the whole population of a country—often for trifling causes which they had nothing to do with themselves—of Divine worship and sacraments, was no longer sufficient. The Popes declared families, cities, and states outlawed, and gave them up to plunder and slavery, as, for instance, Clement V did with Venice, or excommunicated them, as Gregory XI, to the seventh generation, or they had whole cities destroyed from the face of the earth, and the inhabitants transported—the fate Boniface VIII determined on for Palestrina.

"It is a psychological marvel how this unnatural idea of a priestly domination, embracing the whole world, controlling and subjugating the whole of life, could ever have become established. It would have required superhuman capacities and Divine attributes to wield such a power even in the most imperfect way, with some regard to equity and justice; and conscientious and really religious men would have been tormented, nay, utterly crushed under the sense of its rightfulness and the corresponding obligations it involved. There was indeed no want of modest phraseology; every Pope asserts, in the customary language, that his merit and capacities are unequal to the dignity and burden, but, for all that, their constant endeavor for centuries to increase their already excessive power is a proof that no need for restricting themselves was usually realized. There have been kings who said they would not be absolute rulers if they could. So the Popes of the first centuries could say: We desire not to rule over canons and councils, but to be ruled by them. But since Nicholas I, and especially since Gregory VII, the principle was avowed that the Pope is lord of canons and councils; the law is not his will, but his will is law."

- 2.—*History of the Church in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.* By K. R. HAGENBACH, D. D., *Professor of Theology in the University of Basle.* Translated from the last German edition, with Additions. By Rev. JOHN F. HURST, D. D. New York: C. Scribner & Co. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. xii-501 ; vi-487. 1869.

DR. HAGENBACH is already favorably known in this country. His great work, "The History of Christian Doctrine," has long been a standard of high authority, not only in Europe, but also on this side of the Atlantic, where it has been elegantly introduced to English readers in two very excellent translations. The present work has received high encomiums from the evangelical theologians of Germany, and the translation by Dr. Hurst will be heartily welcomed by English readers, both in this country and Europe.

Dr. Hagenbach, like most German authors, displays great industry in the collection of material for his work, while his powers of generalization and conscientious carefulness are unequalled by any historian of his day. He has eminently a conservative mind, and, though belonging to the "evangelical" school in theology, is remarkably free from bigotry, and hence his works may be consulted with profit by all religious people.

The present volumes cover an important field of Church history, and the author presents the course of Christian life and doctrine through this with distinguished ability. He is eminently successful in his sketches of the great master leaders of thought belonging to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Such men as Zimmerman, Bogatzky, Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, Semler, Gellert, Euler, Haller, Zinzendorf, Wesley, Whitefield, Lavater, Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Reinhard, Schiller, Pestalozzi, Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi, Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Strauss, Swedenborg, Bruno, Bauer, are sketched with a master hand. And these were the great actors in Europe during the period of which Dr. Hagenbach's History treats.

There is one seemingly strange defect in the work. The author does little more than recognize the existence of the Church in any country but Germany. Of course this oversight will not appear so strange to those who are acquainted with the peculiarities of German writers ; but to many it will be a very serious objection to the work. For ourselves, we confess a preference for the History just as it is. Dr. Hagenbach is peculiarly fitted for the field over which he has traveled, but would have been less successful in any other field. Then, again, it can not be successfully denied that during the last two centuries German thought has had a controlling influence in shaping the theological and religious tendencies in all other civilized countries. Germany has been a sort of starting-point for all new developments in religious matters ; and hence to have a history of ecclesiastical development in Germany for the period stated is to have, so far as principles are concerned, a history of the Church in almost all other lands. Even the religious move-

ment in which we are engaged in this country for the restoration of Primitive Christianity had many of its seed-thoughts developed in Germany during the latter part of the eighteenth century.

We give the following extract from the concluding chapter of volume second, not only because of the valuable thought it contains, but because it will give to the reader an idea of the spirit which characterizes the entire work :

"We do not yet know what will become of our Protestant Church ; but we may venture to assert that the Catholic Church must necessarily begin its reformation with the sixteenth century, and pass through the whole process through which we have gone. We are not afraid of being swallowed up by Catholicism, nor are we disposed to return to it as it is ; yet we must not forget that the Catholic Church (whether it will confess it or not) has derived advantage from the Reformation, and that Protestantism has in many ways helped to purify it. At the same time we frankly confess that our Protestantism has to pass through many conflicts, and that, meanwhile, we shall be greatly benefited by the experience of our sister Church. We have already spoken of individual apostates from Protestantism to Catholicism. During the most recent period, however, not only pious Catholic individuals, such as Gossner and Hennhöfer, but whole congregations, such as that of Mühlhausen, have gone over to the Protestant Church.

"These isolated phenomena will ever occur. It would be a very mechanical notion to imagine that, in one or the other of these ways, either the Catholics should become Protestant, or Protestants Catholic, so that one would absorb the other. This can never take place. Our notion is simply this : two powers, the Gospel and the Church, are given to us both. The Church has been established by the Gospel, and the Gospel shall be preserved, promulgated, and maintained in vigorous life by the Church. But time has taught that where the Church arrogates absolute authority, the Gospel is suffocated and displaced by Romish tyranny. The Reformation of the sixteenth century restored the Gospel in its purity, so far as God granted it the privilege. But the Reformation did not set up a Church, and yet there are many who ask, 'Where is the evangelical Church?' 'Where are its fixed statutes and forms?' 'Where are its visible limits?' 'Where are its constitution and its unity?'

"True, we can not point to a perfect Church, nor scarcely to the outline and groundwork of one. But should we, therefore, expect from without what can only be developed from within? We desire an evangelical Church, but we can only be aided by what comes from an evangelical spirit, from the spirit of the glad tidings of God's grace in Christ. In opposition to every thing not evangelical, we stand steadfastly Protestant, however proudly the claim to the name of Catholic may be arrogated. But in so far as the Gospel shall be preached to every creature, we also declare our connection with the Catholic Church, since it is the community of saints. If the Church which has been heretofore exclusively called Catholic, shall drop the epithet *Roman*, it will no longer ask, 'What does Rome teach?' but will return to the basis of the Gospel, and on this ground will be renewed in the Spirit, far better than was the case at Trent, when the Holy Spirit came over sometimes from Rome in mail-bags ! It need not make the circuitous journey through the waste deserts of our old Protestant theology in order to be called truly *reformed*. God will shorten the way, and then we shall see whether we have a desire to enter the house that has been thoroughly purified, freed from the Popish leaven.

"But if, on the other hand, our Protestant Church will adhere to the ground which is laid down, it will, with the negative and critical element which it needs, also cultivate the positive one, not one-sidedly, by mere knowledge, but by the culture of pure characters, by energetic working, by true union in faith and love. Thus will God always aid it in escaping from a deformed and declining condition to a love corresponding to the spirit dwelling within it, and the invisible Church will always have a more worthy visible expression. In short, the more evangelical the Catholic Church becomes, and the more ecclesiastical

(*Catholic* in the real sense) the evangelical Church becomes, the more vigorously will the two strive together, though by a reversed order of development, for the goal of their perfection. But will this happen? Will and can the Catholic Church, so far as we are acquainted with it, ever cease to be Roman Catholic? Will it ever give the Bible to the people? On the other hand, has the Protestant Church any reasonable hope of a speedy and happy outward formation of its character?

"These are questions we can not answer. We will not absolutely affirm or deny them; least of all can we expect and compel any thing by outward force. We can not even conjecture—to say nothing of deciding—without being lost in millenarian dreams, whether the Catholic Church, having become internally evangelized, and the Protestant Church, having become outwardly organized, will ever flow together, and thus really represent 'one fold and one Shepherd.' Sometimes it seems to be God's plan to permit both Churches to progress side by side, and not so that one is all wheat and the other nothing but weeds, but that each have enough to do to keep down the weeds, whether they spring up on its own soil or are propagated from its neighbor's garden. But let false zeal be kept as far distant as false submissiveness and indifference."

To those who wish a comprehensive and impartial discussion of the great questions with which religious society is to-day most interested, we would most heartily commend Professor Hagenbach's volumes. We know of nothing in all the range of theological literature that can take their place, and we do not see how any theological student or religious teacher can afford to do without them.

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3.—*The History of Rome.* By THEODOR MOMMSEN. Translated with the Author's sanction, and Additions by the Rev. WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D. D., *Regius Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of Glasgow, late Classical Examiner in the University of St. Andrews.* With a Preface by DR. LEONHARD SCHMITZ. New Edition, in 4 vols. Volumes I and II. Cr. 8vo. pp. 635-568. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869.

OF this work we can not speak too highly. It is, indeed, the *ne plus ultra* of the histories of Rome, and must, in a great measure, supersede all other works written upon the same subject.

Dr. Mommsen has long been known and appreciated as one of the first scholars of Europe, and especially as thoroughly informed in the languages, laws, and institutions of ancient Rome and Italy. He has made these a special study, and has given us the results of his researches in his admirable History of Rome.

This work, when it first made its appearance, about eighteen years ago, was received with enthusiasm by the German public. And now that it has been so elegantly translated by Dr. Dickson, it can not fail to meet with equal favor among English readers.

What Grote has done for Greece, Mommsen has done for Rome. While he follows, in many respects, the same line of investigation as Niebuhr and Arnold, he is much more satisfactory than either, and has pushed his researches much further than these learned historians.

One feature of the work, while it will commend it for popular use, will doubtless detract from its value among scholars. We refer to the fact that the author seems to have thrown aside his whole apparatus of learning, and to have simply entered enthusiastically upon the work of writing out his conclusions, without referring to the authorities upon which these conclusions are based. This method clearly has its advantages. It presents the history in a more connected form, and enables the author to give full force to his very excellent and captivating style; but it will hardly be satisfactory to scholarly, judicial minds, since these will wish to know upon what authority so many heretofore received facts of history are set aside, or else made to change their meaning. Unity of effect is certainly a very desirable object to be sought in a history, but we doubt whether it should be preferred to the less brilliant and impressive method adopted by Grote and Arnold.

The first volume comes down to the struggle between Pyrrhus and Rome, and the subjection of Italy to the Roman power. The history of the kings, from Romulus to Tarquin the Proud, is regarded as altogether untrustworthy, and hence the story even is not told. The author, however, evidently assumes that the reader is acquainted with this story, as he frequently alludes to it. Even the early history of the Republic, down to the burning of the city by the Gauls, is considered, to a great extent, as entirely mythical, and consequently unhistorical. Hence only such events are touched upon as are necessary to account for constitutional changes. By far the most interesting portion of the volume begins with the chapter on the change of the constitution. It is really interesting to behold the principles of constitutional government, as they are developed by these ancient Romans. And we think it quite probable that we Americans may learn lessons from this history that will be of infinite value to us in the management of our own Republic.

But our author does not confine himself to any one feature of the people whose history he is writing. Language, law, religion, industry, art, literature, trade, and, in fact, all phases of Roman activity and civilization, are discussed with a masterly power. The chapter on "Art and Science," which concludes Volume I, is one of rare interest, and full of most valuable instruction.

The second volume extends from the union of Italy to the subjugation of Carthage and the Greek States, embracing one of the most interesting periods in Roman history. The rise and development of Carthage, the great rival of Rome, are depicted in the author's best style; while the great conflicts between Hannibal, the Carthaginian General, and the Roman States, are described with a vividness and interest unequalled by any other historian. Dr. Mommsen is singularly successful in his description of battles. There is no delay with unnecessary details; but, plunging at once

*in medias res*, and presenting only the important facts, he enables us to almost realize each individual conflict, as if we were actually a participant in it.

Passing over the chapters on the Macedonian wars, we desire to call attention to the concluding chapters on the "Government and the Governed;" the "Management of Land and of Capital;" "Faith and Manners;" "Literature and Art." These chapters are worth more than the price of the entire work, and present by far the most satisfactory account of the character of the Roman Republic, the habits and customs of the people of that period, that has ever been written. They are simply exhaustive.

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4.—*The Principles of Psychology.* By JOHN BASCOM, Professor in Williams College. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son. 12mo. pp. xii-346. 1869.

THE American people are not distinguished for accurate and comprehensive views in psychological matters. Whether the study of metaphysics be in opposition to the practical or not, the *kind* of practical which characterizes American habits and thought is clearly in antagonism to any thing like extensive metaphysical studies. Hence, to find an American author making a fresh and vigorous contribution to mental science, is as unexpected as it is welcome to all who do not believe in the rattle of wheels as the highest manifestation of true national development.

Professor Bascom's book is one of the very best that has been written upon the principles of psychology, and that has appeared from the American press. It is a marvel, indeed, of conciseness. There is no needless verbiage, no "vain repetitions," or unnecessary, high-sounding terminology. The book is a straightforward, earnest discussion of the science of which it treats; and, though it does not always convince the reader, it never fails to demonstrate that the author at least has earnest convictions.

Professor Bascom starts out with the following postulates: "The mind has direct intuitive knowledge, which is ultimate, admitting of no further explanation than that involved in the very act of knowing;" "There are different kinds of knowing, each independent of the others;" "We have as many intuitive faculties as we have distinct forms of primitive knowledge;" "What is conceded at one point must be fully conceded at all points." These are the seed-truths of the volume, and hence they furnish a distinct and definite outline of Professor Bascom's whole mental system.

The most original and important portion of the work is that which relates to consciousness. Some of the most distinguished metaphysicians have defined consciousness as an "act," and as "a faculty of the mind." Professor Bascom regards it as simply a regulative idea, like the idea of space, the necessary condition of all mental phenomena. We can not think of body without thinking of space, for all material bodies are *in* space. So con-



sciousness is "the unique realm, cut off from every other," in which we are to find all the materials of mental science. On page 17 he says:

"Consciousness is commensurate with all mental states and acts. It accompanies feeling as much as thinking, and volition as much as either. The only possible way in which a mental state or act can be testified to is by consciousness—some mind at some time has known or felt it. An event that happens nowhere in space is not a physical event: an act or state that is not found in the field of consciousness is not a mental state or act. There are either facts that are neither physical nor mental, that exist neither in space nor consciousness, but in some unintelligible form in some third, unknown region, or all facts fall under these two divisions; and it remains the criterion of one class that they occur in space, and of the other that they occur in consciousness. A third state is inadmissible as unknown and unnecessary. Consciousness is neither a knowing, nor a feeling, nor a willing; is neither this nor that mental act, but a condition common to them all—a field in which they appear, in which they arise and make proof of their existence. A consciousness of knowing is necessary to knowledge, a consciousness of feeling is necessary to feeling, and of willing to volition; and as these three cover all states and acts of mind, consciousness is involved in the very conception of a mental state or act."

It is difficult to harmonize the statements in this extract with many expressions which subsequently appear in the book. On page 30 it is stated that "mind, by virtue of its own nature as mind, does and suffers what it does and suffers, consciously under this simple, peculiar, and inexplicable condition of *being aware of its own acts*," etc. On page 76 we are told that "consciousness, or the inner sense, the remaining means of a *direct knowledge* of phenomena, requires but a brief notice."

We might give other instances where the author seems to regard consciousness as an act or faculty of the mind, notwithstanding his whole effort is to show that it is simply a regulative idea. Bating these seeming contradictions, the style of the author is generally remarkably clear, evincing a deep insight into the powers of the mind, as well as a hearty sympathy with the objective world.

The work will doubtless stimulate inquiry upon the important subjects which it discusses, and will lead to a better and clearer understanding of some of the knotty points in metaphysical science. We regard it as one of the most notable books that has been issued from the American press.

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5.—*Bible Animals*; Being a Description of every Living Creature Mentioned in the Scriptures, from the Ape to the Coral. By the Rev. J. G. WOOD, M. A., F. L. S., etc. Illustrated. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 8vo. pp. xxx-652. 1870.

THE author of this volume has won for himself a front rank among writers on Natural History. He is not only accurate and exhaustive in his treatments, but there is a freshness and vigor in every thing he writes, which make his works eminently popular among the masses. He has the peculiar faculty of making the dryest themes deeply interesting.

The present volume will add to his reputation. In fact, there is no work in any language comparable with it. Its value to the Bible student can scarcely be estimated, as it conveys knowledge of the very first importance in order to a correct understanding of the Holy Scriptures.

The object of the work is to take, "in its proper succession, every creature whose name is given in the Scriptures, and to supply so much of its history as will enable the reader to understand all the passages in which it is mentioned."

We notice one or two strange omissions. Why the whale is not mentioned we can not understand, since it plays such an important part in Bible history. Otherwise the book is well-nigh perfect. And the illustrations, which are numerous and both well designed and executed, are, we are assured, "taken from the living animals, while the accessory details have been obtained, either from the Egyptian or Assyrian monuments, from actual specimens, or from photographs and drawings of the latest travelers." These are arranged so that each illustration explains one or more passages of Scripture.

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6.—*Discourses on Various Occasions.* By the REV. FATHER HYACINTHE, late Superior of the Barefooted Carmelites of Paris, and Preacher of the Conference of Notre Dame. Translated by LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON, Pastor of a Church of Christ in Brooklyn, New York. With a Biographical Sketch. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son. London: S. Low, Son & Marston. 12mo. pp. xliv-198. 1869.

*The Family and the Church: Advent Conferences of Notre Dame, Paris, 1866-7, 1868-9.* By the REV. FATHER HYACINTHE, late Superior of the Barefooted Carmelites of Paris. Edited by LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON. With an Introduction by JOHN BIGELOW, Esq., late Minister of the United States at the Court of France. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son. London: S. Low, Son & Marston. 12mo. pp. 353. 1870.

WE have not been particularly infatuated with Père Hyacinthe. We had learned to esteem him very highly as a man of superior powers in the pulpit, and had been more than delighted with his manly protest against the usurpations of Rome, as presented in his remarkable letter to the General of the Order of Barefooted Carmelites. But we were not prepared to play the toady to the distinguished Père after the style of certain Protestant clergymen of New York. We have not been free from the suspicion that Hyacinthe is not exactly the man to push his convictions to their logical conclusion; and, although we are grateful for the many good things he has said, we have yet to learn that he has made any advance beyond his protest against certain abuses in the Catholic Church. He is simply a liberal Catholic, and is not likely to be anything else. He may protest, but should the Pope cut off his official head, he is just the man to be conquered by such an

act. He may seek to reform the Catholic Church, but if the Church will not hear his plea, he will not continue long a disturbing element. In fact, he is not made of such stuff as is necessary to lead a reformation. Hence we regard him as simply representing a certain amount of discontent, which is just now decidedly manifesting itself within the Catholic Church. This is the precise value of his past action and present position. Like Dr. Döllinger and others, he is making signs which indicate the religious progress of the age, and, so far, we are thankful for his speeches and acts.

In many of his discourses there is much to admire, as well as much to condemn. His views concerning civil society and Christianity, and the family and the Church, frequently differ very materially from the received doctrines upon these subjects in the Catholic Church. But they as frequently differ from Protestant ideas, and especially the Protestantism of America.

It would be difficult to read the two volumes now given to the American public without being deeply impressed with the sincerity of the author. They contain many passages of surpassing eloquence, and abound in fruitful suggestions, that will not fail to commend them to all classes of readers; and, while we are constantly reminded of the Church associations of the preacher, we can not help admiring his beautiful charity, his graceful style, and his quiet, though overpowering enthusiasm. The translation seems to have been somewhat hurriedly done; still it preserves the original characteristics with sufficient accuracy, and is quite creditable as a literary performance. We welcome these volumes as a valuable contribution to religious literature.

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7.—*The Earlier Years of our Lord's Life on Earth.* By the REV. WILLIAM HANNA, D. D., LL. D. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. pp. 400. 1870.

THERE is some truth in Mr. Spurgeon's reply, when requested by a publishing house to write a life of Christ. He said there were two reasons why he should decline. One was, he did not feel himself competent to undertake such a work; and the other was, he regarded the New Testament as furnishing the best life that ever was, or could be, written of Jesus. We say there is *some* truth in this reply, and yet it needs qualification. There are, indeed, few men capable of dealing with the life of Christ so as to present that life, from any point of view, more strikingly than we now have it. And, while we are free to admit that the life of Jesus, *as a whole*, can not be presented better than it is in the New Testament, still, we are inclined to think that many individual features of it may be brought out more clearly and vividly, and with much more effect upon the popular mind. If this were not the case there would be nothing gained in the study of the New Testament, so far as the life of Christ is concerned. Hence we think it altogether possible, by proper arrangement of the lights and shades of

that wonderful picture, for a true artist to develop beauties which would entirely escape the general reader.

Of Dr. Hanna's *Life of Christ* we can not speak confidently until we have examined the subsequent volumes, yet to be published in this country. The present volume embraces only the earlier years of our Lord's life on earth, but is sufficient to indicate the general character of the entire work. It is especially to be commended for one thing. There is no strained effort to fill up the details of the infancy of Jesus, which are omitted in the Divine records. All efforts of this kind are not only offensive to good taste, but are absolutely unworthy of any mind that is capable of comprehending the reason of this omission in the Sacred Records. There was a wise and beneficent purpose in keeping this portion of the Savior's life away from human view. It was the time of preparation for the great life-work before him. Hence we catch but one glimpse of him between his infancy and manhood; and even then there is nothing of weakness in his appearance. It was evidently the design of the Heavenly Father that we should know Christ simply in his truest manhood, and hence the habit of some preachers and writers of drawing fanciful pictures of his youthful days is as ridiculous as it must always prove to be a failure.

There is no parade of learning in Dr. Hanna's work. We are presented with results, rather than the process by which these results are reached. The narrative is allowed to take its natural course, and flows on in an easy and unaffected style. The volume abounds in some beautiful and tender passages, and every-where gives unmistakable evidence that the author has studied his subject with a pure and spiritual insight, which few have equaled and none surpassed. We shall look with anxiety for the volumes which are to follow.

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8.—*Haydn's Dictionary of Dates*; Relating to all Ages and Nations. For Universal Reference. Edited by BENJAMIN VINCENT, Assistant Secretary and Keeper of the Library of the Royal Institution of Great Britain. And Revised for the use of American readers. New York: Harper & Brothers. pp. 541. 1869.

THE value of such a work as this depends upon its comprehensiveness and accuracy; and in both of these Haydn's Dictionary excels. We know of no work that is more exhaustive in the department of which it treats, and it may be said that the accuracy is every thing that could be expected, except the additions of the American editor. While it is scarcely as full in some of its details as Townsend's excellent manual, it is decidedly more satisfactory to the American student, since the events of our own country are brought down to the present time.

The labor bestowed upon this work has been very great. It was first

compiled in 1841, and, notwithstanding many imperfections in the execution of the original plan, it has passed through thirteen editions. In 1855, Mr. Haydn's health having failed, the editing of the work passed into the hands of Mr. Benjamin Vincent, by whom it has been thoroughly revised, and many valuable additions made.

The Dictionary comprises "Remarkable Occurrences, Ancient and Modern; the Foundation, Laws, and Governments of Countries; their Progress in Arts, Sciences, and Literature; their Achievements in Arms, and their Civil, Religious, Military, and Philanthropic Institutions." All these are considered, for the most part, in chronological tables, making a complete dated encyclopedia, a digest summary of every department of human history. It is, in fact, a final condensation of the records of the race.

While we are thankful for the additions of the American editor, we are sorry they can not always be relied upon. We have noted several inaccuracies, but, for want of space, can not now specifically point them out. Bating these slight blemishes, the work is of almost incalculable value.

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9.—*The Sermons of Henry Ward Beecher*, in Plymouth Church, Brooklyn. From Verbatim Reports by T. J. ELLINWOOD. "Plymouth Pulpit," First and Second Series. September, 1868, to September, 1869. New York: J. B. Ford & Co. pp. vi-438; vi-466. 1869.

THESE two volumes contain the principal sermons of Mr. Beecher from the Plymouth Pulpit during one year. And, though the sermons are often faulty, and are not such as are likely to live through the ages, it can not be denied that they present a sort of mental phenomenon, when we take into consideration the circumstances of their delivery. They are not the best sermons of a long ministerial experience, but the extemporaneous utterances of a preacher at his regular successive ministrations. We doubt whether the same class of sermons of any other minister would present more vigorous thought or more stirring eloquence.

Mr. Beecher has demonstrated to the American people at least one thing, namely, that preaching, to be effective, must come within the sphere of the *people*. No other man has shown himself more capable of bringing himself directly into sympathy with his audience. And this, after all, is the chief secret of his success. Preaching is not lecturing. It is the art of bringing the story of the cross, fresh and warm from the Divine pages, to bear upon the hearts and consciences of men. Talking at long range to the intellect will never move men to accept the conditions of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. The preacher must carry his theme directly, with all the fire of heaven's love, into the very ranks of those whom he wishes to convince. This is Mr. Beecher's method, and his sermons, in this respect, are good models for all who do not meet with encouraging success.

- 10.—*A Critical, Doctrinal, Homiletical Commentary*; containing the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Solomon's Song. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 8vo. pp. 595. 1870.

THIS volume belongs to the best class of Commentaries, and is one of the most scholarly of Dr. Lange's series. Dr. Otto Zöckler, the German author, is eminently fitted for treating the Solomonic writings. He evidently has many of the highest qualities of a clear and systematic expositor. He is sober, concise, and mainly free from theological bias. Though belonging to the evangelical school, he does not always pronounce the Shibboleths of orthodoxy, but shows himself sufficiently free from the spirit of dogmatism to make his work valuable to all Biblical students.

President Charles A. Aiken is the translator and editor of the Book of Proverbs, and has performed his work in a highly satisfactory manner. Professor Taylor Lewis edits Ecclesiastes. His work is characterized by many thoughtful and scholarly notes, but we have less faith in him as an interpreter of the Hebrew Scriptures than in Dr. Zöckler.

Professor Green has done his work well in editing the Song of Solomon. Zöckler's view is that this Song is *typical*, not *allegorical*. This opens up a new view of this mysterious portion of the Bible. We do not see, however, that it throws any great additional light where light is so much needed. Nevertheless, something will be gained, if only the allegorical method is abandoned. This has always been as unnatural as the Song itself is seemingly without spiritual meaning.

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- 11.—*Lady Byron Vindicated*; A History of the Byron Controversy, from its Beginning to the Present Time. By HARRIET BEECHER STOWE. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co. 12mo. pp. vi-482. 1870.

WE can not say positively that the public is tired of this controversy, but we think it is high time that it should be. There was never the slightest justifiable reason for the disclosures made by Mrs. Stowe in the first place, and we know of nothing that would punish her sufficiently for what she has done, unless she should be compelled to read all that has been written upon the subject since.

The volume before us does one thing at least. It demonstrates the belief of Mrs. Stowe in the story she has told. No one can read her last "say" without being profoundly convinced that she has an abiding faith in the truthfulness of her revelations. Whether her book will be able to convince others remains to be seen. We do not suppose it will make much difference in the progress of things, no matter on which side public opinion shall finally settle, or if it shall never settle at all.

Mrs. Stowe can congratulate herself that the *Saturday Review*, one of



the ablest journals of England, has recently come to her assistance in one of the most discriminating articles that has appeared on her side of the question. This, however, does not justify Mrs. Stowe's publication, but thinks it altogether probable that what she published is true. We are disposed to leave the matter just where it ought to have been left before any thing was said about it.

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- 12.—*Every-Day Subjects in Sunday Sermons.* By ROBERT LAIRD COLLIER. Boston: American Unitarian Association. Chicago: Western News Company. 16mo. pp. 232. 1870.

It is quite worth while to read this book for two things, if for no other reasons. First: it gives us the staple themes of one of the popular pulpits of the North-west; and, secondly, it gives us much that will enable us to determine somewhat the doctrinal stand-point of what is called the conservative wing of the Unitarians. Mr. Collier has evidently very "broad" views upon the subject of inspiration. For instance, he calls "Berthold Auerbach the Divinely inspired man of this century;" and, further, says that "Mark and John knew Jesus no better than he." His views of the atonement are equally suggestive. He says, "the most heinous contradiction in morals is that one can give one's life in expiation of another's guilt." It must be obvious, also, from the following, that he thoroughly understands the source of religious comfort: "It is a religious delight to give the soul up to the miracle-working power of such a voice as Caboul's"—a French actor, whose "miracle-working power" is just about even with much of Mr. Collier's preaching. His sermons on the "Folly of Converting Jews" and the "Orthodox Hell" are fine specimens of flatly contradicting the Bible. Truly has Cicero said: *Maxima illecebra est peccandi impunitati spes.*

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- 13.—*The Gospel in the Trees; With Pulpit Opinions on Common Things.* By ALEXANDER CLARK. Philadelphia: J. W. Daughaday & Co. 12mo. pp. 305. 1869.

THE author of this volume has the happy faculty of using what are called "common-place things" to illustrate the great matters of life and death, time and eternity. His mind is eminently practical. Hence his volume abounds in many important truths, brought forward in a style which can not fail to interest the masses. He is evidently a close observer of men and things. He keeps his eyes and ears open, and is what we would call in common phrase a *live man*, fully abreast of the age, if not sometimes in advance of it.

Mr. Clark's method of illustrating truth is very forcible, especially to the common people, but may be very easily abused. Many beautiful passages of Scripture have been almost annihilated by strained interpretations. For VOL. II.—18

instance, many parables of the Savior have been forced to speak a hundred voices which the Savior never intended. Every part of the parable is supposed to mean something distinct in itself, instead of considering all these as parts of the whole, which is generally intended to develop only a single truth.

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- 14.—*History of England, from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth.* By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M. A., Late Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 12mo. 1870.

WE have received six more volumes of the "People's Edition" of Mr. Froude's valuable History. We have already stated our views of the work as a whole, and need only say here that with each volume the interest increases.

The period discussed is one of the most important in English history, and as Mr. Froude differs in many important points from all previous historians, the critics are already at work calling in question the truth of many of his statements. There is nothing new, however, in this. It is precisely what we might expect. Any disturbance of historical characters is just as likely to stir up controversy as if we were to interfere with established institutions. Let the controversy go on. Truth will be the gainer in the end. When the work is completed, we will take pleasure in noticing more fully its defects and excellencies. For the present, we need only add, that this edition, though very cheap, is by no means of inferior workmanship. The paper, printing, and binding are as good as are usual in much more expensive books.

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- 15.—*The Holy Grail, and Other Poems.* By ALFRED TENNYSON, D. C. L., Poet Laureate. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co. 16mo. pp. 202. 1870.

WE may not be able to give the reason why it is so, nevertheless we *feel* that this volume will not add to the reputation of Mr. Tennyson. Notwithstanding these poems take us back to the poet's first love, there is, to us at least, an apparent want of the old spirit which characterized the earlier poems of the Round Table. It may be that our appreciation is growing dull, and *it may be* that Tennyson is not quite himself in these passing days. We do not wish to be misunderstood. It is not our purpose to even intimate that the present volume is uninteresting. We mean to say that it is not equal to some of his earlier publications—"only this, and nothing more." In fact, the most interesting poem in the volume is one which belongs to another period of writing, and which is only reset here.

The Holy Grail is the completion of a series of Arthurian legends, in which the first specimen was given in *Morte d'Arthur*, and of which considerable portions were sketched in the *Idylls of the King*. The whole

series now forms a continuous poem, concluding with "The Passing of Arthur," the earliest written and best poem in the book.

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- 16.—*Old Testament Shadows of New Testament Truths.* By LYMAN ABBOTT, Author of "Jesus of Nazareth: His Life and Teachings," etc. With Designs by Doré, Delaroche, Durham, and Parsons. New York: Harper & Brothers. Cr. 8vo. pp. viii-213. 1870.

MR. ABBOTT has been singularly fortunate in the selection of a title for his book. It is a title, too, that expresses quite definitely the subject-matter of the book. Of the treatment we can say truly that it is well done. Many of the themes are presented with a vividness of outline and a distinctness of meaning which can not fail to rivet the attention of the reader. Such subjects as "The Cities of the Plain," "Water in the Wilderness," "The Riven Rock," "The Fiery Serpents and the Brazen Serpent," "Samson's Strength and Weakness," "Elisha's Vision," etc., are full of important and suggestive truths, and are treated in a style beautiful alike for its simplicity, purity, and power.

The illustrations, as a general thing, are excellent, and add much to the interest of the volume. The style of the printing, press-work, and binding, is all that could be desired, and makes it at once an elegant and chaste gift-book, as well as an instructive guide to Bible truth.

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- 17.—*The Polar World: A Popular Description of Man and Nature in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions of the Globe.* By Dr. G. HARTWIG, Author of "The Sea and Its Living Wonders," "The Harmony of Nature," and "The Tropical World." With Additional Chapters, and 163 Illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. 8vo. pp. xiii-468. 1869.

THIS book is exhaustive of what is at present known concerning the Polar regions. While it is written in a vigorous and highly picturesque style, it furnishes an encyclopedia of facts concerning that portion of the world of which it treats. A great part of the work is taken up with the adventures and hair-breadth escapes of travelers in the Polar world, all of which are very entertaining to the general reader. But the work has as well a scientific value, not only because it describes accurately the manners, habits, customs, etc., of the people, and the geographical and geological conditions of the country around the Poles, but also because it furnishes the experiences of so many discoverers in those regions, making it a sort of guide-book for future explorations.

The work is profusely illustrated, and printed in the best style of the art. It is a volume of rare interest, especially at this time, when so much anxiety is felt concerning a passage that will yet probably be discovered by the North Pole.

- 18.—*Health by Good Living.* By W. W. HALL, M. D., editor of "Hall's Journal of Health." New York: Hurd & Houghton. 12mo. pp. vi-277. 1870.

WHOEVER lays this book aside as a dry and uninteresting discussion of subjects which are relished by most people only three times a day, and then in quite a different form from the way they appear in books, will have made a great mistake. The subjects are discussed in a style both interesting and instructive. A list of subjects will serve to give the scope of the book: "The object of eating," "When to eat," "What to eat," "How much to eat," "Regularity in eating," "How to eat," "Biliousness," "Dyspepsia," "Neuralgia," "Nervousness," "The unity of disease," "Air and exercise," "Food cure," "Health by good living—the argument," "Rest," "Appendix," and "Notes."

Dr. Hall is already known to the American people, through his *Journal of Health*, as the author of a great many wise and practical suggestions in reference to the habits of life most conducive to good health. This volume will add to his reputation, and will be of great practical service to any one who will give earnest heed to its important admonitions.

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- 19.—*Among my Books.* By JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, A. M., Professor of Belles-Lettres in Harvard College. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co. 12mo. pp. 380. 1870.

THIS volume contains the finest essays of one of our most gifted authors. They were originally contributed to the *North American Review*, but so far as the public are concerned, this republication has all the freshness of a new work.

The volume opens with an essay on Dryden, which is a sound, discriminating review of his works, and does justice to the man as well as his poetry. The articles on "Witchcraft" and "New England two centuries ago" are full of curious and interesting information. "Shakspeare once more" is one of the finest pieces of poetic criticism with which we are acquainted. The article on Lessing is one of the very best that has ever appeared in English on the genius and character of that splendid intellectual giant. "Rousseau and the Sentimentalists" is a subject well handled in a short concluding article. Altogether the volume is one of rare interest, and will be welcomed by all lovers of honest and earnest criticism.

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- 20.—*Astronomy without Mathematics.* By EDMUND BECKETT DENNISON, LL. D., Q. C., F. R. A. S. Edited, with corrections and notes, by PLINY E. CHASE, A. M. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son. 12mo. pp. 357. 1869.

THIS is an effort to popularize astronomy, and will doubtless be acceptable to a large class of people who have not the time or means to take a

thorough course in the science of which it treats. The book is a success in every point of view, and is so simple in its discussions that it translates one of the most difficult studies into almost a recreation.

- 21.—*A Debate on the beginning of Messiah's Reign, the Abrogation of the Mosaic Law, and First Proclamation of the Gospel; Baptism, Action, Subject and Design; The Disciples' or Christian Church, the same Instituted by Jesus Christ on Pentecost; The Doctrine and Polity of the Methodist Church a feasible basis for the union of all Christians, between Elder JOHN A. BROOKS, of Winchester, Ky., of the Church of Christ, and Rev. J. W. FITCH, of Winchester, Ky., of the Methodist Episcopal Church South. Commencing Sept. 13 and ending Sept. 18, 1869. Phonographically reported. Cincinnati: R. W. Carroll & Co. 12mo. pp. 383. 1870.*

As a rule, we are not favorable to oral religious debates. They are generally, for the most part, of local interest, and are largely characterized by the influence of local prejudices. Sometimes, however, they are necessary, and if conducted in the proper spirit, may be productive of much good. We have not had time to examine with care the volume before us, but from the character of the men who conducted the discussion, we have no doubt that all the questions are presented with clearness and ability. The book is handsomely printed, and will be warmly received by the respective friends of the disputants.

- 22.—*The First Principles of Geology; Presenting the Science in its Physical and Moral Aspects, and exhibiting its application to the Arts and Mining, Agriculture and Engineering. With a Geological Map of the United States. By W. J. BARBEE, A. M., M. D., Member of the American Association for the Promotion of Science. For the use of High Schools and Colleges. Second Edition, enlarged and revised. Louisville, Ky.: John D. Morton & Co 16mo. pp. 523. 1868.*

We have only space to say that this is one of the best books of its kind we have seen. Every subject is presented so concisely, and yet so clearly, that the book may be said to be a fine illustration of the *multum in parvo*. We take pleasure in calling the attention of educators to this invaluable work, as it is really worthy of a much wider usefulness than it has yet attained.

- 23.—*Lamps, Pitchers, and Trumpets. Lectures on the Vocation of the Preacher. By EDWIN PAXTON HOOD. Second Series. New York: M. W. Dodd. 12mo. pp. 303. 1869.*

We have already noticed the first series of this work; this one discusses the pulpit of our age and times, illustrating it by various anecdotes, biographical and historical sketches, and giving examples of some of the leading preachers of the age in which we live. The work is not profound, but is eminently of a popular cast, and is full of interesting and profitable reading.

## FOREIGN LITERATURE.

## BOOKS.

- 24.—*Geschichte der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart. Xter Band. Geschichte der Juden von der dauernden Ansiedelung der Marranen in Holland (1618) bis zum Beginn der Mendelssohnischen Zeit (1760). Aus den Quellen neu bearbeitet. Von DR. H. GRÆTZ.* (History of the Jews from the Earliest Times down to the Present. Volume X. History of the Jews from the Permanent Settlement of the Marranos in Holland (1618) down to the Beginning of the Period of Mendelssohn (1760). Newly Elaborated from the Sources. By DR. H. GRÆTZ.) Leipzig. 1868. 8vo. pp. 438. Notes and Index cxxxvi.

*The History of the Jews, from the Earliest Period down to Modern Times. By HENRY HART MILMAN, D. D.* Reprinted from the Newly Revised and Corrected London Edition. In Three Volumes. New York: W. J. Widdleton. 8vo. pp. 509, 497, 479.

THE indications at the present day are that we shall have to begin to study the history of Judaism anew. There is a movement now going on within the Jewish Church which can not fail to attract the attention not only of scholars, but of the general reading public, to the more careful study of the peculiar intellectual and spiritual character and life of this most remarkable people. The vulgar opinion—and not very many, even among scholars, have risen above it—is that Judaism is dragging out a monotonous existence in history from mere persistence of certain peculiarities of race, that its real life long since died out, that it is only a “body of death,” waiting for permission to drop into the grave. The legend of the Wandering Jew, doomed to live on through the centuries, seeking death and never finding it, bearing about in his person the manifest judgment of God against all who despise and reject Christianity—this is but the poetic garb in which the ignorant prejudice of the ages appears. There never was a greater absurdity than to suppose that the truth of Christianity is inconsistent with the continuance of Judaism as a vital factor in history after the establishment of the new dispensation. Does the fact that men still continue to reap with sickles disprove the reaping-machine, or the fact that the German peasant still yokes his cow to the plow, and fulfills with it his mission, prove that the steam-plow on our Western prairies is not a step in advance? Why, then, all this anxiety, if we are satisfied that we have the steam-plow and the reaping-machine? Why can we not admit, with the utmost equanimity, the great progress that has been made in the construction of sickles and ordinary plows?

But, to drop the metaphor, we must admit, whether we will or not, that



Judaism is any thing but dead. We must admit that it is capable of development, progress, for it has proved itself, and is every day proving itself, to be so; and, while we can not help noticing this progress, we can not but rejoice at it also. A single example, among the many that might be cited, will illustrate what we mean. What good Christian can help rejoicing at the wonderful advance manifest in the spirit in which the most enlightened Jews of the present day treat the history of the founder of Christianity? What a chasm there is between the spirit of the author of the *Sepher Toldoth Jeshua* and that of such men as Jost, Grætz, Geiger, and Dr. Wise! Though we may differ *toto celo*—as the editors of this Review certainly do—from the conclusions to which these scholars come, we can not refuse to acknowledge the step they have taken in advance of former ages. It may well be questioned whether the reforms which modern Judaism is undertaking in its doctrine and ritual will result in bringing this remnant of the ancient people of God into the Christian fold; but, while we may deplore the fact that there is little probability of such a consummation, we can not help regarding their movements with more than ordinary interest. It is evident that this interest is growing among the lookers-on. It will naturally lead many to study the history of Judaism who never studied it before, and will take many a one back to studies he had laid aside.

We are, therefore, glad to be reminded, and to remind others, of the existence of such an excellent manual in the English language as Dr. Milman's history, the last and greatly improved edition of which has been so handsomely reprinted in this country. Milman was, in every way, an exemplary writer. Chaste in style, careful in statement, tolerant of those who differed with him, conscientious in confessing the limits of his learning and in acknowledging his indebtedness to others, no one can read his books without benefit. Contact with such a mind always leaves a grateful impression. It humanizes even where it does not inform. To us there are very serious defects in his history of the Jews, especially in the second volume; but it fills a place in English literature of which it will not be easy to deprive it. The post-Biblical history of the Jews, although it occupies about half of Milman's work, is meagerly treated. The material is too extensive to be compressed into such narrow space and still preserve enough of detail to gratify those who care for more than an epitome.

The work of Dr. Grætz, on the other hand, whatever else may be said of it, can not be accused of too great brevity. The tenth volume only brings us down to the opening of the Mendelssohnian era, and it will, therefore, require at least two more volumes to complete it. It may be a matter of surprise to some that the work is still acephalous. It begins with the third volume, the first and second never having been printed. But this is nothing new or strange. All the more important modern historians of Judaism have

begun with the post-Biblical period. The only exception that occurs to us just now is the "History of the Israelitish Nation," by Dr. Wise. There is an evident indisposition on the part of modern Jewish scholars to meddle with this branch of the subject, which throws a rather curious light on the present state of opinion among them. Whether, after Grætz has brought his work down to the present time, he will return and give us the beginning, is, judging from appearances, somewhat questionable.

Concerning what he has already given us, the judgment of his fellow-believers is much divided. Among those capable of estimating the value of such a work some are loud in praise, while others see much to find fault with and to blame. The opinion of the latter party is so tersely and excellently summed up by Dr. Bernhard Felsenthal, a scholar as able as he is modest and retiring, that we give our readers the benefit of a translation of it. In a lecture on "Jewish Schools in America," in which he speaks of European universities where a thorough knowledge of Judaism may be obtained, he refers to our author as follows:

"He who is able to write such an extensive history of the Jews as Grætz has undertaken must doubtless be a teacher to whom his pupils will, in their after life, look back with grateful recollection. His voluminous history is, to be sure, not a work to which we can point as the ideal of a Jewish History; we even fear that it has made the appearance of a better work of this extent difficult, and, perhaps, impossible, for many years to come. Nevertheless we are willing to concede that the writer possesses signal erudition, and is indefatigable in the collection of material, and his pupils will be certain to receive much substantial knowledge from him and through him."

To such as are likely to find this judgment unjust and unjustifiable, Dr. Felsenthal replies by the following objections to Grætz's work:

1. "The pitiful style, and the manner of expression, which often really approaches vulgarity, are alone enough to show that Jewish History is a long way from having found in Grætz its Macaulay, nay, that it has not even found in him its Schlosser, or Sybel, or Mommsen. To give only a single example, let us turn to Vol. viii, p. 338, and there we are told that 'men and women decked themselves in eye-opening finery.' Such beauties of style we meet with by the hundred.

2. "The historical material is very badly grouped; what belongs together is torn asunder, and the whole produces the impression of historical shreds and patches loosely thrown together. Truly, writing history is an *art*, and one becomes more and more conscious of it when reading Grætz.

3. "The work is not free from material errors. The author has a peculiar penchant for nebulous hypotheses, the foundation for which is often only to be found in his own phantasy and caprice. In this respect, authorities of the first rank, such as Geiger, Steinschneider, Wiener, and others, have shown him to be often in error. Prof. Steinthal, on one occasion, called the really learned Heinrich Ewald 'whimsical.' With still greater justice this epithet might be applied to the work of Dr. Grætz.

4. "Far too much, almost exclusive, attention is paid to the external facts of history. Rarely is a glance cast at the inner life, at the spiritual forces fermenting in the depths, out of which come the external facts. One seeks in vain for information concerning the domestic life of the Jews, their forms of worship, schools, and such like. No attention even has been paid to the psychological character of the people.

5. "The work contains no genetic history of dogmas and usages, does not show how opinions, manners and customs, and ceremonies originated, and how they branched off and co-operated as causal forces in the formation and production of other phenomena. What Grætz says (Vol. viii, p. 387) of Zacuto, namely, that he had 'no notion of the spiritual movement in history,' is perfectly applicable to himself."

While, from our own reading of Grætz, we are bound to concur, for the most part, in this somewhat sweeping judgment, we are, nevertheless, bound to say that whoever consults him will find in him a mine of information on the general history of the Jewish people not readily accessible in the sources and not found in works of similar character.

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25.—*Bibel-Lexicon. Realwörterbuch zum Handgebrauch für Geistliche und Gemeindeglieder. In Verbindung mit vielen der namhaftesten Bibelforscher herausgegeben von PROF. DR. DANIEL SCHENKEL.* (Bible Lexicon. A Practical Manual for the use of Clergymen and Laymen. Edited, in connection with many of the most distinguished Biblical Critics, by PROF. DR. DANIEL SCHENKEL.) Vols. I and II. Leipzig. Cr. 8vo. pp. 623, 640. 1869.

FOR any one who wishes to become acquainted with what the modern rationalistic school of Germany regards as the results of Biblical criticism, without going through with the works themselves, which it would take almost a life-time to do, this Bible Lexicon will be a most excellent compendium, and, as such, we welcome it to an honorable place in literature. Not fearing that our own position will be misunderstood, we feel the more at liberty in noticing the appearance of this work, to call attention to a lamentable fact in the history of theological learning in this country and in Great Britain. There is almost endless denunciation of what is called "German Rationalism," but there seems to be no disposition to enable the reader to judge for himself whether the denunciation is just. A notable instance will illustrate what we mean. Messrs. T. and T. Clark, of Edinburgh, have done, and are still doing, all students of theology good service by the publication of their "Foreign Theological Library," and we should certainly be the last persons to detract from their well-deserved reputation. But we think they might have done a still greater service, and greatly added to that reputation, if, in the works selected for translation, they had pursued a more liberal policy. Any one familiar with the theological literature of Germany for the last thirty-five years, who glances at their list of books, can not fail to see that it is a one-sided collection. It swarms with works written directly, or indirectly, in opposition to the various schools of Rationalism, but there is not one of the books written by the great heterodox authors on the catalogue. Hengstenburg, Olshausen, Häverník, Stier, Keil, Kurtz, Ebrard, Lange, Dörner, Osterzee, and the like, are names of frequent occurrence; but you look in vain for Baur, De Wette, Hitzig, Zeller, Credner, Hilgenfeld, Volkmar,

Holtzmann, Schwegler, Köstlin, Knobel, Schenkel, or Strauss, although these authors are constantly combated in the works selected. Men are constantly saying that "the truth has nothing to lose by investigation;" that it always "shines brighter after every attempt to extinguish it;" but by their actions they are continually betraying a secret fear that these fine speeches correspond to no reality. Why be afraid to put, for example, Schwegler's "*Nach-apostolisches Zeitalter*," and Baur's "*Christenthum der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*," into the hands of the student if we are sure that, poison though they be, we have only to give the antidote at the same time in Lechler or Ritschl? Of what use are mere *ex parte* Histories of Rationalism? What satisfaction can they give to the mind that is not satisfied with the say-so of another? Their utility is certainly very small, even when the authors are not only desirous, but able to give a faithful delineation of opinions not their own. When one or the other of these essentials is wanting, they are a positive nuisance, and do a thousand times more hurt than good.

We are ashamed to say it, but it is a fact nevertheless, that the ignorance of ninety-nine hundredths of Englishmen and Americans who presume to write and speak on "German Rationalism," is equaled only by their unscrupulousness and audacious impudence. How many of them have never read a line of the authors they make bold to criticise, and pretend to refute, except at second-hand! Thus it is that every new-fledged preacher, every half-fledged paragraphist, every theologaster, and every quack-doctor of divinity sets his quill, dipped in poisonous atrament, in rest, and, running a tilt at the nearest pig-sty, returns imagining he has slain the Erymanthian boar. The blunders which such men make in presuming to speak on subjects of which they are as ignorant as babes unborn, are disgraceful, and the ridicule of their scholarly opponents is richly deserved. We will give one instance of what translators may do. A few years ago Messrs. Clark published a translation of a part of Hagenbach's Church History under the title of "German Rationalism, in its Rise, Progress, and Decline," edited and translated by Rev. Wm. Leonard Gage, and Rev. J. H. W. Stuckenberg. Not satisfied with "editing and translating," these gentlemen have furnished an "introduction" to the book, which, as a monument of ignorance, impudence, and self-conceit, is without its counterpart anywhere in the republic of letters. Here we have men whose knowledge of history is so exhaustive that they make Aristotle the predecessor of Plato, telling us that "Plato did not build on Aristotle, but on an entirely different foundation"—whose philosophical acumen is so enormous that they can discover no connecting link between the speculations of the great masters of Greek philosophy, nor any between Leibnitz and those who went before and those who came after him—who apparently have not the remotest perception of the bearings of any philosophical problem whatever, and who yet think themselves thoroughly com-

petent to pronounce judgment on such thinkers as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. It is a burning shame that such men are recognized as champions of the cause of Biblical Christianity. To us it seems time to advocate and to adopt a new policy. Let us encourage our scholars to become acquainted with the enemy himself, instead of with mere descriptions of him; they will then be prepared to grapple with realities instead of, as is too often now the case, wasting their strength in demolishing men of straw. As a work, by means of which they could "orient" themselves with ease, we should be glad to see a translation, by some competent hand, of Schenkel's Bible Lexicon.

#### REVIEWS AND MAGAZINES.

1.—*Fahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie.* Gotha, 1869, 4tes Heft. 1870, 1tes Heft.

THE articles in the first of the above numbers of the "Year Books for German Theology" are as follows: "The Theological Argument, a contribution to Theological Logic," by C. F. Jæger; "The Christology of John the Baptist," by Prof. Dr. Woldemar Schmidt; "Heathen and Jewish Legends Concerning the Destruction and Renewal of the World, and their Relation to the Scriptural Doctrine," by Dr. M. Schenkel; "A Reply to Kœstlin's Studies on the Moral Law," by Dr. Palmer; "The Eschatological Discourse of Jesus, Matt. xxiv, with its Parallels," by Dr. Kienlen; together with a large number of critical notices of works which have recently appeared in the departments of Theology and Philosophy.

The article of Dr. Schenkel (not of Heidelberg) is one of more than ordinary interest, and is an exceedingly valuable contribution to comparative theology. We give the conclusion as communicating the results at which the author arrives in the course of his investigation:

"In regard to these legends concerning the destruction of the world and the renewal thereof, we may consider the following as established. In the first place, they are an inheritance which heathenism brought down from the primeval period, dying echoes of a yearning every-where felt among men in consequence of their common origin in one paternal home. Although we have in the first chapters of Genesis no prophecy to that effect, yet it is certain that the hope of this final catastrophe awoke, as it were, spontaneously in the human soul with the curse that fell upon Nature, and again with the prophecy of Him who should come to bruise the Serpent's head, and to restore the world; so that it already existed when the definite prophecy of Scripture was added. Nor is this difficult to explain. The future restorer was regarded from the very beginning, not merely as Redeemer of mankind, as Savior of the Spirit, but generally as *Redeemer of the world*, because the consequences of sin appeared not merely spiritually and in man, but also bodily and in the whole creation. Now, when heathenism found its birthplace amid the confusion of Babel, the Noachian religion entered upon, as Schelling says, the metamorphosis of the mythological process. In this metamorphosis essential elements and fundamental presentiments could not but be retained. Therefore the key-notes of the story of Creation, of Paradise, the Fall, the Deluge, the Building of the Tower of Babel, the interference of Celestial Spirits, have been preserved in all heathen nations, often even to the very names of the Bible. Now, if

the remembrance of the great events of the primeval age exists in all nations, and most clearly in the religion of their remotest period; if in all their cults the idea of the necessity of a reconciliation of mankind with the Deity through sacrifice exists; why may they not, on the other hand, have brought away the hope that a time would come when this earth would no longer be a place of mutual slaughter and destruction, a vale of tears and lamentation? The more oblivious they became of the paternal home, and the deeper they sank into the slough of heathenism, the more this hope and those remembrances were mixed with Pagan superstition. One thing, in particular, disappears: the consciousness that sin was the corruption of the world, and that, without annihilation of sin, the renewal of the world was impossible. But a presentiment remained, and passed, as legend, from mouth to mouth. Furthermore, in explanation of these myths of the end of the world, it must be remembered that it is repeatedly admitted in the Scripture that even the heathen have a remnant of the Divine light; as, for example, Romans i, 19; Acts xiv, 16, 17; xvii, 23; xxvii, 28. The Logos, it may be said with the Alexandrians, from the foundation of the world the mediator between God and the world, cast rays of his light even into heathendom; and what is true in all mythical and philosophical speculations is, in the last analysis, a scintillation of that light which shone into the darkness before it descended as the Word made flesh. Here lies the truth of that philosophical proposition that the development of mythology marks, in reality, the developmental phases of the self-positing Deity in consciousness. As a man in a dream, or in a state of somnambulism, can not, by an act of will, call up other images than those which are, in reality, presented to his mind, so mythology formed itself, with psychological necessity, not as a disconnected, but as a consecutive, connected dream; and, therefore, a vague seeking for truth (*ψηλαφάν*) must show itself in this dream, as Socrates himself, in the *Phædo*, compares his lisping of the future beyond the grave with the song of the dying swan. Thus, then, although there is a heaven-wide difference between Christianity and heathenism, there are yet points where they touch each other—where, as it is expressed in the beautiful title of the book by Mucius Pansa (*osculum religionis Christianæ et ethnica*), they kiss each other. And, although the mythology of the heathen peoples rises before us like an enigmatical dream-fabric, still it is not, any more than profane history, without some relation to the advent of Him who appeared in 'the fullness of time,' and who was more than the Pythia, the sibyls, more than seer and poet—it is a marvelous dream-prophecy. Christianity, with its revelation, is undoubtedly something new that God has put into the world, but it is not new in the sense that it does away with what is true in the heathen religions, their reminiscences, and hopes—not new in the sense that it leaves the natural religion of the conscience unnoticed. What need, therefore, of surprise that an idea of Christianity is to be found in heathenism, or that an idea of heathenism is present, in a purified form, in Christianity! Here, verily, we need only rightly to understand and to apply the beautiful words of Hammam: 'If one were to separate, with Pharisaical criticism, all Pagan and Jewish elements from Christianity, just as much would remain as of our body after a similar metaphysico-chemical process, namely, a material nothing or a spiritual something. We are, therefore, far from quarreling with what is Pagan in Christianity, and from regarding such ideas only as a remnant of heathen superstition, which Christianity could not overcome; we rejoice, rather, at these adumbrations of Scripture prophecy from ancient times. Just this shadowing forth in the pre-Christian period is a strong testimony for Biblical prophecy on this point. What Paganism hoped for, what its poets dreamed of, what its philosophers speculated about, has been fulfilled in Christ. But, nevertheless, we are very far from wishing, with ancient and modern Gnostic systems, to comprehend the three religions—heathenism, Judaism, and Christianity—as of *one* piece, regarding heathenism as the point of departure for both the others. The Pagan *mythus* has undoubtedly an objective, mysterious, other than merely poetical origin; but there is, nevertheless, a fundamental difference between myth and Divine revelation. The former is the vague product of the world-spirit, of longing remembrance, and dreaming presentiment; the latter the product of the Holy Spirit. Thus, then, in spite of all agreement, there is a prodigious difference between the Pagan presentiment of the end of the world and the renewal of it, and Christian prophecy in regard to it. On this point only a few words more.



"In the first place, I call attention to the fact that, particularly in classical heathenism, the hope of a renewal of the world recedes, while in Scripture-prophecy just this is prominent. The tragic-elegiac trait, peculiar both to the cheerful Greeks and to the proud Romans, led them to occupy themselves more with this tragical destruction of the universe. Again, where the hope of a return of the golden age appears, it is, like the reminiscence of Paradise, eminently sensuous, degenerating, with the Oriental peoples, into the fantastic. Furthermore, the knowledge is wanting that the renewal must begin with the microcosm, spiritually, before it can become visibly and bodily manifest in the macrocosm. Still further, according to the heathen view, it by no means takes place as a redemptive act, through the grace of God. Fate brings it about, and the world reproduces itself. Of that which is absolutely new in Christianity—namely, that Christ's death and resurrection are the ground of the resurrection of man and of the universe—there is, of course, not the slightest trace. Finally, heathenism does not rise above the doctrine of the return of the same world, and a recurring cycle of things (*κυκλῆϊς πάντα πίπτει*). The beautiful hope of Scripture, of an earth void of suffering and sin, and a new heaven, is unknown to it. Cicero says, *Idem ornatus oritur*. Seneca avers that even man who is born then will soon lose again his innocence. In the fourth eclogue of Virgil we hear of the same wars as of old: *erunt etiam altera bella atque iterum ad Trojam magnus mittetur Achilles*; the same deeds of shame, such as the sentence of the innocent Socrates, occur again. This world, therefore, according to heathen opinion, never really passes away, but only through an eternal mutation. But Biblical prophecy posits something absolutely new, combines with this catastrophe the last judgment and the end of the world's history. In heathenism there is a continual repetition of the history of the world. It is an eternal comfortless monotony. Hence Philo justly remarks that the Stoics look upon God as a boy, who, playing on the shore, builds hills of sand, and then destroys them again with his own hands. How comforting, how grand, is the prophecy of the Bible in the sentence, 'Old things are passed away, all things are new,' compared with the presentiment which, even here, can not rise above the course of this world! Thus, notwithstanding the harmony, there is a difference, and the remark of Basilus (*Homil.*, 3 *Hexaem.*, f. 16) is just, that the Christian view surpasses the heathen as the beauty of chaste women surpasses that of harlots; or, as Scripture expresses it (Psalm cxlvii, 19, 20), 'God sheweth his Word unto Jacob, his statutes and his judgments unto Israel; he hath not dealt so with any nation, and his judgments they have not known them.' Here we must beware of all syncretism. It was manifestly a mistake of the fathers, that, with the good intention of defending the doctrines of Christianity, they pointed merely to the similarity, but not to the dissimilarity, of Christian and heathen prophecy.

"But, nevertheless, there remains this remarkable testimony from Paganism—presentiment with the heathen, prophecy among the Jews, provisional fulfillment and beginning in the resurrection of the Lord—all this forms a grand, continuous chain. It must not be said that, because there is poetic creation in the ancient myths, the doctrine of Scripture is also a poetic creation; but, rather, that there was this poetic creation in the earliest times, because Scripture is the fulfillment thereof. The Apostles Judaize, for the New Testament is the crown and blossom of the Old; the Apostles Hellenize, for the mass of the heathen are still the yearning son in a foreign country, full of homesickness and hope."

The January number also contains a series of interesting articles and reviews, among them the following: "Thoughts and Remarks concerning the Objective Character of Exegesis," by Dr. Palmer; "The Divine Image in Man," by Wilhelm Engelhardt; "The New Speculative Christianity," by J. P. Romang; "The Question concerning the Restitution of all Things," by Carl Schmid. Dr. Palmer's remarks might be read with profit by many an over-confident commentator, who first interprets his dogmatic notions into the Bible, and afterward uses the tortured passages to confirm his creed.

The result of the Rev. Mr. Engelhardt's learned and interesting article is contained in the following paragraph:

"The divine image, in which man was created, does not consist in his personality, the constituents of which are life, self-consciousness, and self-determination. Personality forms rather the substratum or basis for the divine image, and so essentially belongs to human nature that without it man would cease to be man—would sink back into the purely animal condition. The devil and his angels are also personal beings, capable of belief in one God (James ii, 19), but no one would assert that the image of God, Holy and Blessed, mirrors itself in them. If man's personality is assumed to be the divine image, it is then utterly impossible to say that he has undergone a change through sin, and that the lost image needs to be renewed in him. If, on the contrary, we hold fast to the fact that man has lost the divine image, we must assume this divine image to be love, or that direction of the individual life of man to God which is in complete communion with him, so that man, as regards both body and soul, intellect and will, feels himself at one with God, and the holy will of God fills out his whole life. It is only a necessary consequence of this that man, thus constituted, standing in the normal relation to God, rules with God over the earth, and is, like him, immortal. What the Lord (John xvii, 21) desires as the goal of his redemptive acts, *iva πάντες ἐν ὧν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐν ὧν*, this was with the first parents the case."

The long article (not yet finished) on "The New Speculative Christianity," is an exhibition and review of the new work on Dogmatic Theology, by Prof. Dr. Biedermann, of the University of Zurich. The work itself, with which the present writer was familiarly acquainted, in all its parts, long before it was printed, is certainly a wonderful production. As a course of mental gymnastics, of the severest sort, it might be recommended to those whose heads are strong enough to bear it. But we can hardly recommend it as "profitable for doctrine"—its rationalism is of the most pronounced order.

2.—*Revue Chrétienne. Paris. Dix-septième année. Janvier, 1870.*

THERE are in the numbers for November and December, of last year, two highly interesting articles, by M. de Pressensé, on "The Present Crisis in the Reformed Church of France," containing a survey of French Protestantism from its origin down to 1865; but as they are to be supplemented by one or more articles, bringing the survey down to the present moment, we refrain from giving an account of them until the series is finished.

The principal paper in the January number is on "The First Ecumenical Council," by J. Pédézet. It is an historical sketch of the Council of Nicæa, at once charming and instructive; an article such as only Frenchmen are capable of writing. It concludes as follows:

"In comparing the Council of Nicæa with the Council of the Vatican, one may measure the progress of the authority of the Pope in the Church. At the beginning of the fourth century the Pope did not think himself responsible for the whole of Christendom, and Constantine would have been greatly astonished if any one had told him that the Bishop of Rome was the head of the Church, even in a higher degree than he himself was the head of the Empire. Constantine had no doubts on this matter; neither, apparently, had the Bishop of Rome, otherwise his conduct would be inexplicable. Would he not have protested against

this usurpation of his *role*, instead of submitting, like the least of the bishops, to the will of the Emperor? But for the latter the Council of Nicæa would never have been convoked; convoked, it would never have assembled; assembled, it would never have come to any thing. It must be emphatically repeated, it was not the Pope who convoked the first Ecumenical Council. As undeniable proofs we have not only the speech of the Emperor before the Council, and all the steps that preceded it, but the confession even of the Bishops; in their letter to the Churches they spoke of themselves as assembled 'by the grace of God and by the order of the most pious Emperor Constantine.' It was not the Pope who presided at the Council of Nicæa; it was probably Osius, as the friend and favorite of Constantine, and not as legate from Rome. The well-known legates of Pope Sylvester mingled, as to rank, with the Bishops. Finally, the assembly did not submit its decisions to the approbation of the Holy See before publishing them. Nobody required it, or thought of it. There was so little thought of universal rights, as attaching to the Bishop of Rome, that, in a celebrated canon, the rights of the Bishop of Alexandria were placed on a par with his. It is said, to be sure, that the Pope had a limited jurisdiction as Bishop, which did not exclude his having universal jurisdiction; but this is answering an objection by the objection itself. He who attempted to correct this canon understood it better. At the Council of Chalcedon one of the legates of Pope Leo ventured to read the following words, as added to the text of Nicæa: 'The Church of Rome has always had the Primacy.' This fraud did not succeed any better than that by which the canons of Nicæa were to be submitted to the approbation of the Holy See.

"These things might have happened thus at a later period; but the aristocratic form of church-government still prevailed. The monarchical form was in the line of progress; long centuries were necessary to achieve it. It is even said that it has not yet reached its goal, and that from being constitutional it must become absolute. This is the grave question submitted to the Council of Rome, and of which the fathers of Nicæa would have comprehended absolutely nothing. It would have been impossible for them to believe that a day would come when bishops would advise the Church to put all its liberties, and its whole destiny, within the power of a single man. If they had believed it they would have experienced a lively indignation. The Catholics can, if it seems good to them, place this crown upon their edifice, which will not be that of liberty; but they will then do well to close the book of history, and to disavow the first Ecumenical Council, which it was perhaps well to call to mind, as it alone suffices to condemn the new pretensions of Rome."

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3.—*Theologischer Jahresbericht; Viertes Quartalheft.* 1869. Wiesbaden. *Fourth Quarterly Number.* 1869.

NOTHING can give us a better idea of the immense activity of the German theological mind than these reports. Here is a good-sized octavo of 293 pages, giving us a notice of the products in this department of only three months, from October to December, 1868, in most cases the names of the works only being given. This would make a volume of 1172 pages, giving a report of the theological activity of Germany in one year only.

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*British Quarterlies and Blackwood's Magazine.* Republication. New York: The Leonard Scott Publishing Co.

THESE reviews occupy a place in literature which no other magazines aspire to fill. Each one has its peculiar merits, and when all are taken together, they furnish an amount of valuable literature which no man who

wishes to be well instructed in the great living questions of the age, can afford to be without.

*The Edinburgh Review*, for January, opens with an able article on "Mr. Froude's History of Queen Elizabeth," in which the historian is handled rather severely, though we think, in some instances, very justly. "John Calvin in Church and State" is another article of considerable interest, in which, as a governor, it is declared that "Calvin's little finger was thicker than the Pope's loins." Another notable article is the "Pre-Christian Cross;" and the number closes with an exhaustive article on "The Irish Land Question."

*The London Quarterly Review*, for January, is very able. "Mr. Lecky's History of European Morals" is reviewed at considerable length. Mr. Lecky's style, ingenuity, good tone, and feeling, are highly complimented; after which we are treated to the following estimate of the value of his book: "It has neither subtlety of analysis, nor exactness of thought; it is loose in its reasoning, inaccurate in its facts, and occasionally betrays an ignorance which takes one's breath away." Another article on "Papal Infallibility" is of special interest at this time.

*The Westminster Review* contains three very noticeable articles. "The Subjection of Women," "American Claims on England," and "Prostitution: Governmental Experiments in Controlling It." This last article is especially valuable, and contains an amount of facts and statistics that can not fail to throw much light upon an important subject. The literary notices of the *Westminster* are full and valuable.

*The North British Review* is always able. The January number opens with an article on "Babylonian and Assyrian Libraries," which is full of curious and interesting information. "The Origin of American States' Rights" will attract attention in this country, while "Autobiographies" will be relished by all classes of readers. Fifty pages, or more, are devoted to a discriminating review of "contemporary literature."

*Blackwood* for January, February, and March contains much of the old flavor, though the articles generally have too much of a local character to be interesting to American readers. The article in the March number on "The Antagonism of Race and Color; or, White, Red, Black, and Yellow in America," will excite attention in this country.